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Abstract
Computer systems are ubiquitous in most aspects of our daily lives, as such the
reliance of end users upon their correct and timely functioning is on the rise.
With technology advancement, the functionality of these systems is increasingly
being defined in software. On the other hand, feature sizes have drastically de-
creased, while feature density has increased. These hardware trends will keep
happening as technology continues to advance. Consequently, power supply
voltage is ever-decreasing and clock frequency and temperature hotspots are
increasing. This steady reduction of integration scales is increasing the sensi-
tivity of computer systems to different kinds of hardware faults. In particular,
the likelihood of a single high-energy ion to cause double bit upsets (DBUs,
due to its energy) or multiple bit upsets (MBUs, due to the incident angle) in-
stead of single bits upsets (SBUs) is increasing. Furthermore, the likelihood of
perturbations occurring in the logic circuits is also increasing. Owing to these
hardware trends it has been projected that computer systems will expose such
hardware faults to the software-level and accordingly the software is expected
to tolerate such perturbations to maintain correct operations, i.e., the software
needs to be dependable. Thus, defining and understanding the potential impact
of such faults is required to propose the right mechanisms to tolerate their oc-
currence. To ascertain that software is dependable, it is important to validate
the software system. This is achieved through the emulation of the type of
faults that are likely to occur in the field during execution of the system, and
through studying the effects of these faults on the system. Often, this validation
process is achieved through a technique called fault injection, that artificially
perturbs the execution of the system through the emulation of hardware faults.
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Traditionally, the single bit-flip (SBF) model is used for emulating single event
upsets (SEUs) and single event transients (SETs) in dependability validation.
The model assumes that only an SEU or SET occurs during a single execution
of the system. However, with MBUs becoming more prominent, the accuracy of
the SBF model is limited. Hence, the need for including MBUs in software sys-
tem dependability validation. MBUs may occur as multiple bit errors (MBEs)
is a single location (memory word or register) or as single bits errors (SBEs) in
several locations. Likewise, they may occur as MBEs in several locations.
In the context of software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI), the injection of
MBUs in all variables is infeasible due to the exponential size of the fault space,
thereby making it necessary to carefully select those fault injection points that
maximises the probability of causing a failure. A fault space, is the set of all
possible fault under a given fault model. Consequently, research have started
looking at a more tractable model, double bit upsets (DBU) in the form of
double bit-flips within a single location, L1C2. However, with evidence of the
possibility of corruption occurring chip wide, the applicability and accuracy of
L1C2 is restricted. Following, this research focuses on MBUs occurring across
multiple locations whilst seeking to address the exponential fault space problem
associated with multiple fault injections.
In general, the thesis analyses the complexity of selecting efficient fault-injection
locations1 for injecting multiple MBUs. In particular, it formalises the problem
of multiple bit-flip injections and found that the problem is NP-complete. There
are various ways of addressing this complexity: (i) look for specific cases, (ii)
look for heuristic and/or (iii) weaken the problem specification.
Next, the thesis presents one approach for each of the aforementioned means of
addressing complexity:
• for the specific cases approach, the thesis presents a novel DBU fault
1injection points that would uncover vulnerabilities and/or cause system failure.
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model, that manifest as two single bit-flips across two locations. In par-
ticular, the research examines the relevance of the L2C1 fault model for
system validation. It is found that the L2C1 fault model induces failure
profile that is different from profiles induced by existing fault models.
• for the heuristic approach, the thesis uses an approach towards depen-
dency aware fault injection strategies to extend the L2C1 fault model and
the existing L1C2 fault model into LnCm (multiple location, multiple cor-
ruption) fault model, where n is the number of locations to target and
m the maximum number of corruptions to inject in a given location. It
proposes two heuristics to achieve this: first, select the set of potential
locations and then select the subset of variables within these locations,
and it examines the applicability of the proposed framework.
• for the weakening of the problem specification approach, the thesis further
refines the fault space and proposes a data mining approach to reduce the
cost of multiple fault injections campaigns (in terms of number of multiple
fault injections experiments performed). It presents an approach to refine
the multiple fault injection points by identifying a subset of these points,
whereby injection into this subset alone would be as efficient as injection
into the entire set.
These contributions are instrumental to advance multiple fault injections and
make it an effective and practical approach for software system validation.
iii
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Modern computer systems are now an inextricable part of the structure of mod-
ern societies. Part of these systems is often a computer control system, a mi-
crocontroller. A microcontroller is usually a self-contained system having a
processor, memory and peripherals and can be used as an embedded system.
Often microcontrollers are embedded in other machinery, such as automobiles,
telephones, appliances, and peripherals for computer systems. Embedded sys-
tems range from portable devices, such as tablets and digital watches, to large
stationary infrastructures, such as traffic lights, industrial process controllers
and largely complex systems like hybrid vehicles, Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(MRI) and avionics. Integral part of virtually all modern computer systems
are integrated circuits (ICs). An IC is an electronic circuits on small plate of
semiconductor device, usually silicon. As technology advances, IC scaling trans-
lates to a shrinkage in the feature size, reduction in supply voltage levels and
increase in feature density and operation frequency. A microprocessor is an IC,
or at most a few ICs, that contains all, or most of, the functions of a central
processing unit (CPU) of a computer; and it is sometimes called a logic chip.
Microprocessors are designed to perform binary, logic and arithmetic, operations
that employs the usage of small number-holding areas called registers. Typical
microprocessor operation include adding, subtracting, comparing two numbers,
and writing and reading numbers to and from one area to another. These oper-
ations are the result of a set of instructions that are part of the microprocessor
design. This set of instructions is called instruction set architecture (ISA), i.e.,
1
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the ISA provides commands to the processor, to tell it what it requires to do.
The ISA consist of different components which include (processor) registers. A
register is one of a small set of data and it may hold an instruction, a storage
address, or any kind of data (e.g., a bit sequence or individual characters). The
low cost of IC made it possible for modern computer systems to pervade our
everyday life. As such, this pervasive nature of these systems has increased our
reliance upon such systems to provide correct and timely service.
However, these current hardware trends has exacerbated the unreliability of
modern computer systems. As technology scales down, their sensitivity to their
environment increases, as a result the probabilities of transient faults and soft-
errors are increasing. A soft-error is an issue that causes a temporary condition
in memory that alters stored data in an unintended way. This means, emerging
technology are error prone to ionising radiation normally caused by low-energy
neutrons coming from cosmic rays and alpha particles coming from packaging
materials. Similarly, soft-error rate (SER) in logic circuits is increasing [111]
and now comparable to the SER in unprotected memory, and the probability
of multiple faults occurring in such devices is equally on the rise. Futhermore,
these emerging technology are projected, in the near-future, to cause computer
systems to expose hardware faults to the information-level, and to ensure that
the software performs as specified [24, 28, 98, 114, 138]. Similarly, it has been
demonstrated that many hardware faults manifest as multiple soft-errors [19].
All of these and the concomitant high cost associated with exclusively tolerating
such faults at the hardware-level necessitate the design of software error resilient
mechanisms and evaluating them under such hardware faults.
The type of fault tolerance to adopt and how to implement it is directly related
and strongly dependent upon the underlying fault assumption. One of the
major issues of designing fault tolerant systems is ensuring such systems meets
their reliability requirements, that is, validating them. This is usually done
with respect to the inputs, i.e., class(es) of faults, they were designed to cope
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with [7, 124]. For a large part of applications, especially safety criical system,
it is important to ascertain the coveragw of the fault inection process. There
are other types of application that are not safety critical but may be prone
to dervice degradation as a result of MBU, e.g., an image processing software
rendering a blurry image. This motivates the need of multiple soft-errors model
for designing and evaluating fault tolerant software systems.
1.1 Motivations
Research has shown assumptions about the types of faults that impact a soft-
ware system and how they may affect the system are crucial in the design of a
fault tolerant software system. Thus, dictating the relevant fault tolerance to
implement. Similarly, such assumptions are relevant for the evaluation of the
efficacy of the implemented fault tolerance mechanisms. As such, the emergence
of multiple soft-errors and the eventuality of these errors increasing in the near
future limits the accuracy of the traditional single fault model assumed during
software dependability assessment. Similarly, the manifestation of soft-errors in
several locations, including in logic circuits, constricts the applicability of the
existing double faults model, emulating two soft-errors originating from a single
location, assumed during software system dependability evaluation. Following,
this motivates the need to define a multiple-locations multiple-corruptions fault
model, to emulate multiple soft-errors occurring in several points, during de-
pendable software assessment, which is the focus of the research presented in
this thesis.
However, to assume a multiple-locations multiple-corruptions fault model for
SWIFI three related issues arises; the problem of determining: (i) the injection
location, i.e where to inject, (ii) the injection time, i.e., when to inject, and (iii)
injection latency, i.e., how long to inject. The focus of the research presented
in this thesis is on the problem of selecting the injection location, i.e., selecting
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efficient injection points for multiple soft-error fault model. The contributions
made in this thesis towards selecting efficient injection points for multiple soft-
error are summarised in the next section and are based on the following thesis:
“There exists a computational feasible bits set to explore
under multiple bit-flip faults that will induce a wider fail-
ure profile.”
1.2 Thesis Contributions
In general, this thesis works to address the challenges associated with multiple
fault injection in terms of the type of faults to inject, where to inject them and
the cost of fault injection in terms of number of experiments to perform. Specif-
ically, this thesis contributes to the advancement of multiple fault injections
by:
• Examining the problem of selecting efficient fault injection locations (in
terms of inducing wider failure profile) in complex software and formalising
this complexity. The formalisation is achieved by applying static analysis
techniques and graph theory concepts on the software source or byte code.
To formalise the complexity of selecting these locations, the work split the
problem into two (i) injection location selection and (ii) target variable
selection over all possible locations. The work proves both problems to be
NP-complete.
• Proposing a novel fault model meant to be representative of emerging
transient hardware faults that are due to hardware scaling and that may
lead to multiple bit-flips in contrast to the single fault model traditionally
assumed. This research studies the influence of such faults once converted
into errors in software. The work extends the traditional model of sin-
gle faults to multiple faults. The multiple faults are modelled as single
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faults in combinations of several locations. The viability of the proposed
fault model for software system validation is demonstrated in an extensive
experimental fault injection analysis (more than 17 million individual ex-
periments in thirteen embedded software modules). The research shows
that, the novel fault model uncovers more vulnerabilities than the tradi-
tional single fault model, and causes more severe failures than a variant
existing multiple fault model.
• Proposing an approach for selecting efficient fault injection (variable) lo-
cations in complex software, which take into account the relationship be-
tween program variables or states. The methodology is contrived to dis-
cern key variables for multiple-bits fault injections. The identification is
done by applying static analysis techniques and graph theory concepts on
the software source or byte code. To determine these locations, it pro-
vides two heuristic, the first to identify potential injection locations and
the second, to identify minimal set of variables (in the potential injection
location) to target. Further, this framework yields the multiple-locations
multiple-corruptions fault model, LnCm. The work has also demonstrated
the applicability of the framework and the validity of the LnCm fault model
on several case studies.
• Proposing and evaluating an approach to refine the faultload for multiple-
bits fault injections by selecting a subset of fault injection points. This
filtering is essential to reduce the fault space and cost (in terms of number)
of multiple fault injection campaigns in embedded software modules. The
proposed methodology is base on classification algorithms. In addition
to the key bits identification, the methodology shows that fault injection
done using these subset of key bits achieves similar efficiency as those done
exhaustively with the entire set of bits.
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1.3 Thesis Structure
This chapter has detailed the main motivations, contributions and thesis of the
research to be presented in this thesis. The remainder of the thhesis will be
structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides basic dependability and fault tolerance validation concepts,
principles and terminology that are central to the work presented in this disser-
tation. This account includes an overview of dependability attributes, threats
and means, as well as discussion of fault assumptions and fault injection analy-
sis, and the role they play in the design and assessment of fault tolerant software
systems.
Chapter 3 describes the models under which the contributions made in this
thesis have been developed, including details of the assumed model of the soft-
ware systems, the fault models under which software dependability validation
was considered and description of the fault injection tool and target programs
adopted in the dependability evaluations.
Chapter 4 states the problem statements and provides a roadmap to the re-
search presented in this thesis. The chapter elaborates on the potential problems
of multiple fault injections addressed by the work presented in this thesis and
maps this to the thesis contributions.
Chapter 5 analyses the complexity associated with the selection of efficient
injection locations for injecting multiple soft-errors. Further, it formalises this
complexity as two sub-problems and proves both problems to be NP-complete.
The complexity is analysed in order to discover whether systematically obtaining
an efficient tractable fault space for multiple soft-errors injections is possible.
Chapter 6 presents an empirical assessment of the limitations of the traditional
single and current multiple fault models emulating software errors due single and
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multiple hardware transient faults respectively, and proposes a variant multiple
fault model for improving fault representativeness during dependable software
validation. In addition, the chapter analyses the influence of the proposed fault
model on software execution. To keep the fault injection experiments tractable,
only double faults are considered.
Chapter 7 develops an approach for the careful selection of fault injection lo-
cations for each of the two associated problems presented in Chapter 5. The
approach also considers the observations made in Chapter 6 to systematically
identify injection locations for the LnCm fault model.The approach is proposed
in order to assist in streamlining the exponential fault space associated with
multiple-soft-error injections with the goal to reveal as many software vulner-
abilities as possibles. Following its development, the proposed approach is ap-
plied and the efficiency of the selected target variables in terms of uncovered
vulnerabilities is measured.
Chapter 8 focuses on narrowing down the fault space for multiple soft-error
injections. As such, it proposes an approach that applies data mining tech-
niques to datasets obtained during multiple fault injection analysis. Following
its development, the proposed approach is applied and the injection efficiency
of the selected injection points is demonstrated.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with final remarks, summary of the research
contributions and indication of applications area and future research directions.
CHAPTER 2
(Software) Dependability Concepts and Terminology
The prevalence of modern computer systems in all aspect of our daily lives,
from consumer-oriented systems, such as automobiles and mobile phones, to
high-end systems, such as nuclear power-plants and aircrafts etc, has prompted
the increase in our dependence on such systems to render correct and timely
service. Further, as technology advances, there is a concomitant increase of
system functionality being defined in software and rise in frequency of faults
and errors impacting these systems. Hence, it becomes crucial that software be
dependable. In order to give an appropriate and consistent context presented
in this thesis, this chapter describes and introduces the fundamentals and ter-
minology in software dependability in general and topics that will be developed
in subsequent chapters in particular.
2.1 The Fundamentals of Dependability
The fundamental concepts of dependability used throughout this disseration are
adopted directly from the comprehensive compilation of concepts made by [7].
The dependability of a system is defined as the ability of the system to deliver
service that can justifiably be trusted. The ability to avoid service failures
that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable is also defined as
dependability of a system. Dependability of a system is characterised by a set
of attributes, impaired by a set of threats and imparted by a set of means.
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Dependability Threats
Means
Attributes
Faults
Errors
Failures
Availability
Reliability
Safety
Confidentiality
Integrity
Maintainability
Fault Prevention
Fault Tolerance
Fault Removal
Fault Forecasting
Figure 2.1: Dependability tree. [7]
2.1.1 Dependability Attributes
The dependability of a given system is characterised and profiled by the de-
pendability attributes. These attributes are as follows:
Availability: The probability that the system is operational and providing its
service at any given time is measured by availability. The higher the availability,
the higher the likelihood that the system provides its service at the time that
the service is requested. Or formally, availability is defined as a function of
time representing the probability a service provided by a computer system is
operating correctly and able to perform its designated function at a given time.
Three frequently used availability terms are explained as follows:
Inherent availability, as seen by maintenance personnel, (excludes preventive
maintenance outages, supply delays, and administrative delays) is defined as in
Equation 2.1:
Ai =
MTTF
MTTF + MTTR
(2.1)
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where MTTF and MTTR represents the mean time to failure and the mean
time to repair for the service respectively.
Achieved availability, as seen by the maintenance department, (includes both
corrective and preventive maintenance but does not include supply delays and
administrative delays) is defined as in Equation 2.2:
Aa =
MTBF
MTBF + MDT
(2.2)
where MTBF and MDT represents the mean time between failure and the mean
down time for the service respectively.
Operational availability, as seen by the user, is defined as in Equation 2.3:
Ao =
uptime
operatingcycle
(2.3)
where operating cycle is the overall time period of operation being investigated.
Reliability: The probability that a system provides the service it was originally
set to provide during a finite period of time is measured by reliability. This
means that the higher the reliability, the higher the likelihood that the response
given by a system is correct. Reliability is concerned with reducing the frequency
of failures over a time interval and is a measure of the probability for failure-free
operation during a given interval, i.e., it is a measure of success for a failure free
operation. It is often expressed as in Equation 2.4:
R(t) = exp−
t
MTTF = 1 − exp−λt (2.4)
where λ is constant failure rate.
Safety: The extent to which a system provides a service that is safe to its
environment, i.e., it does not endanger the user, is measured by safety [7]. The
safety measure may be higher than the reliability measure, in the sense that
2.1. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF DEPENDABILITY 11
the system may provide a service which was not originally intended, and this
service may still be safe for users.
Confidentiality: The extent to which a system will allow those without suf-
ficient privilege to obtain information that should not be made available is
measured by confidentiality. The higher the confidentiality the higher the prob-
ability that it will not disclose undue information to non-authorised entities.
Integrity: The extent to which a system prevents alterations by unauthorised
entity, or ensures an unauthorised entity does not prevent authorised modifi-
cations (including causing information interruption) by authorised entities is
measured by integrity. Integrity is the absence of improper system alteration.
The higher the integrity measure the higher the probability that a system will
ensure that there is absence of improper systems alterations, with respect to
withholding, modification and deletion of information.
Maintability: Maintainability is the measure of how long it takes to achieve
(in terms of ease and speed) to restore outages to services provided by a sys-
tem. Maintainability is the ability for a process to undergo modifications and
repairs. The maintainability measurement is often the MTTR and a limit for
the maximum repair time. Formally, maintainability is defined as a function of
time representing the probability that a failed computer system will be repaired
in t time or less. The maintainability attribute is conventionally denoted by
M(t). Where a constant rate of repair, µ, can be assumed, the maintainability
of a system can be estimated by Equation 2.5:
M(t) = 1 − exp− tMTTR = 1 − exp−µt (2.5)
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2.1.2 Dependability Threats
During the development and operation of a dependable system, events may
occur that may impair the trustworthiness of the system by introducing faults
into the system. A fault is a defect in system, i.e., a fault may be a software
bug or effect of hardware fault. A system is said to provide correct service when
the service is originally the one it set to provide, i.e., the service it provides
complies with its functional specification. On the contrary, a system is said to
provide incorrect service, i.e., a system failure is said to have occurred, when
the service it provides differs from its functional specification. Typically, such
system failure occurs due to the presence of threats to dependability. As shown
in Figure 2.1, dependability threats are faults, errors and failures. However,
the mere presence of faults is not sufficient to impair the dependability of the
a system. A fault must become active, i.e., the part of the system the fault
is located must be referenced in some way during the system execution. The
activation of a fault may result in an error occurring. An error is a discrepancy
between the intended behaviour of a system and its actual behaviour inside the
system boundary, i.e., an error is erroneous state in the system. An active error
may cause other errors to occur in the system. This process in called error
propagation. Error propagation may result in system failure by preventing the
system from providing correct services. That is failure occurs when error(s)
propagate beyond the system boundary. i.e., if the error(s) become visible to
the environment of the system.
The fault-error-failure error causality cycle is known as the fundamental chain
an it is represented as follows:
fault → error → failure
The fundamental chain is recursive in nature. Thus what can be seen as a failure
at one level of the system can be seen as a fault on the next level. Therefore,
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these repetitive sequence leads to the definition extended chains of causality to
represent the error propagation process, such as the following causality chain:
· · · fault activation−−−−−−−→ error propagation−−−−−−−−→ failure causation−−−−−−→ fault · · ·
A fundamental capability of any dependable system is to limit the extent of
error propagation. Given the nature of the fundamental chain it is possible to
develop means to break these chains and thereby increase the dependability of
a system.
2.1.3 Type of Faults
A fault can be classified into a hardware or a software fault according to where
it occurs. A hardware fault is classified into a permanent, an intermittent, or
a transient fault as indicated by the extent of its existence in a system (see
Figure 2.2). This thesis focuses on hardware faults, which do not originate
due to hardware damage and impact the execution flow of software and/or
program. A permanent fault (stuck-at, stuck-open, and bridging faults) remains
permanently in the system, an intermittent fault introduces repetitive broken
data in a specific place because of hardware damage and a transient fault appears
and disappears within a brief time. Permanent and intermittent faults occur
because of inaccurate specifications, implementation mistakes, or component
defects. A transient fault usually occurs because of internal and external noise.
The data errors that result from a hardware fault include hard- and soft-errors.
A hard-error causes data corruption as a result of permanent and intermittent
faults. A soft-error causes data corruption because of transient faults resulting
from environmental disturbances, such as alpha particles or neutrons. As op-
posed to a hard error, a soft-error occurs under conditions where the device is
not damaged. A soft-error can be divided into single and multiple bit-flips. A
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Hardware	
Fault
Software	
Fault
Intermittent	
Fault
Permanent	
Fault
Transient	
Fault
Hard	Error Single	Bit-Flip
Event	
Upset
Soft	Error Multiple	Bit-Flips
Event	
Transient
Fault Data Error
Figure 2.2: An overview of fault and error terminology focused on the transient
hardware fault.
single bit-flip (SBF) consists of one bit-flip, and multiple bit-flips (MBF) consist
of several bit-flips. Further, a bit-flip can be categorised into an event upset or
an event transient, depending on where it manifests. An event upset manifests
in storage element, e.g., in the latch or flip-flop, whereas an event transient oc-
curs in combinational logic. Thus an SBF can be either be a Single Event Upset
(SEU) or a Single Event Transient (SET); and an MBF is either a Multiple
Event Upset (MEU) or a Multiple Event Transient (MET). It is common for
the bits in a data word to not be physically adjacent, but interleaved with bits
of other data words, i.e., bits in the same data word are physically number of
bits apart from each other. This means that when an n-bit MBU occur, it may
not affect bits in the same word. For it to translate into a data word MBU the
following two condition must be true: (i) at least two of the failing bits in the
MBU must belong to the same row, and (ii) the physical MBU must spread over
more than the interleaved space. This interleaving architecture, typically makes
physical MBUs manifest as data word SBUs [130]. For circuits protected with
Error Correction Codes (ECC), such physical MBUs do not necessarily affect
the performance of these circuits. Figure 2.3 shows an overview of MBU and
Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) bits interleaving relationship. This
thesis, thusly, focuses on MBUs that originate in the ISA registers (however, it
does not consider errors in registers holding instructions).
The soft-error rate (SER) is defined as the occurrence rate of a soft-error in a
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Figure 2.3: An overview of the relationshipship of an 8-bit MBU and a 3-bit
data word with an 8-bit interleave.
device. The number of failures-in-time (FIT) or the mean time between failures
(MTBF) are commonly used to express the SER.
In this thesis, an impactful error is considered to be those soft-errors that affect
the software behaviour. Figure 2.4 depicts an overview of impactful errors and
their propagation from the circuit level to the application level.
Circuit	Level
Architectural	Level
Operating	System	Level
Application	Level
Impactful Errors
Figure 2.4: Block diagram of propagation of soft-error impacting software.
2.1.4 Dependability Means
When developing dependable systems, there are a number of means by which de-
pendability can be achieved and analysed. As shown in Figure 2.1 and described
as follows, the four dependability means are fault prevention, fault tolerance,
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fault removal and fault forecasting:
Fault Prevention is the process of preventing faults being incorporated into
a system. Fault prevention techniques focus on hindering and obstructing the
occurrence, introduction and spread of faults. Established examples of such
techniques include modular software design, software development methodolo-
gies and process quality assurance.
Fault Tolerance is the process of putting mechanisms in place that will allow
a system to still deliver the required service in the presence of faults, although
that service may be at a degraded level. Generally, such fault tolerance tech-
niques focus on the recognition of an erroneous state in a system and restoring
a suitably correct state, or at least a safe system state, following the occurrence
of an error.
Fault Removal is the process of mitigating the number and seriousness of
faults in a system. Fault removal techniques focus on reducing the number,
likelihood of activation and wider consequences of faults in a computer system.
Fault removal is generally a three stage process, where these steps are valida-
tion, diagnosis and system correction. Particularly, the validation stage focus
on determining whether a system adheres to a set of defined properties, the
diagnosis stage focus on identifying faults, which prevent these properties from
being fulfilled and the system correction stage focus on modifying the system
to allow the defined properties to be fulfilled.
Fault Forecasting is the process of predicting likely faults so that they can
be removed or their effects can be circumvented. Fault forecasting techniques
focus primarily on estimating the number, likelihood of activation and wider
consequences of faults in a computer system. The fault forecasting process
typically involves the identification, classification and analysis of modes by which
a system can fail, as well as an evaluation of dependability attributes using
probabilistic and analytical approaches. Fault injection analysis is a common
2.2. FAULT TOLERANCE VALIDATION 17
technique in usage when attempting to establish dependability measures and
forecast fault proneness. Fault injection is a dependability validation approach
whereby the behaviour of a system to the artificial insertion of faults or errors
is analysed so that insights can be gained with respect to the dependability of
the system
The contributions made in this thesis are generally related to the areas of fault
tolerance and fault forecasting. In particular, the research presented in this
thesis is focuses on improving the fault tolerance and fault forecasting mecha-
nism dependability assessment and validation. More specifically, the research is
concerned with demonstrating that the dependability assessment and validation
process can be enhanced through the design of multiple fault model based on a
set of candidate variables and candidate bits.
2.2 Fault Tolerance Validation
Fault tolerance techniques are not equally effective. The measure of efficacy
of any given fault tolerance technique is called its coverage. The imperfections
of fault tolerance, i.e., the lack of fault tolerance coverage, constitute a dras-
tic impediment to the increase in dependability that can be achieved. Such
imperfections of fault tolerance arise due to either:
• development faults that affect the fault tolerance mechanisms with respect
to the fault assumptions specified during the development, the upshot of
which lack of error and fault handling coverage, defined with respect to
a class of errors or faults, (e.g., single errors, multiple errors etc), as the
conditional probability that the technique is effective, given that the errors
of faults have occurred,
• fault assumptions that are not representative of the fault that actually
occur in operation, i.e the fault assumptions differ from the faults really
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occurring in operation, resulting in a lack of fault assumption coverage,
that can in turn be due to either (i) lack of failure mode coverage, i.e.,
the assumption on how failure occurs and (ii) lack of failure independence
coverage, i.e., assuming components failure occur independently whereas
they have a common failure trigger and vice vera.
Figure 2.5 summarises the relationship of fault tolerance of coverage. Fault
tolerance coverage of a given technique is evaluated by means of validation
techniques with respect to the fault tolerance assumptions the technique design
is based on. There are several validation techniques, including formal methods,
fault injection, and dependability analysis. Validation usually takes place at the
end of the development cycle, and looks at the complete system as opposed to
verification, which focuses on smaller sub-systems. Verification is the process of
checking that the system conforms to its specification
Fault Tolerance 
Coverage
Error and Fault Handling
Coverage
Fault Assumption
Coverage
Failure Mode
Coverage
Failure Independence
Coverage
Figure 2.5: Overview of fault tolerance coverage [7].
2.2.1 Formal Method
Formal methods are concerned with the use of mathematical and logical tech-
niques to express, investigate, and analyse the specification, design, documen-
tation, and behaviour of both hardware and software. Formal methods are orig-
inally used as verification techniques, however, they are now being employed
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in validation of fault tolerance techniques. For example Ayache et al. [8] de-
fines a methodological framework applicable to the early life cycle phases of
fault-tolerant systems engineering. The framework focuses on the verification
of fault tolerance properties using model-based formalisms. Lecocke et al. [86]
describes an approach to fault tolerant design and implementation that uses a
formal model to automatically generate fault detection and response methods.
The approach is designed for resource-constrained embedded systems with high
reliability requirements such as manned or critical space assets. Fey et al. [44]
propose the use of formal methods to assess the robustness of a digital circuit
with respect to transient faults. The formal model uses a fixed bound in time
to cope with the complexity of the underlying sequential equivalence check.
2.2.2 Fault Injection
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, fault injection is the inten-
tional activation of faults by either hardware or software techniques to observe
the system operation under the effect of the fault. Fault injection is adopted
to evaluate the dependability of a system. Fault injection may be used to de-
termine vulnerable parts of a system in order to design, assess and improve
fault tolerant systems. The fault injection system interacts with the target sys-
tem for fault activation, process control, and fault analysis. Figure 2.6 depicts
fundamental fault injection workflow and Figure 2.7 summarises a basic fault
tolerance validation process. Fault injections techniques can be classified as
hardware-based, software-based, simulation-based and emulation-based. These
are briefly described in the following sections.
Hardware-Based Fault Injection
Hardware-implemented fault injection is also called physical fault injection be-
cause faults are actually injected into the physical hardware [5, 21, 46, 74].
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Figure 2.6: An overview of a basic fault injection environment.
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Figure 2.7: An overview of fault tolerance validation.
Hardware fault injection introduces a direct stimulus at the pins or socket. The
circuit is tested using the change in the operating power or temperature or the
external shocks that cause transient errors. The testing speed is fast owing to
the real-time fault injection structure. By directly changing the environment, a
wide range of circuits can be evaluated through these disturbances. However, its
processes are difficult to monitor and control because the exact moment when
a fault is injected by the disturbance is not known. A drawback of hardware-
based fault injection is there exists a possibility of damaging the target system
as actual circuits cannot be restored after testing.
Software-Based Fault Injection
Traditionally, software-based fault injection involves the modification of the soft-
ware executing on the system under analysis in order to provide the capabil-
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ity to modify the system state according to the programmer’s modelling view
of the system. This is done as a possible way to assess the consequences of
software bugs. However, software-based fault injection have been extended to
assess not just software bugs, but other faults that can impact the operation
of system at the application level. All types of faults may be injected, from
register and memory faults, to dropped or replicated network packets, to er-
roneous error conditions and flags to transient hardware faults. These faults
may be injected into simulations of complex systems where the interactions are
understood though not the details of implementation, or they may be injected
into operating systems to examine the effects. Fault injection is a widely used
technique in software dependability evaluation, e.g., [58, 73, 103, 156, 163]. The
work presented in this thesis falls under the area of SWIFI.
Simulation-based and Emulation-Based Fault Injection
Simulation-based fault injection is concerned with the construction of a simula-
tion model of the system under analysis, including a detailed simulation model of
the processor in use [29, 45, 95, 135, 145]. This means that the errors or failures
of the simulated system occur according to predetermined distribution. The
simulation models are designed using a hardware description language such as
the Very high speed integrated circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL).
Faults are injected into VHDL models of the design and activated by a set of
input patterns. Emulation-based fault injection are designed to cope with the
time limitations imposed by simulation and to take into account the effect due to
the circuit environment in the application, in system emulation using hardware
prototyping on FPGA-based logic emulation systems [20, 94].
2.2. FAULT TOLERANCE VALIDATION 22
Risk	Analysis
Hazard	Analysis
Causes
Mitigation	
Actions
Consequences
Risk	Reduction	
Strategies
Hazard
Safety	
Requirements
Figure 2.8: An overview of dependability analysis.
2.2.3 Dependability Analysis
Dependability analysis is the process identifying hazards and then proposing
methods that reduces the risk of the hazard occurring. Dependability is cate-
gorised into hazard analysis and risk analysis. Hazard analysis is the process
of recognising hazards that may arise from a system or its environment, doc-
umenting their unwanted consequences and analysing their potential causes.
Hazard analysis involves using guidelines to identify hazards, their root causes,
and possible countermeasures. Risk analysis takes hazard analysis further by
identifying the possible consequences of each hazard and their probability of oc-
curring. Dependability analysis is being used in the validation of fault-tolerant,
e.g., [116, 140, 153, 167, 168]. Figure 2.8 summarises the basic dependability
analysis workflow.
CHAPTER 3
System and Faults Models and Target Systems
To be able to perform dependable software validation, the software system model
along with fault model considered has to be specified. This chapter describes the
software model assumed in the development of the contributions made in this
thesis, and the fault models under which they were assessed. This chapter also
introduces all target systems together with their associated input set, system
failure modes, software system instrumentation procedures and dependability
validation techniques used to evaluate and illustrate the approaches presented
in this thesis.
3.1 System Model
This thesis considers modular software, i.e., software consisting of a number of
discrete software functions called modules, that interact to deliver the requisite
functionality. A module is considered as a generalised white-box, having possibly
multiple inputs and outputs and whose codebase is available.
Modules communicate with each other in some specified way using different
forms of signalling, such as, shared memory, parameter passing etc. A software
module performs computations using the inputs received on its input channels
to generate outputs, which are then placed on the requisite output channels. At
the lowest level, such a module may be a procedure or a function and a process at
the highest level. A software consists of such modules that interact via signals.
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Signals can originate (or end) from hardware or from another module. Such
type of software is common place nowadays, and can be seen in many different
application areas, such as embedded systems. In this thesis, henceforth, modules
is used interchagebly with software systems, unless otherwise specified, and a
software system is modelled as an extended control flow graph (extended-CFG).
A control flow graph (CFG) is a representation, using graph notation, of all
paths that might be traversed through a program during its execution. In a
CFG, a node in the graph represents a sequence of statements called basic
block (or block for short), i.e. a straight-line piece of code with branching only
allowed at the end. Directed edges are used to represent possible transfer of
control. There are, in most presentations, two specially designated blocks: the
entry block, through which control enters into the flow graph, and the exit block,
through which all control flow exits.
v	:=	3;	
w	:=	5;	
L1:	x	:=	v	+	w;	
y	:=	x	−	v;	
if(···)	goto L2;	
y	:=	v	−	w;
z	:=	z	−	2;	
if(···)	goto L3;	
L2:	w	:=	v	+	w;	z	:=	x	−	v;	
if(···)	goto L1;	
L3:	v	:=	w	+	y;	
w	:=	v	−	y;	
(a) Sample Program
† v	:=	3;	
w	:=	5;	
† L3:	v	:=	w	+	y;
w	:=	v	−	y;	
† L2:	w	:=	v	+	w;	
z	:=	x	−	v;	
if(···)	goto L1;	
† y	:=	v	−	w;
z	:=	z	−	2;	
if(···)	goto L3;	
† L1:	x	:=	v	+	w;	
y	:=	x	−	v;	
if(···)	goto L2;	
† = header
BB1
BB2
BB3
BB4
BB5
(b) Basic Blocks
Entry
BB1
BB2
BB3
BB4
BB5
Exit
(c) CFG
Figure 3.1: Example of basic blocks for a dummy program and its corresponding
CFG.
The first statement in a basic block is a header, the target of any branch is a
header, and the statement following any branch is a header. Thus each basic
block is consist of a header at the entry and the ensuing sequence of statements
between it and the next header. In a CFG, there exists a directed edge from
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basic-block1, BB1 to basic-block2, BB2, i.e BB1 −→ BB2, if: (i) there exist a
branch from the last statement in BB1 to the header of BB2 and/or (ii) BB1
does not end in an unconditional loop and it immediately precedes BB2. There
is at most one edge for any given direction between BB1 and BB2, i.e, not
more than one edge exists for BB1 −→ BB2. There is an edge From Entry
to the initial basic block, there is an edge from each final basic block to Exit.
Figure 3.1 shows a sample program code, and an overview of its basic blocks
and CFG.
In this thesis, an extended-CFG is obtained from its CFG by ensuring each node
does not contain a program variable that is depended upon another program
variable within the said node, i.e., no self-loop exists in any given block. In the
next section, an extended-CFG is formally defined.
3.1.1 Extended-CFG for a Program
An Extended CFG for a program P is a labeled weighted directed graph GP =
〈V, v0, A,W,Φ〉, where
• V : is a set of vertices, with each vertex v ∈ V representing a block in
P , and each block represents a sequence of consecutive instructions or
statements in P .
• v0: is the root vertex, representing the starting block in P . It has an
in-degree of 0.
• A: is a set of arcs (u, v), where u, v ∈ V . An arc exists between u and v
if execution of block u can directly lead to block u.
• W : is a function W : A → N, that defines a weight for each arc (u, v) in
GP . In this thesis, it is assumed that assume the weight to represent the
number of steps or statements of the blockv.
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• In a given block, whenever there is a data dependency between two vari-
ables, the block is split into two such that the dependency is across blocks.
Thus, there is no data dependency within a block. This is done based on
the assumption that error propagation occurs across blocks, rather than
within a block.
Extended-CFG under Multiple Soft-Error
The extended-CFG used for Multiple-bits errors have this additional property:
• Φ: is a function Φ : V → B, where B is a function that assigns a boolean
value to each vertex v ∈ V . The vertex is assigned a value 1 if it is a
potentially vulnerable block, 0 otherwise (details are provided in Chap-
ter 5.3).
Notation: The set of paths in G is denoted by ρG and the set of paths between
two vertices u, u′ ∈ V by ρu,u′G . Given a path ρ = u · v . . . v′ · u′, then ρˆ =
{a|a ∈ v . . . v′}. The length of a path ρ in G, denoted by Length(ρ), is given by∑
(u,v)∈ρW (u, v).
3.2 Fault Model
This thesis considers the transient hardware faults originating at the transistor
level, that ultimately impact on the software modules. As previously mentioned,
these faults are aggravated by current hardware trends. These faults impact
on the program state by altering the content of CPU registers and memory,
and through the process of error propagation causes errors [7] to exist in the
software system. These errors are usually mimicked by injecting bit-flip errors1
1In this thesis bit-flip errors are taken to mean the same as corruptions, and from this
point, both would be used interchangeably unless specified otherwise.
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in registers and memory. The general assumption is any number of bit-flip
errors may occur in any number of locations. This thesis considers single bit-
flips and multiple bit-flips errors occurring. As mentioned, this thesis focuses
on soft-errors in register locations only.
3.2.1 Single Fault
Traditionally a single fault assumption has been used for fault injection analysis.
This means in a given location a single bit is flipped in a single execution of
the program. Research has shown multiple bits errors 2 occurring in the field as
single-cell, single-row, single-column, multiple-rows, multiple-columns or chip-
wide errors [51, 97, 150]. This pinpoints the need for considering multiple-bits
errors in software dependable validation. This thesis adopts the Single Bit-Flip
or L1C1 fault model as baseline for evaluating the efficiency of the adopted
multiple-bits errors models.
3.2.2 Multiple Faults
In consideration of the potential of multiple soft-errors affecting the running
software, research have begun studying the impact of double-bits errors on soft-
ware for dependability evaluation [9]. In [163], the double-bits fault model has
also been shown to mimic the presence of software bugs. The mentioned research
focused on a version of double-bits errors occurring within a single location. In
this thesis, this fault model is modelled as two bits flipped within a single loca-
tion, and referred to as model as Double Bit-Flips or L1C2 (which is a specific
case of the LnCm fault model) . Lu et. al. [103] adopted the double-bits errors
to show the applicability of their fault injection tool. This thesis adopts the
L1C2 fault model to evaluate the viability of the proposed variant double-bits
models in terms of its ability to induce programs to fail differently. This thesis
2In this thesis bits errors is short for bit-flips errors.
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adopts a second pattern of double hardware faults occurring as single faults in
a pair of locations. This thesis models this fault model as double single bit-flip
errors in two different locations, and this is refered to as L2C1 (which is also a
specific case of the LnCm fault model). The thesis proposes this model in order
to ascertain the need to adopt it for the purposes of dependable software valida-
tion. The model assumes in any run of the program only two errors can occur,
as such it selects two locations and flip one bit in each. It should be mentioned
that the work presented in [103] tested the applicability of their fault injection
tool with both the L1C2 and L2C1 fault models, and their work post dates that
presented in [2] which serves as the basis of some of the work presented in this
thesis.
This thesis generalises the double faults model to allow multiple faults to be
introduced in a single run instead of two. This model assumes any number of
errors can occur in a single execution of a program, as such several locations
are selected and a minimum of a single bit is flipped in each location. This new
multiple faults model is referred to as Multiple Locations Multiple Multiple
Corruptions (LnCm, where n is the number of injection locations and m the
maximum number of faults to inject in each location) fault model.
From the extended-CFG perspective of a program, it means that (i) several
variables in a given block can be corrupted, (ii) several blocks can be corrupted,
with a single variable being corrupted in each block or (iii) several variables
being corrupted in several blocks of the program. As this thesis focuses on
capturing the impact of multiple hardware faults on a program, it is important
to (i) determine the location (block) where the fault will be injected and (ii)
determine the variables in which the faults will be injected into. At one extreme,
the entry block (root of the control flow graph) can be chosen and all variables
in that block being selected as target variables. At the other extreme, every
variable within every block can be target variables. However, the computational
cost of validation will be prohibitive.
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This thesis only evaluates LnCm having a maximum of four faults. That is,
in addition to the aforementioned double-bits errors, L1C2 and L2C1,the thesis
also assumes triple faults models, where (i) three bits are flipped in a single
location (L1C3) and (ii) three single bits are flipped in three different locations
(L3C1), and quadruple bits errors, where (i) fours bits are flipped in a single
location (L1C4), (ii) four single bits are flipped in four different locations (L4C1)
and (iii) double bits are flipped in a pair of locations (L2C2).
3.3 Target Systems
An overview of each target program used in this thesis is provided in following
sections. From this point onwards, program is used interchangeably with module
and software system (or system for short), unless it is otherwise stated.
3.3.1 Flight Control
Flight Control is a safety-critical system, Mathwork’s implementation of a flight
control system for the longitudinal motion of an aircraft [109]. First order
linear approximations of the aircraft and actuator behaviour are connected to
an analog flight control design that uses the pilot’s stick pitch command as the
set point for the aircraft’s pitch attitude and uses aircraft pitch angle and pitch
rate to determine commands. To perturb the system, a simplified Dryden wind
gust model is incorporated. Within the flight control system, two programs
were used for instrumentation:
• Derivatives: This program updates derivatives for the root system
• Step: This program updates the model step
The input data for these programs is a pilot frequency in rads/secs.
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3.3.2 SUSAN (Smallest Univalue Segment Assimilating -
Nucleus)
SUSAN is an image recognition package, developed for noise filtering and for
recognising corners and edges in Magnetic Resonance Image (MRI) of the brain [152].
SUSAN is available as a self-contained C program from [53]. SUSAN is also
available as a program in the automotive package of the MiBench suite [53]. It
is typical of a real world program that would be employed for a vision based qual-
ity assurance application. For example, it may be used for digitally processing
images to determine the position of edges and/or corners therein for guidance
of unmanned vehicle. In SUSAN, three different programs were targeted:
• Corners: Performs corner (two feature) detection.
• Edges: Performs edge (one feature) detection.
• Smoothing: Performs structure preserving noise reduction (noise filter-
ing).
The input data for SUSAN are set of Netpbm grayscale image format (PGM).
3.3.3 MiBench Suite
MiBench [53] suite consists of a benchmark suite targeting embedded process-
ing environments. In the MiBench suite, programs from these packages were
instrumented:
Automotive and Industrial Control Package
Benchmarks in the Automotive and Industrial Control (Automotive for short)
package are intended to show use of embedded processors in embedded control
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systems. These processors require performance in basic math abilities, bit ma-
nipulation, data input/output and simple data organisation. Typical real appli-
cations for these programs are air bag controllers, engine performance monitors
and sensor systems.
Two benchmarks from the Automotive package were chosen to be used for fault
injection. These programs are selected because they perform simple, usually
necessary, mathematical calculations that mostly do not have dedicated support
in embedded systems. For example, cubic function solving and integer square
root are all necessary calculations for calculating road speed or other vector
values.
• Cubic Equation Calculator (Cubic): This program calculates the
square root of the input.
• Square Root Calculator (Isqrt): This program calculates the roots
of a cubic equation using floating point arithmetic implemented in the
software.
The input data for these programs is a fixed set of constants.
Telecommunications Package
With the explosive growth of the Internet, many portable consumer devices are
integrating wireless communication. These benchmarks consist of voice encod-
ing and decoding algorithms, frequency analysis and a checksum algorithm. The
programs chosen from the Telecommunications package are as follows:
• CRC: This program performs a 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)
on a file. CRC checks are often used to detect errors in data transmission.
The input data for CRC are speech samples.
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• FFT: This programs performs a Fast Fourier Transform and its inverse
transform on an array of data. Fourier transforms are used in digital signal
processing to find the frequencies contained in a given input signal. The
input data is a polynomial function with pseudorandom amplitude and
frequency sinusoidal components.
Network Package
The benchmarks in this package represent embedded processors in network de-
vices like switches and routers. The work done by these embedded processors in-
volves shortest path calculations, tree and table lookups and data input/output.
The algorithms used to show the networking category include finding a shortest
path in a graph and creating and searching a Patricia trie data structure. The
following programs are chosen in the Network package:
• Dijkstra: The Dijkstra program constructs a large graph in an adjacency
matrix representation and then calculates the shortest path between every
pair of nodes using repeated applications of Dijkstra’s algorithm. Dijk-
stra’s algorithm is a well known solution to the shortest path problem and
completes in O(n2) time.
• Patricia: A Patricia trie is a data structure used in place of full trees
with very sparse leaf nodes. Branches with only a single leaf are col-
lapsed upwards in the trie to reduce traversal time at the expense of code
complexity. Usually, Patricia tries are used to represent routing tables
in network applications. The input data for this benchmark is a list of
IP traffic from a highly active web server for a two hour period. The
IP numbers are disguised. The following algorithms are targeted from
Patricia:
– insert: This program performs insertion operations, i.e., it adds new
element(s) in the trie.
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– remove: This program performs deletions operations by deleting the
specified element(s) from the trie.
– search: This program performs lookup operations in order to deter-
mine if an element exists in the trie.
Security Packages
As the Internet continues to gain popularity in e-commerce activities, the impor-
tance of data security is also increasing. The Security package includes several
common algorithms for data encryption, decryption and hashing. One pro-
gram is chosen to be targeted, rijndael, the new Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES). AES is based on a design principle known as a substitution-permutation
network, combination of both substitution and permutation, and is fast in both
software and hardware.
• Rijndael: Rijndael was selected as the National Institute of Standards
and Technologies Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). It is a block
cipher with the option of 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys and blocks. The
input data sets are ASCII text file of articles found online. The following
algorithms are targeted:
– encfile: This program performs encryption operations, i.e, it en-
crypts the input data.
– decfile: This program performs decryption operations on an en-
crypted input.
Each program have nine inputs, of three varying sizes.
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3.4 Fault Injection Analysis
This thesis uses the LLVM Fault Injection Tool (LLFI) [156] to introduce faults
into target programs. LLFI is a LLVM-based fault injection tool that works at
the LLVM [84] compiler’s intermediate representation (IR) level.
3.4.1 LLVM
Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) [84] is a compiler infrastructure designed as
a set of reusable libraries with well-defined interfaces for program analysis and
optimisation. LLVM consists of (i) a front-end to translate program code written
in a high-level language such as C/C++ to an intermediate representation and
(ii) a backend to translate the intermediate representation (IR) into machine
code for specific platforms. The IR is a low-level programming language similar
to assembly. The IR is a strongly typed RISC instruction set which abstracts
away details of the target. It can be transformed by multiple optimisation
passes before being converted to the machine code by the backend. The LLVM
intermediate representation is a typed language in which source-level constructs
can be easily represented. It preserves the variable and function names, making
source mapping feasible. Further, LLVM has extensive support for program
analysis and transformations which makes it easier to study the effect of fault
injection at a higher level than assembly language.
3.4.2 LLVM Fault Injection (LLFI) Tool
On the account that LLFI target programs at the IR code, it allows fault-
injections to be performed at specific program points and into specific instruc-
tions. The effect can then be easily tracked back to the source code. LLFI
supports various fault injection customisations, and enables tracing the propa-
gation of the resulting error among instructions in the program [156].
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Figure 3.2: LLFI workflow [156].
LLFI Workflow and System Instrumentation
Figure 3.2 shows the working of LLFI, which consists of three compulsory stages.
First stage, entails running LLFI instrument. In this step, LLFI takes the
program byte-code as input, and applies a configuration instructions specified
the fault injection configuration script written in PyYaml format. The config-
uration file contains both (i) compile-time options, including injection location
and register to target in the specified injection location, and (ii) the run-time
options, consisting of the fault model, i.e the type of fault to inject, number
of experiments to run and time out definitions. The LLFI instruments target
injection locations with calls to fault injection functions. Call-backs functions
are also instrumented for profiling. Running the LLFI instruments produces as
output fault-injection and profiling executables, a dynamic count of injection
locations is also logged.
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Secondly, the LLFI profile runs the profiling executables produced in Step 1
in order to create a golden run of the target program, where a golden run is
a reproducible fault free execution of the system. This is done in provide a
baseline for comparisons with fault injection executions. This step also create
more fault injection setup text files.
Thirdly, the fault injection executables created in Step 1 is executed at runtime,
and LLFI randomly selects one runtime instance of the instrumented instruc-
tions to trigger the fault injection function and inject into the selected instruc-
tion operand value leveraging the information in setup files created in Step 2.
Because hardware faults occur randomly at runtime, LLFI picks a random in-
struction from the set of all dynamically executed instructions at runtime to
inject into. This is possible because the fault injection function is invoked at
runtime, and can hence choose which invocation of an instruction to inject into.
The output of the fault-injector is the fault injection experiments, including
program output, log and stat file. The log files captures execution information
including program exceptions and system crashes etc, while the stat files stores
execution information such as injected fault type, injection location etc.
Further, by instrumenting the program once with the set of all fault-injection
functions, and injecting the fault at runtime, LLFI ensures that the same ex-
ecutable file (with the instrumentation in it) is used in all the fault injection
runs. Finally, this method makes it unnecessary to recompile the code for each
fault injection. Other work on high-level fault injection has followed a similar
approach [16, 59, 73]. The result is then logged (i.e., where the fault was in-
jected, what type) and the program allowed to continue. The final output of the
program is also logged. This requires the profiling step to have completed suc-
cessfully and the corresponding stat file to have been created. However, when
any compile-time options is changed, the process has to start from Step 1.
In an optional final step, LLFI traces the propagation of faults in the IR code
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and allows visualisation how the IR code are mapped to the source code. Trace
is collected only if specified in Step 1. This generates an execution trace after
the profiling and fault-injection steps, for each fault injected. The traces can be
compared to identify how the fault propagated.
3.4.3 Failure Scheme
To better understand the failure profile of the targeted program, the outcome
of the fault injection experiments are categorised, using a purpose-built tool, as
follows:
• No Impact: If the program execution terminates normally, and the out-
put produced is identical to the output produced by the fault-free execu-
tion of the program, the outcome is labelled as No Impact. This fault-free
execution of the program is referred to as Golden Run.
• Exception Failure (Exception): The outcome is classified as an Ex-
ception Failure, if the program execution encounters an unexpected error
that does not result in the program crashing or hanging, i.e., the program
terminates normally but does not produce any output.
• Silent Data Corruption (SDC): If the program execution terminates
normally, but produced an output that deviates from that produces by the
golden runs, the outcome is classified as Silent Data Corruption (SDC).
• Time Out Failure (Time Out): The outcome is classified as a Time
Out failure, if the program execution hangs, i.e. fails to terminate within
predefined time. This time is arbitrary set to be approximately 15 times
larger than the execution time of the golden run.
• Crash Failure (Crash): If the program execution is terminated unex-
pectedly when it encounters an unexpected error, the outcome is classified
as a Crash failure.
CHAPTER 4
Problem Statements
Fault tolerance mechanisms have traditionally been validated through the use of
software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI). Several SWIFI frameworks exist,
however most of them are based on single-fault assumption, i.e., they assume
that a single fault will occur in any execution run of the system. During the
validation process, this assumption translates into a single fault being injected
into an execution of the system, overlooking any potential interactions between
simultaneous independent faults. Such a fault assumption has become less ap-
propriate and limited as (i) software systems containing more than a single
fault are more often the norm rather than the exception [14], (ii) current safety
standards require the consideration of multi-point faults [62] and (iii) it has
been shown that simultaneous fault injections can efficiently detect robustness
vulnerabilities [163].
In general, during fault injection, (i) the type of faults to inject, (ii) which
variable to inject in (referred to as the injection location) and (iii) the time
at which the fault injection occurs, are usually considered. Under the single
soft-error assumption, i.e., single bit-flip, the fault space is linearly large (in the
size of the word or register and in the number of variables), making exhaustive
fault injection feasible. Generally, when multiple fault injections are considered:
(i) several variables can be targeted at any given point, and/or (ii) several
different locations can be target at a given time. When multiple soft-errors are
considered, important challenges arises, the most important ones being to deal
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with the exponential size (in the number of variables, variables combinations
and the bit-positions) of the fault space. To make the multiple fault injection
process efficient, it is important to inject fault combinations that are likely
to convey more information and uncover more vulnerabilities, i.e., cause the
system to fail. Moreover, the values to inject at the injection location is also
an important dimension to consider for multiple faults assumption. Thus, the
following challenges are identified in support of the thesis statement:
“There exists a computational feasible bits to explore un-
der multiple bit-flip faults that will induce a wider failure
profile.”
4.1 Selecting Potential Injection Blocks Loca-
tions
Does a set of locations (blocks) exists which will be suitable can-
didate blocks for multiple faults injections? How can these blocks
(potential injection locations) be identified?
Having addressed this problem, it is important to discern the best combination
of variables to target. Thus following problem needs to be considered.
4.2 Identifying Candidate Variables to Target
Does a set of candidate variables exists within the set of potential
injection locations that will be suitable for injecting multiple faults?
How can they be identified? To what extent is dependability val-
idation improved? That is, what is the probability of uncovering
vulnerabilities?
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To address this problem, the nature of interactions between variables needs to be
understood and thus the associated problem of error propagation when multiple
faults are considered for injections arises.
4.2.1 Error Propagation Masking
Does an activated fault nullify the effect of a previously activated
fault? Does an activated fault prevent another fault from being acti-
vated? Can faults that may potentially mask another be identified?
If multiple faults are injected, an activated fault f1 can potentially mask another
fault (or error) f2 if, for instance, either f1 prevented f2 from being activated
or f1 cancelled the effect of f2. The following illustrations elaborate on error
masking:
Prevention of Fault Activation: Considering the following program code,
the following is a typical problem that can occur during multiple fault injections:
2 Z = X + Y ;
4 if Z ≤ v2 then
6 Y = v2 − X;
8 else
10 Y = v1 − X;
12 c = Y ;
Assuming that at a given point during the program’s execution at Line 2, v2 = 7,
X = 1 and Y = 0; in this instance, in the absence of any fault, the value of Z
will be 1, the program execution will true for the branching condition in Line 4
and thus the value of Y would be updated at Line 6, and in turn C will assume
the value of Y at Line 12. Also, assuming each variable is 4-bit long, and Y
is targeted at Line 2. Any fault injection that causes the state of Z to assume
a value between 0 to 7 will be masked, this means the injected fault will not
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change the execution flow, and the state of Y and C would be updated with
the correct value at Line 6 and Line 12, respectively. Further, any injected fault
that changes the state of Z to become a value in the range of 8 to 15 would
cause the execution flow to change and consequently the state of Y and C will be
incorrectly updated at Line 10 and Line 12 respectively, which may likely lead
to some sort of system failure. This means, some injections would be wasteful,
i.e., certain injections exercise the system in the same way, and faults targeted
at locations whose state may be used to determine branching conditions may
not likely get activated.
However, assuming Y is instead targeted after the program execution have ex-
ited the loop at Line 12, the state of C will be updated with the corrupted Y
value. Thus, targeting Y at that location ensures the fault will be activated,
and subsequently increasing the probability of causing a system failure.
Nullification of the Effect of Activated Fault: Considering another dummy
program, another typical problem associated with multiple fault injections could
occur as follows:
2 a1 = a2;
4 b1 = getB();
5
...
...
7 E = a1 − b1;
8
...
...
Supposing that during a given program execution a2 = 2 at Line 2 and b1 = 0
at Line 7, this means during a fault free execution a1 and E will assume the
values 2, at Line 2 and 2, at Line 7, respectively. Assuming also, that double
single faults are injected if: location a2 is targeted at Line 2 and location b1 is
targeted at Line 7. Supposing each location is 4-bit long, and at Line 2, the
fault corrupted the first bit position in a2 thus changing its state from 2 to 3.
Consequently, at Line 7, E will be computed as 3. Assuming the second fault is
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activated at this location and the first position is corrupted, thereby changing
the state of E from 3 to 2. Thus, the second activated fault in E will mask the
first corruption in a2, i.e., the effect of the second fault cancels the effect of the
first fault.
4.2.2 Error Propagation Amplification
Does an activated fault increase the effect of a previously activated
fault? Would flipping a single bit be more impactful than flipping
multiple bits in a given location? Can faults that may potentially
amplify the effect of each other or another be identified?
Another ambiguity that can occur during multiple fault injections is reduction
of the impact of an error when another fault gets activated. However, when the
effect of an activated fault is increased by a another fault being activated then
amplification has occurred. If multiple faults are injected, an activated fault f2
can potentially reduce the impact of another error f1, if, for instance, f1 leads
to a corrupted value in location l that deviates with a large difference from the
supposedd correct value l at that point, and f2 updates the state of l with a
corrupt value that deviates with the a small difference of the correct value of l.
Considering the following sample code illustrates the concept of amplification:
1
...
...
3 a := getA();
5 c := getC();
7 b := c + a;
8
...
...
Assuming all the variables are 4-bits long integers, and at a given execution
cycle of the program, getA() returns a value 4 at Line 3. In the absence of fault,
an error the value of a at that point will be 4, and let c = 5 at Line 5. In a fault
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free execution of the program b = 9 at Line 7. If, a fault is activated at Line 3,
and it corrupts the state of a by making a = 0, without the activation of any
other, the corruption will propagate to b at Line 7 (b = 5, deviating from its
fault-free value by −4). Supposing a second fault is activated at Line 7 that led
c to have a corrupted value of 8, with both faults activated at Line 7 (b = 8, just
1 less than its fault-free value). In this scenario, the activation of the second
fault has reduced the deviation introduced by the first fault activated, thus the
second fault did not amplify the effects of the second fault, and thereby reducing
the likelihood of system failure. However, supposing at Line 5, the state of c
is corrupted with the value 13 rather than 8, this will result in b assuming a
corrupted value of 13 (4 more than its fault-free value) instead of 8. In this
second scenario, the second error have increased the effect of the first error, i.e.,
amplification has occurred, and the likelihood of a system failure is increased.
Another type of amplification effect that may potentially occur is when multiple
bit-flips are considered within a single location. Still considering the preceding
source code, maintaining the assumptions of each variable being 4-bits long
integers and in a given point of a fault-free execution of the program getA()
returns a value of 4 at Line 3 and getC() returns a value of 5 at Line 5, then
b = 9 at Line 7. Considering a at Line 3 to be the only target location, where
any number of faults can be injected, i.e., any number of bits can be flipped. In
a fault-free execution, a will be represented as 0100. If, the first bit from left is
flipped, a will become 1100 (12), when the error propagates to b at Line 7, b will
be 17 (8 more than its fault-free value). Supposing, three faults are introduced
into a in the first, second and third bit-positions from right; a then becomes
0011 (3), and when the error propagates to b at Line 7, b will be 8 (just −1 less
than its fault-free value). In this scenario, injecting multiple faults is less likely
to induce a system failure than the injecting single fault. On the hand, if a single
fault is introduced in the first bit-position from the right, (a = 0101 (5)), and
multiple fault are injected in the first, second and third bit-positions from the
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left, (a = 1010 (10)), then at Line 7, b = 10 (just 1 less than its fault-free value)
and b = 15 (6 more than its fault-free value), respectively. In this scenario, the
impact of multiple faults is more likely to induce a system failure. This implies
that in the case of multiple faults within a single location, amplification may or
may not occur when multiple bits are flipped as opposed to flipping a single bit
in the said location.
Having identified a set of good injection candidates, it is desirable to have ef-
ficient bit-positions to perturb. As it has been highlighted above, some bit-
positions may not be good injection points. Moreover, the fault space remains
exponentially large in terms of variable and bit-position combinations, 2n · 2m,
where n is the number of candidate variables and m the number of bits. Thus,
the final problem statement to be considered is:
4.3 Selecting Choice Bit-Positions
Does an efficient set fault injection point exists? If so, how can the
most suitable points for injecting multiple faults be identified? How
well do the proposed injection points uncover vulnerabilities? That
is, how high is their probability of inducing a system failure?
These problem statements have guided the work that is now presented in this
thesis, and hopefully, some light can be shed upon these problems. How these
problems maps to the main thesis contributions are briefly described in the next
section.
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Figure 4.1: An overview of the thesis contributions.
4.4 Roadmap of Thesis Statement
This thesis seeks to address the problems associated with multiple soft-error
injections in general, and in particular it aims to minimise the cost of fault in-
jection campaigns while maximising injection efficiency1, in terms of uncovering
vulnerabilities. Thus, the main objective of the thesis is to discover a set of
bit-positions that exists within a set of variable locations which when flipped
will uncover as much vulnerabilities as if the entire bits set is flipped. The major
problems associated with multiple faults injections include determining what to
inject, where to inject, when to inject and how long to inject. What to inject,
1This thesis considers injection efficiency of a location as its ability to induce a failure
when a fault or an error is injected into it.
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where to inject and when to inject are the hurdles this thesis must overcome in
order to achieve its main goal. Figure 4.1 summaries the objective of the the-
sis, the problem statements associated with this goal, the chapters that address
these problems and the outcome of addressing the problems.
Knowing where to inject will help in determining suitable injection locations
that will potentially induce a high proportion of system failures. Finding these
candidate locations requires understanding how program variables interact with
one another and how these interactions ultimately effect the program execution.
These issues are elaborated as Problem Statements 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, addressing
these problems involves understanding a program’s control flow and data de-
pendencies. Understanding these relationship highlights that there exists an
intuition that will guide in choosing candidate variables. This, also highlights
the challenge of dealing with an exponential space, in the number of variables
to consider and in the number of possible variable combinations. To address
this challenge, first, the associated complexity of identifying candidate vari-
ables needs to be understood. Chapter 5 addresses some of the issues stated in
Problem Statements 4.1 and 4.2, by analysing and formalising the complexity
of finding suitable variable candidates. To fully tackle the exponential space
challenge, when dimension of injecting faults needs to be concomitantly investi-
gated. Thus, Chapter 6 investigated the effect of locations in terms of variable
placement hierarchy in both the control and execution flows of the program.
However, the aspect of when to inject the fault, in terms of relative time spent
in executing the program, i.e., faults being triggered by timing-triggers, is a com-
ponent not considered in this thesis. Leveraging, the information uncovered in
Chapters 5 and 6, the remainder issues stated in Problem Statements 4.1 and 4.2
are addressed in Chapter 7 by creating a framework, to first identify locations
that can potentially improve fault injection efficiency, and then to choose the
subset of candidate variables that would circumvent the issues stated in Prob-
lem Statements 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. The solutions, up to this point, have narrowed
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down the fault injection space by making the variable locations space polyno-
mial. However, the fault space remains exponentially large in terms of number
of variables and bits combinations, this brings about the issues stated in Prob-
lem Statement 4.3 and highlights the what dimension of injecting faults. To
address this challenge, this aspect of the combinatorial space of variables and
bit-position needs to be made tractable by identifying choice bit-positions that
can potentially uncover as much vulnerabilities as if the entire set of bit-positions
(in terms of variables-bits combinations) have been used. The need to identify
bit-position is implicitly highlighted in Problem Statement 4.2.2, and Chapter 6,
attempts to achieve bits space tractability by considering only double bits, al-
beit, bits and variables choice are not systematically determined. Chapter 8
addresses this issue by applying data mining algorithms to fault injection data
generated by targeting the identified candidate variables in Chapter 7. Thus,
achieving the objective of this thesis of minimising multiple bit-flips fault injec-
tions and maximising injection efficiency, in terms inducing as much failures as
using entire bits combinations.
CHAPTER 5
Towards Selecting Locations for Multiple Soft-Errors
Injection
As emphasised in earlier chapters, the main objective of the work presented
in this thesis is to find and evaluate new approaches for reducing exponential
size of multiple fault injection point space whilst selecting those points that will
induce a similar profile as in exhaustive fault injection with all points. Thus far,
importance on how soft-error manifests in a system including when and where
they appear and how long they remain in the system has been shown. However,
before the duration and occurrence-timing dimensions can be considered, it is
crucial to determine when, where and how they occur. It should be mentioned
that the duration and timing dimensions are not investigated in this thesis.
In Chapter 4, potential problems associated with multiple fault injections are
stated. One of these problems highlights the importance of the location dimen-
sion of multiple fault injections, in terms of selecting locations that would en-
hance the efficiency of injections whilst minimising the overall injections. How-
ever, very few works have addressed this complexity problem in a systematic
way [9, 103, 163]. For example, Winter et al. [163], to handle this large fault
space, target the variables at the input interface, and either randomly chooses
a small subset from the fault space (for fuzzing fault type) or flips only a small
number bits (for the bit-flip fault type), to keep the fault space polynomial
in size. Also to circumvent the exponential fault space for multiple bit-flips
fault type, randomly chooses a small subset of locations and then, either flips
48
CHAPTER 5. TOWARDS SELECTING LOCATIONS FOR MULTI-FI 49
only a small number of bits in one location [1, 2, 9, 103] or flips one bit in a
small number of locations [1, 2, 103]. Thus, current state-of- the-art techniques
in SWIFI-based software validation using MBFs either flip a small number of
bits (e.g., [9, 156, 163]) or use a small number of random values (for fuzzing
fault type) to assign to chosen variables [163] or target a small number of vari-
ables [156]. However, the efficiency of MBFs in uncovering vulnerabilities is
better than that of fuzzing1 [163], indicating the need for a systematic way to
determine the multiple-bits combinations to flip during fault injection. The re-
search in [163] focuses of injecting software bugs and the works in [1, 2, 9, 103]
focus of injecting soft-errors. Some of work presented in this thesis is based on
the work in [1, 2].
This generally means that when multiple fault injections is considered, at one
extreme, similar to the single fault model, a fault is injected only in one location
and let it effect propagate through the program execution. And at the other
extreme, a fault is injected in each location, which may likely cancel earlier
injections and is also computationally intractable. This means, there is a need
to inject fault in a subset of locations, as injection in every single location is
infeasible and injection in a single location may not produce accurate results.
However, some intuition may need to be considered when selecting candidate
injection locations as injecting in some location may also lead to the undesirable
occurrence of a later injection cancelling the effect of an earlier injection. This
occurs if, for example, a fault f1 leads to a corrupted value in a location, and by
activation of a different fault f2 that particular location is never referenced, the
effect of f1’s activation never becomes visible although it would have if f2 had
not been activated. Or if, for instance, a fault f1 leads to a corrupted value in
a location l1, and by activation of a different fault f2 resets the corrupted value
in l1 (See Chapter 4).
1Fuzzing, also fuzz testing, is a software testing technique used to discover coding er-
rors and security loopholes in software, operating systems or networks by inputting massive
amounts of random data, called fuzz, to the system in an attempt to make it crash.
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This necessitates selecting meaningful candidate variables for multiple faults in-
jections. Following, to systematically select such efficient variables, the following
problems have to be addressed: (i) choosing the locations in which faults can be
injected and (ii) choosing the variables in which faults will be injected. In order
to do so, it is necessary to understand the complexity associated with achieving
these task. And this complexity can be understood by applying computational
complexity theory concepts to analyse the complexity.
5.1 Basic concepts of Computational Complex-
ity Theory
Computational complexity theory is a subfield of theoretical computer science
that is concerned with the study of the intrinsic complexity of computational
tasks. Its most important goals include determining the complexity of any well-
defined task and obtaining an understanding of the relations between various
computational concepts, i.e., it focuses on classifying computational problems
according to their inherent difficulty, and relating those classes to each other.
A computational problem is a problem that may be solved by systematic appli-
cation of mathematical steps, such as an algorithm or a heuristic. A problem
is regarded as inherently difficult if its solution requires significant resources in
terms of whatever the algorithm used, including time and space [147]. Consider
the following instances: (i) Given two natural numbers n and m, are they rela-
tively prime, i.e., do n and m posses greatest common divisor 1?, (ii) Given a
propositional formula Φ, does it have a satisfying assignment? And (iii) Given
a chess board of size n × n, does white have a winning strategy if play is
started from a given initial position? These problems are equally difficult from
the perspective of classical computability theory in the sense that they are all
effectively decidable. Yet they still seem to differ significantly in practical diffi-
culty. For having been supplied with a pair of numbers m > n > 0, it is possible
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to determine their relative primality by a method which requires a number of
steps proportional to log(n), e.g., Euclid’s algorithm. On the other hand, all
known methods for solving the latter two problems necesitate a ‘brute force’
search through a large space of cases which increase at least exponentially in
the size of the problem instance.
Complexity theory attempts to emphasise such distinctions by proposing a for-
mal criterion for what it means for a mathematical problem to be feasibly de-
cidable, i.e., that it can be solved by a conventional Turing machine in a number
of steps which is proportional to a polynomial function of the size of its input.
The class of problems with this property is known as P, polynomial time, and
includes the first of the three problems described above. P can be formally
shown to be distinct from certain other classes such as EXP, exponential time,
which includes the third problem from above. The second problem from above
belongs to a complexity class known as NP, non-deterministic polynomial time,
consisting of those problems which can be correctly decided by some compu-
tation of a non-deterministic Turing machine in a number of steps which is a
polynomial function of the size of its input. A famous conjecture, often regarded
as the most fundamental in all of theoretical computer science, states that P
is also properly contained in NP, i.e., P ⊆ NP . Many complexity classes are
defined using the concept of a reducibility and completeness.
5.1.1 Reducibility, NP-hardness and NP-completeness
A reduction is the mapping of one problem into another problem, i.e., a trans-
formation of one problem into another problem. It captures the informal notion
of a problem being at least as difficult as another problem. For example, if a
problem X can be solved using an algorithm for solving Y , that denotes that
solving Y is at least as difficult as solving X, and that X is reducible to Y .
There are many different types of reductions, based on the method of reduc-
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tion, such as Cook reductions [25], Karp reductions [75], and the bound on the
complexity of reductions, such as polynomial-time reductions or log-space re-
ductions. The most common reduction in usage is polynomial-time reduction,
i.e., the reduction process takes polynomial time. For instance, the problem of
squaring an integer can be reduced to the problem of multiplying two integers.
This means an algorithm for multiplying two integers can be used to square an
integer. Indeed, this can be done by giving the same input to both inputs of
the multiplication algorithm. Thus, it can be seen that squaring is not harder
than multiplication, since squaring is reducible to multiplication. This moti-
vates the concept of NP-hardness, i.e the concept of a problem being hard for a
complexity class. A problem X is understood to be hard for a complexity class
C, if every problem in C, is reducible to X. This means that an algorithm for
solving X can be used to solve every problem in C and solving X is at least
as difficult as solving any problem in C. The set of problems that are hard for
NP is the set of NP-hard problems, i.e., a problem is NP-hard if it is a member
of NP and if an algorithm for solving it can be translated into one for solving
a known NP-hard problem. If a problem Y is a member of a complexity class
C and hard for C, i.e., all problems in C are reducible to Y , then Y is said to
be complete for C. The completeness of Y for C may thus be understood as
demonstrating that Y is representative of the most difficult problems in C. The
set of problems that are complete for NP is the set of NP-complete problems,
i.e., a problem is NP-complete, if it is a member of NP and is it also in NP-hard.
This chapter, focuses on capturing the complexity of (i) choosing the locations in
which faults can be injected and (ii) choosing the variables in which faults will be
injected. This chapter formalises each problem as an optimisation problem, and
shows them to be NP-complete. Specifically, the problem of injection selection
is formalised and its intractability is shown by proving the The minimum vertex
cover (MVC) problem is reducible to it (See Section 5.3.1). A vertex cover of
a graph G can simply be thought of as a set S of vertices of G such that every
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edge of G is incident to at least one member of S, i.e., each edge of G has at
least one member of S as an endpoint. The vertex set of a graph is therefore
always a vertex cover. The smallest possible vertex cover for a given graph G
is known as an MVS, and its size is called the vertex cover number, denoted
τ(G) [121]. Finding an MVC of a general graph is a classical NP-complete
decision problem in computational complexity theory [75]. Formalised also, is
the problem of target variables selection and its complexity is proven by showing
that the minimum dominating set (MDS) is reducible to it (See Section 5.4.1).
For a graph G, the dominating set of G is a subset S of the vertex set V (G), such
that every vertex in V that is in S is adjacent to at least one member of S. The
domination number γ(G) is the number of vertices in a smallest dominating
set for G. The MDS problem concerns finding a minimum such S and it is
a known NP-complete problem [48] . The dominating set problem concerns
testing whether γ(G) ≤ K for a given graph G and input K; it is a classical
NP-complete decision problem in computational complexity theory [49].
It should be mentioned that this chapter does not consider the number of cor-
ruptions that can occur within a given variable or location. However, this aspect
of the research will be addressed in later chapters.
5.2 Selecting Locations for Mulitple Fault Injec-
tions
SWIFI is an experimental technique that has been extensively used to evaluate
the robustness and dependability of software systems, e.g., [58, 73, 156, 163].
Software systems that have been experimented on range from safety-critical
embedded systems, e.g., [58, 159] to non-critical operating system’s compo-
nents [40, 137]. Most of them assume a single bit upset to emulate hardware
faults that occur. With single bit upsets, the size of the fault space varies
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linearly with the word or register size, making exhaustive bit-flips possible,
e.g., [58, 67, 91].
However, the single fault assumption rules out multiple faults and their possible
interactions during execution. It has been shown that multiple fault injections
can be very effective in detecting software vulnerabilities [163]. Furthermore,
research has found that many hardware faults manifest as multiple bit-flips in
the program, and hence traditional single bit-flip injection may not be sufficient
to model these faults [19, 97]. The impact of overlooking multiple fault injec-
tions is wide ranging: the software may appear to be more dependable than it
is [163] and hence, the error handling mechanisms designed for the software may
only have limited coverage or efficiency. In spite of these important problem,
few works are addressing mulitple fault injections because of concomitant com-
putational cost associated with it. To make multiple fault injection tractable it
becomes neccessary to identify a minimal set of locations that can be corrupted
such that wider system failure occurs. This neccesitates understanding the com-
plexity associated with selecting efficient injection points. The remainder of this
chapter, shows the complexity analysis of selecting injection points for multiple
fault injections.
5.3 Injection Location Selection (ILS)
For multiple fault injections to work, first, a set of potential locations for injec-
tions need to identified. However, selecting such a set of potential locations at
which to inject faults is very difficult. This chapter formalises the problem, anal-
yses its complexity and shows it to be NP-complete by mapping the ILS problem
into minimum vertex cover problem. The following section (Section 5.3.1) shows
the formalisation and the proofs.
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5.3.1 Complexity Analysis of ILS
Given a program P as its CFG2 GP = 〈V, v0, A,W,Φ〉 of P , where Φ represents
the labelling (or tagging) of locations as vulnerable or not. The amplification
factor is denoted by A. The amplification factor captures the rate at which
faults are injected in a given run. For a high amplification factor, then the rate
is high, i.e., the number of blocks between successive fault injection locations
is very small. On the other hand, for a low amplification factor, the number of
blocks is high. For example, for the highest amplification factor, a fault can be
injected in every single block. On the other hand, for the smallest amplification
factor, a fault is injected in a single block (as in traditional fault injection).
Thus, it is considered that the length of a path between two successive potential
injection locations as a measure of amplification, with the shorter the length,
the higher the amplification. Thus, for multiple fault injections, the objective
is to select the smallest number of potential locations at which faults can be
injected that satisfies A.
Now, depending on the inputs to the program P , execution may follow different
paths in P . Since it is difficult to know which execution path the system will
follow, it is imperative then that the set of potential locations spans every
possible execution path of P , i.e., every possible execution path of P has several
selected potential locations.
From a graph perspective, the injection location selection problem is as follows:
select a set V l ⊆ V such that, for any two vertices u, u′ ∈ V l, the length of the
longest path between u and u′ that does not go through a distinct node u′′ ∈ V l
does not exceed A. The set V l captures the set of possible injection locations.
Thus, A has to be set such that A is at least equal to twice the longest distance
between two successive potential locations as it may be possible that one such
location is overlooked when choosing target variables.
2CFG, here means an extended-CFG and henceforth CFG is used interchangeably with
extended-CFG unless specified otherwise.
5.3. INJECTION LOCATION SELECTION (ILS) 56
Formally, the problem is defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 (Injection Location Selection (ILS)). Given a CFG GP =
〈UP , u0, A,W,Φ〉 of program P , an amplification factor A, and a positive in-
teger KP ≤ |V |, then does there exist U l ⊆ UP such that:
• |U l| ≤ KP
• v0 ∈ U l
• ∀u ∈ U l : Φ(u) = 1
• ∀u, u′ ∈ U l :
∀p ∈ ρu,u′G :
U l ∩ pˆ = ∅ :
Length(p) ≤ A
Lemma 5.1.1 (ILS). ILS is in NP.
Proof. To prove this, the correctness of the solution set U l is required to be
verified in polynomial-time. So, given an instance of ILS and a solution set U l,
correctness of U l is verified as follows: The first three conditions can be trivially
verified.
For the fourth condition, it is needed to verify that, from any vertex u ∈ U l,
all paths originating from u will contain another vertex u′ ∈ U l with distance
at most A away. This is done follows: First, a node u ∈ U l is selected, and a
spanning tree of depth A rooted at u constructed, by doing a depth-first traversal
on G. This tree is denoted by U t. Now, given graph U t, it is required to verify
whether for every path p originating from u and ending at a leaf has at least
one vertex u′ ∈ U l. If the answer is negative, then U l is not a solution for ILS.
On there other hand, if the answer is true for U , then the process is repeated
for all other vertices u ∈ U l. The complexity of this verification procedure is
O(|U |2).
Lemma 5.1.2 (NP-hardness). ILS is NP-hard.
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Proof. To prove this, a known NP-hard problem, the MVC problem [48] is
reduced to ILS. First, the MVC problem is defined:
MVC: Given a graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer K, find a set V ′ ⊆ V
such that:
• |V ′| ≤ K
• ∀(u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ V ′ ∨ v ∈ V ′
With this definition of MVC, the work now develops the mapping between ILS
and MVC.
Mapping
It is assumed that graph for MVC has a vertex with in-degree 0, denoted by v0,
which do not change the complexity of MVC.
• UP = V
• u0 = v0
• A = E
• W (a) = 1,∀a ∈ A
• A = 2
• KP = K
• Φ(u) = 1,∀u ∈ U
Reduction
It is now imperative to show that a solution to MVC exists if and only if a
solution of ILS exists.
(⇒) Let V ′ ⊆ V be a solution to MVC with graph G = (V,E). Let U l
be a solution to the instance of ILS as defined under the mapping, for
graph G′ = (UP , u0, A,W,Φ), with amplification factor A = 2, such that
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U l = V ′. It has been shown that this solution U l is valid for ILS. First,
since V ′ is a solution to MVC and U l = V ′, then |U l| ≤ K. Secondly,
since Φ(u) = 1,∀u ∈ U , then ∀v ∈ U l : Φ(v) = 1. Finally, for every edge
(m,n) ∈ E ⇒ m ∈ V ′ ∨ n ∈ V ′. For the case where only one disjunct
is satisfied, i.e., (m ∈ V ′), then the maximum distance to another vertex
u ∈ V ′ is at most 2, which is equal to the amplification factor A. In the
case of both disjuncts being satisfied, then the distance between 2 vertices
in V ′ is 1, which is less than A. Hence, the maximum distance between
any pair of vertices in V ′ is at most 2, thus not violating A. Since U l = V ′,
V ′ is a solution to ILS.
(⇐) Let U l ⊆ UP be a solution to the instance of ILS defined under the previous
mapping for graph G′ = (UP , u0, A,W,Φ) with amplification factor A = 2.
Now, it is assumed a graph G = (V,E) for MVC, with solution set V ′ ⊆ V .
It has been shown that V ′ is a solution to MVC, when V ′ = U l. Given
that U l is a solution to ILS, (|U l| ≤ KP ) ∧ V ′ = U l ⇒ |V ′| ≤ KP .
Secondly, since the maximum distance between any pair of vertices (m,n)
on the same path in G′ that are in V ′ is at most 2, then it means that
either (m,n) ∈ E or ∃k : (m, k) ∈ E ∧ (k, n) ∈ E. Since V ′ = U l, U l is a
solution to ILS
Theorem 5.1.1 (NP-completeness). ILS is NP-complete.
Proof. The proof follows trivially from Lemmas 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.
It has thus been shown that the selection of fault injection locations is NP-
complete. To circumvent this high complexity, a heuristic that select a set of
potential locations is proposed and studied in later chapter of this thesis.
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5.4 Target Variable Selection (TVS)
Once the set of potential locations has been identified, it is then necessary
to determine the set of variables into which faults will be actually injected.
Specifically, there may be locations at which no fault will be injected and other
locations where several faults may be injected.
The challenge in selecting target variables set from the fact that when a variable
u is overlooked, then it means either that a variable v on which it depends has
been selected (and selecting u will override the effect of propagating error from
v to u) or a variable w that depends on v has been selected. Thus, the decision
of selecting a variable is not a local one. This problem then is very similar to the
problem of generating dominating sets. Thus, this chapter proceeds to prove
that the problem of target variables selection (TVS) is NP-complete.
5.4.1 Complexity Analysis of TVS
The problem of target variables selection is formally defined as an optimisation
problem.
Definition 5.2 (Target Variables Selection (TVS)). Given a graph GDP =
(U,A,U0,W,L), where U0 ⊆ U , a positive integer N , a positive integer A,
does there exist a set UV ⊆ U such that:
• |UV | ≤ N
• ∀u, u′ ∈ UV :
∀p ∈ ρu,u′G :
UV ∩ pˆ = ∅ :
length(p) ≤ A
It should be observed here that the amplification factor is carried over from
the injection location selection problem (ILS). Specifically, given that no two
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successive potential locations are no more than distance A apart, the selection
of target variables should not violate this requirement.
Lemma 5.2.1 (NP membership). TVS is in NP.
Proof. To prove this, the correctness of the set Uv is shown in polynomial-
time. So, given an instance of TVS as described and a solution set Uv, the
verification is performed as follows: The first condition is trivially verified. For
the second condition, it is required to verify that, from any vertex u ∈ Uv, all
paths originating from u will contain another vertex u′ ∈ Uv with distance at
most A away. This is done as follows: It first select a node u ∈ Uv, and construct
a spanning tree of depth A, rooted at u, by doing a depth-first traversal on G.
This tree is denoted by U t. Now, given graph U t , it is needed to verify whether
for every path p originating from u and ending at a leaf has at least one vertex
u′ ∈ Uv. If the answer is negative, then Uv is not a solution for TVS. On the
other hand, if the answer is true for U , then the process is repeated for all other
vertices u ∈ Uv. The complexity of this verification procedure is O(|U |2).
Lemma 5.2.2 (NP-hardness). TVS is NP-hard.
Proof. To prove this, MDS problem [48] is reduced to the TVS problem. Before
defining the MDS problem, it is denoted by U1, the set of vertices adjacent to
a node u ∈ V . Then, the MDS problem is defined as follows:
MDS: Given a graph G = (V,E), a positive integer K, find a set V ′ ⊆ V such
that
• |V ′| ≤ K
• ∀u 6∈ V ′ : ∃v ∈ U1 : v ∈ V ′
With this definition of MDS, now the mapping between MDS and TVS is de-
veloped.
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Mapping
It is assume that the graph for MDS has a set of vertices with in-degree 0,
denoted by V0, which does not affect the complexity of MDS.
• U = V
• U0 = V 0
• A = E
• N = K
• W (a) = 1,∀a ∈ A
• A = 3.
Reduction
It now has to be to shown that a solution to MDS exists if and only if a solution
of TVS exists.
(⇒) Let V ′ ⊆ V be a solution to MDS with graph G = (V,E). Let Uv be a
solution to the instance of TVS as defined under the mapping, for graph
G′ = (U,U0, A,W ) with amplification factor A = 3, such that Uv = V ′. It
is shown that this solution Uv is valid for TVS. First, since V ′ is a solution
to MDS and Uv = V ′, then |Uv| ≤ K. Secondly, for ∀n 6∈ V ′ : ∃m ∈ N1 :
m ∈ V ′. Now, assume there is a edge (p, q) ∈ A such that p, q 6∈ V ′. Then,
there are two extreme cases: (i) if ∃m ∈ P 1 : m 6= q ∧m 6∈ Q1 : m ∈ V ′
and ∃n ∈ Q1 : n 6= p ∧ n 6∈ P 1 : n ∈ V ′, then the distance between
nodes m and n is at most 3, satisfying A, and (ii) ∃m ∈ P 1 : m 6= q and
∃n ∈ Q1 : n 6= p, then if m = n, then the distance is 0, which is less than
A. Hence, the maximum distance between any pair of vertices in V ′ is at
most 3, thus not violating A. Since U l = V ′, V ′ is a solution to TVS.
(⇐) Let Uv be a solution to the instance of TVS as defined under the mapping,
for graph G′ = (U,U0, A,W ) with amplification factor A = 3. Let V ′ ⊆ V
be a solution to MDS with graph G = (V,E) such that V ′ = Uv. Now,
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since Uv is a solution for the defined instance of TVS and |Uv| ≤ k, then
|V ′| ≤ k. Further, since no node n ∈ V ′ is more than distance = 3 from
some other node m ∈ V ′, then it means that there is at most two nodes
between nodes m and n that are not in V ′, i.e., ∀p 6∈ V ′ : ∃q ∈ P 1 : q ∈ V ′.
Since V ′ = Uv, then Uv is a solution to MDS.
Theorem 5.2.1 (NP-completeness). TVS is NP-complete.
Proof. The proof follows trivially from Lemmas 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.
To circumvent the complexity of target variables selection, a heuristic is devel-
oped and investigated later in this thesis.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter investigates the complexity associated with selecting efficient lo-
cations for injecting multiple soft-errors. To understand the problem associated
with selecting the efficient injection locations, the problem is split into two:
(i) injection location selection and (ii) target variables selection at the poten-
tial locations. Following, this thesis formalises each problem and proved both
problems to be NP-complete using graph theory concepts.
To prove the NP-completeness of the injection location selection, first, the prob-
lem is formally defined as a graph optimisation problem, ILS using the CFG for
programs. Second, the correctness of the ILS problem is verified in polynomial-
time with complexity of O(|U |2). Thus proving ILS to be in NP. Third, MVC
problem is mapped and reduced to ILS problem, thereby proving ILS is NP-
hard. Thus proving the ILS problem to be NP-complete.
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Solving the problem of target variables selection follows from solving the ILS
problem. Thus, assuming that a graph exists for potential injection locations,
the problem of selecting target variables is formally defined as an optimisation
problem, TVS problem. The complexity of the verifying the correctness of the
TVS problem has been proved to be O(|U |2), hence TVS is proven to be in NP.
Next, the NP-hardness of the TVS problem is proved, by mapping and reducing
the MDS problem to TVS problem. Thus, showing that the TVS problem is
in NP and is NP-hard, and in turn proves the NP-completeness of the TVS
problem.
Following, this implies that exponential fault space for multiple soft-error injec-
tions can be made efficiently tractable in polynomial time. In subsequent chap-
ters of this thesis, three approaches were developed to address the complexity
formalised in this chapter: (i) In Chapter 6 the multiple soft-error injections
fault space is made tractable by injecting only a maximum of two faults, the
viability of the DBU faults for the LnCm fault model was investigated, (ii) In
Chapter 7, heuristics to solve the ILS problem and TVS problem for LnCm
fault model is developed, and (iii) In Chapter 8, the problem specification is
weakened using data mining approach to further minimise the fault injection
points.
CHAPTER 6
Double Single Bit-Flips (L1C2) Fault Model
The suppositions of the kind of faults a system is prone to and the way these
assumed faults may influence the system is key to the design of fault tolerance
mechanisms for the system. Fault tolerance mechanisms are evaluated with
respect to the assumptions their design was based on. Should any assumptions
on which a supposedly fault tolerant system design is based prove to be false, the
system may likely fail to achieve its fault tolerance objectives. In the previous
chapter, complexity analysis for selecting fault injection locations for multiple
faults was done and it demonstrated that the fault space for multiple fault
injections may be tractable. Thus, this chapter attempts to ascertain whether
it is worth considering multiple faults for fault tolerance validation, i.e., to
determine if the failure profile induced by the multiple fault model deviates
from the failure profile single faults induce. To this end, this chapter proposes a
double fault model for soft-errors that can be used for the design and validation
of fault tolerance for embedded software systems. As mentioned, the main goal
of this chapter is to consider whether the LnCm fault model may potentially be
a viable fault model to be considered for software dependability validation. As
such, the double faults error is considered because it is a tractable version of
the LnCm fault model, and has been mentioned double faults error can occur
either as double bit-flips in a single location, L1C2 or as two separate single
bit-flips in two different locations, L2C1, (see Figure 6). Research has started
looking at the former version of the double faults, thus the work presented in
this chapter focused on the latter version in order to determine whether both
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versions of double faults are the same (in terms of the failure profile they induce).
Moreover, to keep the injection location space tractable, the chapter focuses
on 3-dimension location space, i.e., early block, central block and late block.
In order to demonstrate the viability of this fault model for fault tolerance
validation, the fault model is introduced into seven embedded modules and
analysed for error resilience with respect to failure mode. Analysis of the results
presented indicates that the failure profile induced by the new fault model differs
from the profile induced by existing fault models, indicating that the proposed
fault model in this chapter is relevant during software dependability validation.
Thus, the next chapter develops heuristics to address the problems associated
with selecting efficient locations for multiple soft-errors injections presented in
Chapter 5, by leveraging the information presented in this chapter.
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(b) L2C1 injects double faults in two loca-
tions: flip only 1-bit in location 1 and only
1-bit in location 2.
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(c) L1C2 injects double faults in one location only: either flip 2-bits in location 1 or flip
2-bits in location 2.
Figure 6.1: An overview of double faults.
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6.1 Evaluation of Fault Models and Failure -
Modes
As previously mentioned, fault injection is a widely used technique in depend-
ability evaluation. Recent research have shown that multiple fault injections
can be very effective in detecting software vulnerabilities [9, 163]. Other works
have investigated impact of device-level fault injections that manifest as single
bit-upsets in registers and main memory [30, 32, 139].
Current techniques in SWIFI-based FI for multiple bit-flips make use of sim-
plifying decisions to keep the size of the fault space tractable. Recently, the
effects of MBUs on SRAMs and DRAMs have been studied. In [78], the authors
investigated DRAM disturbance errors that manifests as multiple bit-upsets in
memory. On the other hand, the authors of [141] investigated the geometric ef-
fects of multiple bit-upsets injected into DRAMs. The main difference between
the study in this thesis and these studies is the level of abstraction focused on.
While these studies focus on fault effect on the circuit level, the work presented
here is concerned with faults impacting the application level. The fault model
under investigation in [141] is MBUs in multiple cells within the same memory
location while that under investigation in [78] is MBUs in different memory lo-
cations. In spite of the fundamental differences between these works [78, 141]
and the work presented here, they all showed higher rate of No Impact under
the single bit-flip model. In addition, under the double bit-flip model, higher
crash failure rate is observed. However, in these works [78, 141], it is reported
that the proportion of SDCs is higher under the double bit-flip model, this is
contrary to the findings of the work presented in this chapter. The work pre-
sented here reported a lower proportion of SDCs under the variant of double
bit-flip model studied here than when compared with the single bit-flip model.
Another difference between these works and the work presented here is, while
in [141] and [78] the target location is the memory, the research presented here
6.2. CASE STUDIES 67
target the ISA registers.
Similar to the work presented in this chapter, Ayatolahi et al. [9] mimicked bit-
flips in registers of a real hardware platform. In addition, they investigated the
impact of L1C1 and L1C2 on program execution. The work presented here differs
from that presented in [9] mainly in the DBU fault model assumed. The DBU
fault model in [9] selects a single location and flips two bits in that location,
while in this work, in addition to the L1C1 model assumed in [9], the L2C1
fault model that chooses two locations and flips one bit in each location is also
assumed. Another difference is: in [9], faults are also injected in memory words
and the bit-error sensitivity for different target locations is investigated, in order
to provide an insight regarding the results. Both the work presented here and
that presented in [9] reported a higher level of benign (No Impact) executions
for SBUs and a higher proportion of crash failures for DBUs.
6.2 Case Studies
As an assessment on how fault models impact on program executions, a series
of experiments is conducted, using soft-error injections on seven embedded soft-
ware systems where single bit and double bits errors were injected into CPU
registers of the target systems. The aim of the study is to investigate how failure
mode varies for different fault models. The first set of evaluations focused on
how error resilience and error sensitivity varies for the different fault models,
and the second set of evaluations focused how error error resilience and error
sensitivity varies for different target locations. Error sensitivity is taken to be
the probability that a fault causes software system failure as defined in Chap-
ter 3 and error resilience taken to be the probability that a fault does not result
in a program failure defined under the failure scheme in Chapter 3.4.3 .
The target programs used and fault models assumed are described in Chapter 3
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(See Section 3.2). This section describes the parameters adopted for the target
programs to use them with the fault injection tool described in Chapter 3 (See
Section 3.4.2.
6.2.1 System Instrumentation
The LLFI tool was used for all fault injection experiments conducted in this the-
sis. The fault injection experiments reported in this chapter are undertaken on
seven programs: derivatives, step, cubic, Isqrt, Corners, Step and Smoothing.
To perform fault injection with LLFI, the source code of the software system is
first compiled into a single IR byte-code. Twelve variables were instrumented in
each target program. A golden run was created for each program. Three fault
models, L1C1, L1C2 and L2C1 (See Chapter 3.2), were adopted for the fault
injections experiments in this chapter. In line with the fault models assumed in
this chapter, bit-flip faults were injected into bit-positions for all instrumented
program variables. Nine different input sets are selected for each target pro-
gram. The combination of input and target program is called an execution flow.
This means, for each target program under each fault model experiments were
conducted for nine execution flows. The target systems and their input data
are described in Section 3.3.
For the L1C1 model, each fault injection input execution flow entailed a single
bit-flip in a program variable at one bit-position, i.e., no multiple fault are in-
troduced in any single input execution flow. For the L1C2 model, each fault
injection input execution flow entailed a double bit-flip in a program variable
at two bit-positions, i.e., not more than two faults are introduced in any single
program execution, and only a single variable can be targeted. For the L2C1
model, each fault injection input execution flow entailed single bit-flip in two
program variables at one bit-position each, i.e., exactly two variables are tar-
geted in any single input execution flow, and no multiple faults can be inserted
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in any variable.
6.2.2 Experimental Procedure
Before commencing the fault injection experiments, the CFG of IR byte-code of
the program was partitioned into three parts, namely: (i) early, (ii) central and
(iii) late. These partitions are defined as block locations (or blocks for short).
From each block location, four target locations, were choosen at random, i.e.,
target locations are partitioned and selected according to their placement in
the IR byte-code of the program, and also according to their execution location
in the program. A target location (or location for short) is defined as a given
register used by the program. When an L1C1 error is injected, a single location
is selected. On the other hand, two locations are selected for L2C1 errors. A
fault injection experiment is the injection of an error under the assumed fault
model in a given target location or pair of locations. A fault injection campaign
for a fault model is a set of experiments for a given input and program, i.e., a
set of experiments for an execution flow.
Once a location (or pairs of locations) have been selected, bit-flip errors were
then injected exhaustively in the locations to cover all possible combination.
Errors are only injected in target location(s) immediately before the target lo-
cation is read to avoid unnecessary overwrites. For each selected location, fault
is injected only once during the execution of the program. For L1C1 and L1C2
errors, there are twelve target locations for each campaign and for L2C1 errors
there are
(
x
r
)
target locations pairs, x = 12 being the number of all chosen target
locations and r = 2, the number of locations to target in any given experiment.
Under the L1C1 fault model, n experiments were conducted in each target loca-
tion, n being the length of the register. A total 48, 384 L1C1s were introduced
in the various programs. For L1C2 errors,
(
n
r
)
experiments were performed in
each location, n being the size of the target location and r = 2 (the number of
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bits to flip in the said location). A total of 1, 524, 096 L1C2 errors were injected
across the different target programs. Under the L2C1 model, for each location
pair, n ×m experiments were undertaken, m,n being the length of the target
locations. Overall, a total of 17, 031, 168 L2C1 errors were injected into the
target programs.
Table 6.1: Register classificaiton scheme
Register Operation
Instruction
Type
Data
Type
ADD/FADD Returns the sum of its two operands. Binary
Control
or Other
SUB/FSUB Returns the difference of its two operands. Binary
Control
or Other
MUL/FMUL Returns the product of its two operands. Binary
Control
or Other
DIV/FDIV Returns the quotient of its two operands. Binary
Control
or Other
SHL
Shifts a value to the left a specified number
of its, and returns the shifted value.
Binary Other
BITCAST
Converts a value to a second type
without changing any bits.
It returns the converted value.
Casting Other
SITOFP
Converts a signed integer value
to a floating point value.
It returns the converted value.
Casting Other
ZEXT
Zero extends its operand to a larger size,
i.e., fills the higher order bits of the
value with zero until it reaches the size
of the destination type.
Casting Other
LOAD
Specifies the memory address form
which to load. The location of the memory
pointed is loaded.
MAAC
Control
or Other
ALLOCA
Allocates memory on the stack frame
of the currently executing function
and returns a pointer.
MAAC Pointer
GETELEM
Gets the address of a subelement
of an aggregate data structure.
It performs address calculations
only and does not access memory.
It returns a pointer to an element.
MAAC Pointer
Further, target locations were categorised based on register instruction type
and the type of data held in the register. Table 6.1 depicts register classification
scheme.
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Register Instruction Type Categorisation
A target location is classified based on the type of operation it performs (see
Table 6.1) as follows:
• Binary: If it performs binary or bitwise binary operations in a program,
i.e., it performs computaions, such as adding, on two operands and returns
the results of the operation.
• Casting: If it performs bit conversions operations, such as casting, con-
verting value of one data type to another data type.
• Memory Access and Address Computation (MAAC): If it loads
data from memory, allocates memory on stack or gets address of a subele-
ment of an aggregate data structure.
For L2C1 errors, target location pairs are classified as above only if both loca-
tions belong to the same category, and locations of mixed categories are classified
as follows:
• Binary and Casting: If one location is Binary and the second is Casting.
• Binary and MAAC: If one target location is Binary and the other is
MAAC.
• Casting and MAAC: If the target location is made of Casting and
MAAC pair.
Register Data Type Categorisation
A target location is classified based on the type of data it holds (see Table 6.1)
as follows:
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• Pointer: If it holds data that affects memory allocation or address com-
putation. Pointer data include pointer, address computations for array
and struct data items
• Control: If it holds data that would affect control flow. Control data
items are usually loop termination condition and branching condition.
• Other: If it holds general value data that are neither pointer nor control.
The data under this category are usually general value data such as signed
and unsigned integer numbers etc.
For L2C1 errors, similar to instruction type categorisation, target location pairs
are classified as any of the above only if both locations belong to the same
category, and locations of mixed categories are classified as follows:
• Pointer and Control: If one target location holds Pointer data and the
second holds Control data.
• Pointer and Other: If one location is Pointer and the other is Control.
• Control and Other: If the target location is made of Pointer and Control
pair.
6.3 Impact of Fault Models
Three types of errors are injected into seven target programs. It should be
mentioned that all target programs are without fault tolerance mechanisms.
Further, a system without any specific fault tolerance implemented often ex-
hibits a certain level of error tolerance (robustness) due to the fact that errors
can be overwritten or that the system has a built-in resiliency against errors.
Hence, experiments resulting as No impact may be due to this internal robust-
ness of the program. The investigation shows that the different fault models do
induce different failure profiles, it reveals that:
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Figure 6.2: Error sensitivity distribution of the various fault models for each
programs.
1. Double faults uncover more failures than the single faults,
2. L1C2 faults induce more SDCs than L2C1,
3. L2C1 faults cause more severe failures than L1C2.
Thus, motivating the need to adopt various fault models in software depend-
ability validation and to extend these specific cases of the LnCm fault model.
The remainder of this section presents and further discuses the results of impact
of the different fault models investigated.
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Figure 6.2: Error sensitivity distribution of the various fault models for each
program.
Figures 6.2a–6.2c show the error sensitivity distribution for each fault model over
the different programs. The vertical axis shows the percentage of experiments
that fall in different failure classification for different target program represented
in the horizontal axis.
Table 6.2 shows a summary of error resilience for the different failure classes
under the different fault models. Each row shows the percentage of experi-
ments that results in different error classifications for the different fault models.
Table 6.3 shows the result for one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests per-
6.3. IMPACT OF FAULT MODELS 75
0.
00
%
0.
00
%
1.
85
%
1.
87
%
45
.4
1%
37
.0
6%
30
.8
4%
18
.5
4%
45
.7
3%
45
.3
5%
79
.2
8%
3.
37
%
0.
00
%
20
.7
7%
0.
00
%
0.
00
% 2.
59
%
2.
62
% 7
.6
1%
0.
01
%
0.
02
%
0.
00
%
0.
01
%
0.
01
%
0.
27
%
0.
02
%
0.
08
% 4
.5
4%
81
.4
6%
54
.2
6%
50
.2
1%
15
.9
6%
43
.6
0%
62
.8
5%
43
.8
3%
DERIVATIVES STEP CUBIC ISQRT CORNERS EDGES SMOOTHING
No	Impact Exception SDC Time	Out Crash
(c) L2C1
Figure 6.2: Error sensitivity distribution of the various fault models for each
program.
formed to statistical test the effect of fault models on fault outcomes. Each row
depicts the results of the significance of the effect of fault model on the fault
outcome under the Dependent Variable column, it should be mentioned that
the first row shows the results of fault model on no particular fault outcome.
The p-value column determines whether the effect of the model is significant
with 99% of confidence interval, the null hypothesis is accepted if the the p-
value is greater than 0.01 and rejected otherwise. The F column depicts the
Wilks’ lambda value for the ANOVA test. The test are based on the linearly
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independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means, the
difference between these means is shown in Table 6.5. Negative mean difference
denotes under the fault model J, the mean of the percentage of error resilience
for the given error is higher than under the fault model I. The p-value column
determines whether the mean difference is significant with 99% of confidence in-
terval. The mean difference is significant when the p-value is less than 0.01 and
insignificant otherwise. Table 6.4 shows the means, standard errors and confi-
dence interval of experiments that fail in different error classifications over all
programs for the fault models. Due to the large number of experiments (≈ 48000
for L1C1 errors, over 1.5 million for L1C2 errors and excess of 17 million for
L2C1 errors), the 99% confidence interval for the measures in this section varies
from ±1.02% to ±4.49% for L1C1 and L1C2 errors and from ±0.65% to ±2.84%
for L2C1 errors.
6.3.1 L2C1 vs. L1C2 vs L1C1
Figures 6.2a, 6.2b and 6.2c present the overall error sensitivity for L1C1, L1C2
and L2C1 errors respectively. The error sensitivity for a fault outcome is calcu-
lated as shown in equation 6.1.
ES =
Ff
FN
(6.1)
Here FN is the total number of faults injected, i.e., total number of experiments,
and Ff is the total number of experiments that results in the given fault outcome
class.
The results from these figures show that observed failures are not uniform across
the different programs. For example, errors injected into Derivatives consistently
ended up as either Exception or Crash. Further, campaigns with Step never
resulted in No impact or SDC. On another hand, the proportion of Time out
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Table 6.2: Error resilience distribution of all fault models
Fault
Model
Target
Program
Fault Outcome (%)
No Impact Exception SDC Time Out Crash
L1C1
Derivatives 100.00 72.17 100.00 100.00 27.83
Step 100.00 68.93 100.00 99.95 31.12
Cubic 94.13 55.42 85.65 99.66 59.23
Isqrt 93.32 52.04 85.42 99.66 64.32
Corners 64.33 91.47 72.86 99.92 60.75
Edges 56.76 100.00 99.99 99.61 43.64
Smoothing 67.03 89.95 99.98 82.81 60.22
L1C2
Derivatives 100.00 65.72 100.00 100.00 34.28
Step 100.00 63.73 100.00 99.97 36.31
Cubic 97.72 56.63 89.74 99.96 50.90
Isqrt 97.24 37.94 91.14 99.82 71.30
Corners 60.47 94.31 73.09 99.94 61.92
Edges 54.12 100.00 99.99 99.76 46.13
Smoothing 82.50 57.39 99.99 91.60 68.51
L2C1
Derivatives 100.00 81.46 100.00 100.00 18.54
Step 100.00 54.27 100.00 99.99 45.74
Cubic 98.15 54.65 94.80 99.99 49.79
Isqrt 98.13 20.72 96.87 99.73 84.04
Corners 54.59 96.63 86.50 99.98 56.40
Edges 62.94 100.00 99.98 99.92 37.15
Smoothing 69.16 79.23 99.96 95.46 56.17
is predominantly higher when L1C1s are injected and fewest when L2C1s are
injected. Similarly, the observed rate of No impact is often highest for L1C1 error
experiments and lowest for L2C1 errors. The percentage of Crash was almost
consistently highest for experiments under the L2C1 fault model. Similarly,
frequency of Exception is almost regular highest when L2C1 errors are injected.
Further, the results denote SDCs to results less from L2C1 errors.
Table 6.2 shows a summary of error resilience results under each fault model.
The error resilience for a fault outcome is calculated as in equation 6.2.
ER = 1− ES (6.2)
If the error resilience of a program to a given fault outcome is considered to
be distributed as a normal variable with a mean value equals to the quotient
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Table 6.3: Null hypotheis test results for fault model effect on error resilience
Dependent
Variable
F
P-value
(α = 0.01)
Result
62.933 0.000 Reject
No Impact 0.648 0.523 Accept
Exception 10.128 0.000 Reject
SDC 15.059 0.000 Reject
Time Out 244.816 0.000 Reject
Crash 9.120 0.000 Reject
The F tests the effect of fault models on fault outcomes.
This test is based on the linearly independent pairwise
comparisons among the estimated marginal means
(see Table 6.5).
between the number of experiments in the said fault outcome category and the
total number of experiments, ANOVA can be performed. ANOVA is performed
to test whether there are error resilience rate difference between the programs
under the three fault models by testing the null hypothesis H0 which states: “the
fault outcome of an experiment does not depend on the fault model assumed for
the experiment”. The results of ANOVA in Table 6.3 allows the the rejection of
H0 with a confidence of 99%, this means that there is a statistically significant
difference in error resilience based on an assumed fault model. However, the
results also allows the acceptance of H0 that states: “the probability of an
experiment resulting in No impact is dependent on the assumed fault model”.
Table 6.5 presents a pairwise comparisons of mean difference between error
resilience of the programs to the different fault classes. Considering the first
row, for example, the mean difference between error resilience to No Impact
under L1C1 (fault model I) and L1C2 (fault model J) is −2.1352. This means
on the average the there’s a higher propbaibilty of programs being error resilient
to No Impact for L1C1 errors than for L1C2 errors.
For example, the results show there is no significant mean difference in resilience
to No impact between the three fault models (see Table 6.5). However, the
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Table 6.4: Estimated marginal means for error resilience of all fault models
Dependent Variable Fault
Model
Mean
(%)
Std. Error
Confidence
Interval
(99%)
Fault Outcome
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
No Impact
L1C1 82.371 1.331 78.936 85.805
L1C2 84.506 1.331 81.071 87.941
L2C1 83.562 0.842 81.390 85.734
Exception
L1C1 74.464 1.369 70.931 77.997
L1C2 67.944 1.369 64.411 71.476
L2C1 75.082 0.866 72.847 77.316
SDC
L1C1 95.233 0.511 93.913 96.552
L1C2 95.975 0.511 94.656 97.295
L2C1 92.989 0.323 92.155 93.823
Time Out
L1C1 97.376 0.396 96.355 98.397
L1C2 98.714 0.396 97.693 99.735
L2C1 89.787 0.250 89.142 90.433
Crash
L1C1 50.557 1.738 46.071 55.042
L1C2 52.862 1.738 48.376 57.347
L2C1 58.581 1.099 55.744 61.418
results (see Table 6.2) shows that error resilience to No Impact is often lower
for L1C1 errors than for either L1C2 or L2C1 errors. This implies L1C1 errors are
more likely to end in No Impact than either L1C2 or L2C1 errors. On the other
hand, the results indicate that all three error types have similar percentage
of error resilience to Time Out failures. This implies that likelihood of an
Experiment causing a Time out is low irrespective of the error type.
The results (see Table 6.5) also depict the mean error resilience to Exception is
significantly lower for L1C2 errors than for both L1C1 and L2C1 errors, however
they do not show significant difference between means under L1C1 and L2C1
fault models. The results further depict that for both L1C1 and L1C2 errors,
average percentage of error resilience to Exceptions is significantly lower than for
L2C1 errors (see Table 6.2). Thus, implying that the likelihood of an experiment
causing an Exception is higher when injected with either L1C1 or L1C2 errors
than when a L2C1 was injected . The results also show that across the programs,
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Table 6.5: Pairwise comparisons between mean for all fault models
Dependent
Variable
(Fault
Outcome)
Fault Model Mean
Difference
(I-J)
Std.
Error
P-value
(α = 0.01)
Confidence
Interval
(99%)
I J
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
No Impact
L1C1
L1C2 -2.1352 1.88248 0.493 -7.6311 3.3606
L2C1 -1.1914 1.57500 0.730 -5.7895 3.4068
L1C2
L1C1 2.1352 1.88248 0.493 -3.3606 7.6311
L2C1 0.9439 1.57500 0.821 -3.6543 5.5420
L2C1
L1C1 1.1914 1.57500 0.730 -3.4068 5.7895
L1C2 -0.9439 1.57500 0.821 -5.5420 3.6543
Exception
L1C1
L1C2 6.5205* 1.93617 0.002 0.8679 12.1731
L2C1 -0.6175 1.61991 0.923 -5.3468 4.1118
L1C2
L1C1 -6.5205* 1.93617 0.002 -12.1731 -0.8679
L2C1 -7.1380* 1.61991 0.000 -11.8673 -2.4086
L2C1
L1C1 0.6175 1.61991 0.923 -4.1118 5.3468
L1C2 7.1380* 1.61991 0.000 2.4086 11.8673
SDC
L1C1
L1C2 -0.7429 0.72312 0.560 -2.8540 1.3683
L2C1 2.2437* 0.60501 0.001 0.4774 4.0100
L1C2
L1C1 0.7429 0.72312 0.560 -1.3683 2.8540
L2C1 2.9865* 0.60501 0.000 1.2202 4.7528
L2C1
L1C1 -2.2437* 0.60501 0.001 -4.0100 -0.4774
L1C2 -2.9865* 0.60501 0.000 -4.7528 -1.2202
Time Out
L1C1
L1C2 -1.3379 0.55958 0.045 -2.9715 0.2958
L2C1 7.5887* 0.46818 0.000 6.2219 8.9556
L1C2
L1C1 1.3379 0.55958 0.045 -0.2958 2.9715
L2C1 8.9266* 0.46818 0.000 7.5597 10.2934
L2C1
L1C1 -7.5887* 0.46818 0.000 -8.9556 -6.2219
L1C2 -8.9266* 0.46818 0.000 -10.2934 -7.5597
Crash
L1C1
L1C2 -2.3048 2.45845 0.617 -9.4821 4.8726
L2C1 8.0240* 2.05688 0.000 -14.0290 -2.0189
L1C2
L1C1 2.3048 2.45845 0.617 -4.8726 9.4821
L2C1 5.7192 2.05688 0.015 -11.7242 0.2858
L2C1
L1C1 -8.0240* 2.05688 0.000 2.0189 14.0290
L1C2 -5.7192 2.05688 0.015 -0.2858 11.7242
Based on estimated marginal means. (see Table 6.4
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 761.538.
* The mean difference is significant
error resilience to Exception is often lower under L1C2s than under L1C1s. This
implies that L1C2 errors are more likely to cause Exceptions than either L1C1
errors or L2C1 errors.
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Table 6.5 also shows that mean percentage of error resilience to SDC is signifi-
cantly higher under the L2C1 fault model than under either L1C1 or L1C2 fault
models, and no significant mean difference for L1C1 and L1C2 errors. Similarly,
the results demonstrate that for majority of the programs percentage error re-
silience is higher under L2C1s than under both L1C1s and L1C2s (see Table 6.2).
This means that the occurrence of SDCs are more probable under both L1C1
and L1C2 fault models than under L2C1 fault. However, for Edges and Smooth-
ing the percentage of error resilience to SDCs is similar across the three fault
models. On the hand, similar percentage of error resilience has been observed
under L1C1s and L1C2s.
On another hand, the results have shown there is a significant overall lower
mean error resilience to Crash when L1C1 or L1C2 errors are injected than for
L2C1 errors (see Table 6.5). The results also show (see Table 6.2), percentage
of error resilience to Crash is almost consistently lower under L2C1 than under
either L1C2 or L1C1 across the different programs with the exception of Step
and Isqrt, which shows the reverse. Hence, this means experiments subjected
to L2C1 errors had higher probability of ending in Crash than those imparted
with L1C1 and L1C2 errors.
The overall reduction of No impact and SDC under L2C1s may be due to L2C1
errors causing more severe failures resulting in the system exiting prematurely.
Similarly, because L2C1 and L1C2 errors mostly causes the program to prema-
turely exit, little and no executions tend to hang.
6.4 Impact of Injection Location
This section investigates the effect of injection location on failure mode. Hence,
the effect on block locations, instruction type and data type are analysed. The
impact of blocks on failure groups is measured with respected to error sensitivity
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rate as described in the preceding section. Percentage of error resilience is used
to measure the effects of register instruction type and data type on experiments.
The investigation demonstrates that injection location do affect the failure pro-
file, this means, injection in certain locations are more efficient in uncovering
vulnerabilities and are likely to cause failures. This motivates the need for a
systematic approach to select injection locations for the LnCm fault model. The
remainder of the section presents and further discuses these results.
Table 6.7, Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 present the percentage error sensitivity ob-
served under the L1C1, L1C2 and L2C1 fault models respectively. Each row
represents the percentage of error sensitivity for the different failure classes un-
der the fault outcome column for a given block location and target program.
Table 6.6 depicts the confidence interval at 99% for the observed error sensitiv-
ity.
Figures 6.3a–6.3c depict effects of instruction type on the error sensitivity rate
to the different failure classes with respect to the assumed fault model. The
vertical axes represent the percentage of error sensitivity plotted against the
failure classes.
Figures 6.4a–6.4c present the results of the effect of error injections into the
different register data types on the different failure classes. Similar to the in-
struction type charts, the horizontal axes depicts percentage error sensitivity
over the different failure classes represented on the vertical axes.
6.4.1 Block Location
This section evaluates the impact of faults with respect to their block location in
the program execution. Tables 6.7–6.9 show the percentage of error sensitivity
observed for the different fault models over the different target programs and
Table 6.6 shows confidence interval ranging from ±3.34% to ±6.44% for L1C1
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and L1C2 errors and from ±0.45% to ±9.10% L2C1 errors.
Table 6.6: Confidence interval of error resilience for all blocks
Fault
Model
Block
Location
Confidence Interval (99%)
No Impact Exception SDC Time Out Crash
L1C1
Early
±3.34% ±5.62% ±1.76% ±0.63% ±6.44%Central
Late
L1C2
Early
±3.34% ±5.62% ±1.76% ±0.63% ±6.44%Central
Late
L2C1
Early ±4.72% ±5.62% ±2.49% ±0.90% ±9.10%
Central ±7.95%
Late
±2.36%
±3.97% ±1.25% ±0.45% ±4.55%Early + Central
Early + Late ±3.98% ±1.24%
Central + Late ±7.95% ±0.63% ±0.90% ±9.10%
Table 6.7: Error sensitivity distribution for different block locations under L1C1.
Target
Program
Block
Location
Fault Outcome (%)
No Impact Exception SDC Time Out Crash
Derivatives
Early 0.00 25.30 0.00 0.00 74.70
Central 0.00 28.88 0.00 0.00 71.13
Late 0.00 29.33 0.00 0.00 70.68
Step
Early 0.00 12.27 0.00 0.05 87.68
Central 0.00 54.15 0.00 0.05 45.80
Late 0.00 26.80 0.00 0.05 73.15
Cubic
Early 5.50 43.00 5.95 0.43 45.13
Central 4.60 47.40 10.69 0.30 37.01
Late 7.50 43.33 8.70 0.30 40.18
Isqrt
Early 7.94 16.43 8.59 0.43 66.61
Central 4.60 65.77 10.69 0.05 18.89
Late 7.50 61.70 8.70 0.55 21.55
Corners
Early 28.38 7.40 16.53 0.25 47.45
Central 68.08 10.85 3.78 0.00 17.30
Late 10.55 7.35 29.10 0.00 53.00
Edges
Early 8.72 0.00 0.01 1.17 90.10
Central 54.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.78
Late 66.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.20
Smoothing
Early 5.58 30.16 0.00 2.35 61.91
Central 75.83 0.00 0.01 0.00 24.17
Late 17.50 0.00 0.02 49.22 33.26
The results show that block location exhibits both similar and contrasting be-
haviours for the three types of errors. For example, it is observed that overall,
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Table 6.8: Error sensitivity distribution for different block locations under L1C2.
Target
Program
Block
Location
Fault Outcome (%)
No Impact Exception SDC Time Out Crash
Derivatives
Early 0.00 33.53 0.00 0.00 66.47
Central 0.00 34.75 0.00 0.00 65.25
Late 0.00 34.55 0.00 0.00 65.45
Step
Early 0.00 4.85 0.00 0.03 95.12
Central 0.00 69.43 0.00 0.03 30.53
Late 0.00 34.53 0.00 0.03 65.43
Cubic
Early 2.39 41.90 3.18 0.11 52.42
Central 2.54 44.16 6.37 0.00 46.93
Late 1.91 44.04 6.10 0.00 47.95
Isqrt
Early 2.90 39.20 3.87 0.13 53.90
Central 3.07 73.99 7.70 0.00 15.24
Late 2.30 72.99 7.33 0.42 16.96
Corners
Early 33.67 4.93 12.10 0.17 49.13
Central 75.47 7.23 3.60 0.00 13.70
Late 9.45 4.90 34.23 0.00 51.42
Edges
Early 8.70 0.00 0.01 0.73 90.56
Central 51.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.96
Late 77.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.09
Smoothing
Early 1.84 37.32 0.00 1.47 59.38
Central 41.01 43.98 0.01 0.00 15.00
Late 9.64 46.53 0.01 23.72 20.09
irrespective of the error type, early injections terminates with a Crash, and late
injections results in higher proportion of Time outs. Further, the results also
denote that failure mode for individual target programs tend to vary under all
three fault models. This may be possibly be on the account of early injections
increasing the likelihood of error propagation. Additionally, the results show
an almost consistent concomitant increase in proportion of Crash with reduc-
tion of Exception rate and vice versa across the block locations. On the other
hand, the results depict late injections of L1C1 and L1C2 errors induces higher
percentage of SDCs whereas the opposite is the case for late injection of L2C1
errors. L2C1 error can be injected at different times. For, L2C1 errors injection
in Central blocks rarely causes Crash, whereas injecting a L2C1 error in target
combination of central and block of another location type greatly increase the
proportion of Crash.
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Table 6.9: Error sensitivity distribution for different block locations under L2C1.
Target
Program
Block
Location
Fault Outcome (%)
No Impact Exception SDC Time Out Crash
Derivatives
Early 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 99.85
Central 0.00 13.63 0.00 0.00 86.38
Late 0.00 13.35 0.00 0.00 86.65
Early & Central 0.00 21.38 0.00 0.00 78.63
Early & Late 0.00 22.04 0.00 0.00 77.96
Central & Late 0.00 40.73 0.00 0.00 59.28
Step
Early 0.00 6.82 0.00 0.02 93.15
Central 0.00 77.08 0.00 0.03 22.90
Late 0.00 76.48 0.00 0.00 23.53
Early & Central 0.00 11.76 0.00 0.02 88.22
Early & Late 0.00 25.78 0.00 0.00 74.22
Central & Late 0.00 76.48 0.00 0.00 23.53
Cubic
Early 1.42 44.64 1.54 0.02 52.38
Central 2.01 43.52 2.95 0.00 51.51
Late 2.03 48.64 3.17 0.00 46.16
Early & Central 1.74 44.64 2.38 0.01 51.23
Early & Late 1.73 43.52 2.25 0.01 52.49
Central & Late 2.14 47.15 3.24 0.00 47.48
Isqrt
Early 1.48 79.02 1.60 0.02 17.88
Central 2.06 81.28 3.02 0.00 13.64
Late 2.06 81.92 3.22 0.30 12.50
Early & Central 1.79 81.36 2.44 0.01 14.40
Early & Late 1.77 70.15 2.31 0.49 25.29
Central & Late 2.08 81.92 3.16 0.78 12.05
Corners
Early 15.80 2.96 10.56 0.10 70.58
Central 81.88 4.34 0.76 0.00 13.02
Late 6.73 4.46 0.76 0.00 88.05
Early & Central 44.64 2.00 8.86 0.00 44.51
Early & Late 39.79 1.98 23.82 0.00 34.42
Central & Late 83.63 4.46 0.91 0.00 10.99
Edges
Early 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 99.63
Central 16.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 83.54
Late 88.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.83
Early & Central 8.52 0.00 0.01 0.10 91.36
Early & Late 40.47 0.00 0.02 0.00 59.52
Central & Late 68.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.25
Smoothing
Early 0.00 24.83 0.00 0.85 74.33
Central 89.71 0.00 0.01 1.08 9.20
Late 17.74 0.00 0.08 14.69 67.49
Early & Central 7.32 43.94 0.00 0.31 48.43
Early & Late 0.96 55.85 0.01 4.69 38.50
Central & Late 69.31 0.00 0.02 5.63 25.04
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No	Impact Exception SDC Time	Out Crash
Binary 13.26% 25.39% 9.95% 7.02% 44.38%
Casting 29.37% 24.01% 2.81% 0.10% 43.71%
MA-AC 16.11% 25.45% 3.85% 1.68% 52.90%
(a) L1C1
Figure 6.3: Error sensitivity distribution of instruction type for the fault models
over all target programs.
6.4.2 Register Instruction Type
Figure 6.3a presents the impact of instruction type of the target location when
imparted with L1C1 errors. The results, for example, implies that Crash rate
is higher in MAAC operations. It may be argued that errors injected in these
type of locations are more severe because these instructions are most probably
pointers to stack and other register addresses. On the hand, the results show
that SDC rate are most probably when injected in Binary locations. This may
be on the account of Binary targets are usually value which may likely affect
the output program. In Figure 6.3b, the result showing how injecting L1C2
errors into the different instruction type affect the failure classes is presented.
The results show that subjecting the different instruction types to L1C2 errors
causes similar failure mode.
Figure 6.3c depicts the failure mode when the different instruction type are tar-
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No	Impact Exception SDC Time	Out Crash
Binary 13.19% 25.49% 10.75% 3.53% 47.04%
Casting 24.91% 31.90% 2.11% 0.03% 41.05%
MA-AC 13.87% 30.80% 2.73% 0.94% 51.66%
(b) L1C2
Figure 6.3: Error sensitivity distribution of instruction type for the fault models
over all target programs.
geted with L2C1 errors. Similar to block locations, L2C1 errors have instruction
type combination unique to them, because, they can have one target in an in-
struction type of one category and the second target in instruction type of a
different category. The results show, dissimilar to L1C1 and L1C2 errors, Crash
rate is higher when injection is in a combination of Binary and Casting location.
6.4.3 Register Data Type
The results in Figure 6.4a depict the effect of L1C1 error injections into the
different data types on the different failure classes. The results, for example,
show that L1C1 errors in Pointer often result in Crash, L1C1 errors in Control
cause higher proportion of No impact and in Other induce more SDC rate.
Arguably, L1C1 errors in pointers tend to cause more severe failures. Figure 6.4b
demonstrates that the effect of the different data types on the fault outcome
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No	Impact Exception SDC Time	Out Crash
Binary 23.33% 15.75% 3.21% 2.70% 55.02%
Casting 28.93% 20.70% 4.25% 0.97% 45.14%
MA-AC 40.85% 21.23% 2.03% 0.66% 35.24%
Binary	&	Casting 23.03% 6.43% 2.76% 2.70% 65.09%
Binary	&	MA-AC 28.66% 17.43% 3.87% 0.90% 49.13%
Casting	&	MA-AC 40.80% 17.13% 2.00% 0.64% 39.43%
(c) L2C1
Figure 6.3: Error sensitivity distribution of instruction type for the fault models
over all target programs.
when imparted with L1C2 errors is similar to the effect caused by injecting L1C1
errors.
Figure 6.4c show how injecting L2C1 errors into the various data type impact
on failure mode. The results show that, similar to L1C2 and L1C1 errors, L2C1s
cause higher Exception rate when injected into Other. The results demonstrate,
dissimilar to L1C2 and L1C1 errors, L2C1s cause higher No impact rate when
injected into Other or when inserted into combination of Control and Other. The
results also show that although injecting L2C1 in Pointer cause high proportion
of Crash, injecting L2C1 errors into a Pointer and Control target combination
induces higher proportion of Crash.
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No	Impact Exception SDC Time	Out Crash
Pointer 9.85% 18.91% 3.68% 0.51% 67.05%
Control 29.62% 29.58% 3.60% 0.06% 37.15%
Other 15.69% 24.07% 6.65% 7.16% 46.43%
(a) L1C1
Figure 6.4: Error sensitivity distribution of data type for the fault models over
all target programs.
6.5 Correlations
In this section two sets of correlations analysis was done to test: (i) the linear
relationship between failure classifications, and (ii) testing the monotonic rela-
tionship between injection locations with respect to error sensitivity rate and
failure classes. Correlation coefficient is used to measure the correlation rela-
tionships, i.e., correlation coefficient is used as a measure to test the extent to
which two variables tend to change together. A correlation coefficient describes
both the strength and the direction of the association. Pearson correlation co-
efficient is adopted to measure linearity between failure classes, and Spearman’s
rank-order correlation coefficient to test association between injection locations
with respect to failure classes and their rate. To this the percentage of error sen-
sitivity is ranked starting from 1 being the highest. when more than one sample
share the same error sensitivity percentage, they are then given the same rank.
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No	Impact Exception SDC Time	Out Crash
Pointer 4.86% 20.20% 2.41% 0.23% 72.30%
Control 20.81% 44.01% 2.18% 3.45% 29.55%
Other 19.32% 34.16% 5.63% 1.08% 39.81%
(b) L1C2
Figure 6.4: Error sensitivity distribution of data type for the fault models over
all target programs.
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient: The Spearman’s correla-
tion evaluates the monotonic relationship between two continuous or ordinal
variables. In a monotonic relationship, the variables tend to change together,
but not necessarily at a constant rate. There are two methods to calculate
Spearman’s rank-order correlation depending on whether: (i) the data does not
have tied ranks or (ii) the data has tied ranks. The formula in equation 6.3
measures the ρ when there are no tied ranks:
ρ = 1− 6
∑
di
n(n2 − 1) (6.3)
where di = difference in paired ranks and n = number of cases. Equation 6.4
shows the formula to calculate ρ when there are tied ranks:
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No	Impact Exception SDC Time	Out Crash
Pointer 20.76% 12.03% 1.50% 0.79% 64.91%
Control 17.81% 14.79% 3.77% 2.90% 60.74%
Other 45.64% 29.88% 1.89% 1.29% 21.30%
Pointer	&	Control 20.53% 5.13% 1.22% 0.76% 72.36%
Pointer	&	Other 17.55% 11.67% 3.43% 2.90% 64.46%
Control	&	Other 45.75% 23.83% 2.03% 1.21% 27.18%
(c) L2C1
Figure 6.4: Error sensitivity distribution of data type for the fault models over
all target programs.
ρ =
∑
(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√∑
(xi − x¯)2(yi − y¯)2
(6.4)
where i = paired score. The ρ is based on the ranked values for each variable
rather than the raw data. A ρ of +1 indicates a perfect association of ranks, a ρ
of zero indicates no association between ranks and a ρ of −1 indicates a perfect
negative association of ranks. The stronger the association of the two ranks,
the closer ρ will be to either +1 or −1 depending on whether the relationship
is positive or negative, respectively.
Table 6.10 shows the ρ and how significant (p−value) is the association between
ranks. ρ is the correlation between the two variables (one listed in the row, the
other in the column). ρ marked with ∗∗ means the association is significant at
α = 0.01.
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Table 6.10: Spearman’s rank-order correlations
Instruction
Type
Data
Type
Block
Location
Fault
Model
Instruction
Type
ρ 1.000 0.270** 0.332** 0.498**
p-value . 0.000 0.000 0.000
Data Type
ρ 0.270** 1.000 0.462** 0.576**
p-value 0.000 . 0.000 0.000
Block
Location
ρ 0.332** 0.462** 1.000 0.619**
p-value 0.000 0.000 . 0.000
Fault
Model
ρ 0.498** 0.576** 0.619** 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 .
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Pearson product moment correlation: The Pearson correlation evaluates
the linear relationship between two continuous variables, X, Y . A correlation is
linear when a change in one variable is associated with a proportional change in
the other variable. The Pearson correlation coefficient can take a value between
+1 and −1 inclusive, where +1 is total positive correlation, zero is no correla-
tion, and −1 is total negative correlation. A value greater than zero indicates
a positive relationship; i.e., as the value of one variable increases, so does the
value of the other variable. A value less than 0 indicates a negative association,
i.e., as the value of one variable increases, the value of the other variable de-
creases. Pearson’s correlation coefficient when applied to a sample is commonly
represented by the letter r. Equation 6.5 shows how r is measured:
r =
n
∑
xiyi − x¯y¯√
(
∑
xi2 − nx¯2)(
∑
yi2 − ny¯2)
(6.5)
where n = number of cases. Similar to the Spearman’s correlation coefficient,
the closer r is to zero, the weaker the association between the variables.
Table 6.11 depicts the r and the significance (p − value) of the association
between variables. r the linear correlation between the two variables (one listed
in the row, the other in the column). Similar with the Spearman’s rank-order,
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Table 6.11: Pearson product moment correlations
No Impact Exception SDC Time Out Crash
No Impact
r 1.000 -0.373** -0.133** -0.162** -0.328**
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exception
r -0.373** 1.000 -0.183** -0.254** -0.426**
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SDC
r -0.133** -0.183** 1.000 0.530** -0.371**
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time Out
r -0.162** -0.254** 0.530** 1.000 -0.368**
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Crash
r -0.328** -0.426** -.0371** -0.368** 1.000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
** Correlation is,significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
p− value of r marked with ∗∗ means the association is significant at α = 0.01.
6.5.1 Testing Monotonic Relationships
The Spearman’s rank-order correlation coeffient was used to measure the as-
sociation between injection locations and models (see Table 6.10). It should
be mentioned that statistical significance does not indicate the strength of the
Spearman’s rank-order correlation. In fact, the statistical significance testing of
the Spearman’s correlation does not provide you with any information about the
strength of the relationship. Thus, achieving a value of p = 0.001, for example,
does not mean that the relationship is stronger than if a value of p = 0.04 is
achieved. This is because the significance test is investigating whether one can
reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis, H0. For example, setting α = 0.05,
achieving a statistically significant Spearman’s rank-order correlation means
that one can be sure that there is less than a 5% chance that the strength of the
relationship found (ρ) happened by chance if the H0 are true. Also note that,
by definition, any variable correlated with itself has a correlation of 1.
Following are the H0
i tested for the correlation relationships:
• H01: There is no relationship between fault model and block location
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with respect to failure classes and their error sensitivity rate.
• H02: There is no relationship between fault model and instruction type
with respect to failure classes and their error sensitivity rate.
• H03: There is no relationship between fault model and data type with
respect to failure classes and their error sensitivity rate.
• H04: There is no relationship between block location and instruction type
with respect to failure classes and their error sensitivity rate.
• H05: There is no relationship between block location and instruction with
respect to failure classes and their error sensitivity rate.
• H06: There is no relationship between instruction type and data type
with respect to failure classes and their error sensitivity rate.
Here, strength of relationship is considered to be: (i) positively small or nega-
tively small, if the value of ρ falls between 0.1 to 0.3 or between −0.1 to −0.3
respectively; (ii) positively medium or negatively medium, if ρ measures between
0.3 to 0.5 or −0.3 to −0.5 respectively, and (iii) positively large or negatively
large, if ρ ranges between 0.5 to 1 or −0.5 to −1 respectively.
Table 6.10 denotes that H0
1 through H0
6 are rejected and the results show that
the strength of correlation varies from small to large. For example, the results
show that there is small positive association between instruction type and data
type (ρ = 0.277), a medium positive relation between data type and block
location (ρ = 0.462) and a large positive correlation between block location
and fault model (ρ = 0.619). This implies that error sensitivity rate for failure
classes is effected by (i) relationship of the instruction and data type of target
locations, (ii) relationship of the data type and block location of target locations
and (iii) relationship of the block location and fault model of target locations
respectively.
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6.5.2 Testing Linear Relationships
Pearson product moment correlation is used to measure the linear correlation
between failure groups (see Table 6.11). Similar with the Spearman’s rank-order,
the significance level does not show indicate strength of the linear association is
between the two variables. Further, the strength of relationship for r is classified
similarly to how the strength of association for ρ is defined. However, for r, only
associations of medium and large strength are considered. A variable correlated
with itself will always have a correlation coefficient of 1. The null hypotheses
are tested, one for each pairwise comparisons between failure classifications. For
example, a null hypothesis to test the relationship between SDC and No impact
states: “There is no linear relationship between error sensitivity rate of SDC
and error sensitivity of No impact”.
Table 6.11 shows that often the failure classes have statistically significant nega-
tive linear relationships with 99% confidence interval, which is expected. Thus,
the analysis set criterion for acceptable correlation as r > 0.3 or r > −0.3
for positive and negative correlations respectively. The results show Crash to
predominantly have statistically significant negative linear correlation with all
other failure classes. For example, Crash strongest linear association is with
Exception, r = −0.426, p − value < 0.0001. This means, overall Crash rate
increases when Exception rate decreases, and vice versa.
Based on the correlation criterion adopted, the result depicts few linear as-
sociations between the other class of failures. For example, the results show
a medium negative linear correlation between Exception and No impact, r =
−0.373, p − value < 0.0001. The results also denote a positive linear associ-
ation based on the analysis criterion set. For example, a large positive linear
correlation between SDC rate and Time out, r = 0.530, p− value < 0.0001 was
observed. This implies that SDC rate increases when Time out increases.
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6.6 Implication and Limitation
The case studies presented have demonstrated that the fault model assumed
have an impact on program execution. However, it should be noted that the
results presented in this chapter are specific for the target programs, the fault
models and input sets selected. For other programs, fault models, and/or input
sets the results may vary. A second limitation in the results presented here is
that, to the best of our knowledge, there is scarcity of field data that shows
how multiple bit upsets will manifest themselves in registers. There is however
increasing evidence that the rate of hardware errors is increasing. The relevance
of the results presented in this chapter is only relevant as far as the field data
matches the pattern of errors injection used. Another implication of the results
is that it does not matter for the SDC rate of the program whether L1C1 or
L1C2 faults are injected. This implies that if the primary focus is on SDCs, then
L1C1 fault models may be sufficient for analysing the resilience of the program,
compared to the double fault models.
6.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter the failure modes for soft-error models is investigated. Two vari-
ants of double bit-flip errors have appeared in dependability evaluation recently.
The objective, in this chapter, is to determine whether there is relevance in us-
ing both variants during validation. A range of errors injected into register are
considered and the impact of the type of locations on failures investigated. The
results presented in this chapter are statistically significant, especially after con-
ducting ≈ 10.5 million fault injection experiments on seven embedded software.
The analyses shows both variants are relevant as they induce different failure
profile in software and, in some cases, the failures are unique to a given variant.
Thus, the Double Single Bit-Flip (L2C1) fault model is proposed as novel fault
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model for soft-error dependability evaluation and as a specific case of the LnCm
fault model.
The results presented in this chapter indicate certain instruction type and cer-
tain data type (held in the register) are more resilient to certain errors than
others. Similarly, certain block locations are more sensitive to errors than oth-
ers. Further, fault models to be considered for validation, may be influenced by
the failure class under focus.
To this point it has been shown that the injection location have an impact on
failure profile of a software, and will provide insight into selecting potential tar-
get locations under a multiple locations multiple corruptions fault model. The
next chapter develops an approach, using the information obtained in this chap-
ter, to address the complexity issues associated with selecting potential locations
and target variables for multiple fault injections, identified in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 7
Towards Efficient Multiple Soft-Errors Injection
In this chapter, the problem of injecting multiple faults during an execution of
a software system is addressed. Traditionally, for a single bit-flip, a location
in the software is selected and a variable at that location is targeted for fault
injection. During execution, when the location is reached, a fault is injected
into that target variable.
On the other hand, when multiple fault injection is considered, there is both
a spatial and temporal dimension that have to be taken into account [163].
In general, it means that more than one variable can be targeted at a given
location (spatial dimension) or fault injection can happen in several locations
at different times (temporal dimension). Illustrated here is one typical problem
that can occur during multiple fault injections: variables v1 and v2 are targeted
at locations l1 and l2 respectively, and v2 depends on v1. Now, a fault injection
in v2 may override the effect of the error propagating from v1 to v2. There are
extreme solutions: (i) to inject in one location and allow for error propagation
(this is the traditional approach with single bit-flip model) or (ii) to inject in
every single location, potentially overriding the effect of previous fault injections
in that run, which is also computationally expensive.
Thus, as fault injection at every single location is not viable and fault injection
at a single location may not yield accurate results, a, possibly optimal, set of
possible locations should be chosen. There is a trade-off to be made then: to
inject early but potentially overriding the propagating error later during the
98
CHAPTER 7. TOWARDS EFFICIENTMULTIPLE SOFT-ERRORS INJECTION99
execution or to inject late but with reduced error propagation (this is taken to
mean a lesser number of variables with corrupted values). To guide the selection
of variables, two pieces of information are leveraged:
1. Locations based upon their perceived impact on the output are considered
2. Variables based upon their potential combined effect when corrupted are
chosen
For the first problem, the perceived impact of a location on the output may be
estimated by detecting the invariants at various locations in the software. This
can be possibly achieved by approximating the predicate at various locations
through the use of abstract interpretation-based techniques, as proposed in [68].
Overall, it is possible then to tag or label locations with a boolean value, with a
value of 1, indicating that the location can impact on the output. This does not
mean that all fault injection runs will lead to a deviation, but rather that there
is some fault injection run that will lead to some problem. Here, such locations
are referred to as vulnerable locations.
However, not all vulnerable locations are suitable for fault injection. For exam-
ple, a vulnerable location can exist within a branch and, if a variable is selected
for fault injection at that location, the variable may not be corrupted at runtime
as the execution may not follow the said branch. Thus, selecting vulnerable lo-
cations that will always be reached and that are reached earlier is better since
these locations will provide a higher probability of error propagation and hence
of causing a system failure. Henceforth, these locations are called potential lo-
cations. These locations are referred to as potential locations since, when target
variables are selected, no variable may be a chosen at the given location. They
merely indicate that such locations are good candidates.
For the second problem, given a set of potential locations, variables are chosen
according to the potential combined effect when corrupted.
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If a variable v is not targeted, then it means that either it is dependent on a
variable that has already been targeted (injecting a fault in v would overwrite
the propagating error) or a variable that depends on it has been targeted. Thus,
the objective is to target a small set of variables while maximising the number
of possible deviations (failures).
Earlier in Chapter 5 each problem is formalised as an optimisation problem, and
is shown to be NP-complete. Later in this chapter, a methodology to solve each
problem is developed. Specifically, the heuristics for injection locations selection
and target variables selection are developed and their usability is demonstrated.
7.1 Selecting Locations for Mulitple Fault Injec-
tions
As previously mentioned, the single fault that is traditionally assumed by SWIFI
techniques has become limited as it does not take into account multiple faults
and their possible interactions during executions. Few works have addressed
multiple fault injections [43, 79] and recently [103, 163], which addressed the
problem in a more systematic way. Aspects of mutation testing [70], through
the use of higher order mutants, can be considered as instances of multiple fault
injections.
Although there are works that studied the impact of multiple faults [1, 9, 103] in
the form of double faults, there is a dearth of work that addresses the problem
selecting the injection locations for multiple fault injections in a systematic way.
Lu et al. [103], to test the applicability of their fault injection tool, considered
double faults models. Similar to other work that adopted the L1C2 models,
they random flip two bits in a random target location. However, for the L2C1
fault, they selected the first target location randomly and use a time window, in
terms of execution cycle, to select the second injection location. They used time
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windows between 1 to 4. Similar to Lu et al. [103]’s work, the work here injects
into register, and considered the L1C2 and L2C1 as two of the specific cases of
the LnCm fault model evaluated in this chapter. However, the work here differs
from the work in Lu et al. [103], not only in objective but in the approach
selecting the fault injection points. The work, uses the proposed framework to
systematically select candidate variables to target.
Perhaps the work closest in spirit to that proposed here is that in [72], where
the authors develop a fault injection tool for cloud environment where multiple
failures are assumed to occur. To handle the exponential fault space, the au-
thors proposed pruning strategies that are based on static properties of specific
systems such as HDFS. Also, the fault type assumed in [72] is different to what
is assumed in this work, i.e., this work assumes bit-flips whereas Joshi et al.
[72] assume component failures. Further, the pruning strategies are developed
at an early stage whereas in this chapter, pruning strategies are developed at
“runtime”.
7.2 Injection Location Selection (ILS)
One disadvantage of SWIFI is that of intrusiveness. The impact of the use of
multiple fault injections on software systems, such as control software for real-
time embedded systems, will cause a high temporal overhead, causing deviation
in the program’s behaviour. Thus, the trade-off is that, on one hand, choosing
several potential fault injection locations may help to uncover vulnerabilities
but, on the other hand, the intrusiveness may cause the program to significantly
deviate from its original behaviour.
Thus, for multiple fault injections to work, this thesis seek to reduce the number
of fault injections to be performed while increasing the effect of each one, i.e., it
is counter-productive to inject into two variables where the respective effects are
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cancelled. To bound the number of possible fault injections, the number of po-
tential locations selected for injection are minimised with the aim of maximising
their effect. This is done by requiring the selected locations to be close to each
other, resulting in increased error propagation (i.e., a potentially greater number
of variables with corrupted values). This thesis capture this notion of location
closeness by a parameter, which is called amplification. However, selecting such
a set of potential locations at which to inject faults is very difficult.
7.2.1 Heuristic for ILS
To develop a heuristic for injection location selection, the concept of dominators
and dominance is adopted [92, 126]. First, the dominators concept will be briefly
outlined before explaining the heuristic. In a CFG G = 〈V, v0, A〉, where v0 is
the entry node, a node M is said to dominate a node N , (M dom N), if and
only if every path from v0 to N goes through M . Based on this basic dominance
concept, several other concepts can be developed, namely:
• By definition the dominance relationship is:
– Reflexive, i.e., every node dominates itself. Thus (N dom N) is
always true. Note a node is said to trivially dominates itself.
– Transitive, i.e, if a node M dominates a node N and N dominates a
node R, then M dominates R. Thus if (M dom N) and (N dom R)
then (N dom R) is always true.
– Anti-symmetric, i.e., if a node M dominates a node N and N dom-
inates node M , this implies that M = N . Thus if (M dom N) and
(N dom M) then M = N is true.
• M strictly dominates N, (M sdom N), if and only if (M dom N) and
M 6= N . Thus, a node cannot strictly dominates itself, i.e., (N sdom N)
is never true.
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• A node M immediately dominates a node N , (M idom N), if and only if
(M sdom N) and there does not exist a node D such that (D sdom N) and
(M sdom D). Thus if a node has more than one dominator, there is always
a unique ”nearest” strict dominator called its immediate dominator. Note
all nodes except the entry node have immediate dominators.
• The dominance frontier of a node M , DFM , is the set of all nodes that
are immediate successors to nodes dominated by M, but which are not
themselves strictly dominated by M. This means the dominance frontier
of M is the set of nodes where M ’s dominance stops, i.e., the set of nodes
where M lies only in some of the paths in G from v0 to the these nodes.
Thus DFM = {Z | (N idom Z) ∧ (M dom N) ∧ ¬(M sdom Z)}. Note a
node can be in its own dominance frontier.
• The dominator tree of G DomTree(G) is a tree created using immediate
dominators, where a parent node has as its children the nodes it imme-
diately dominates and the entry node v0 is the root of the tree. Thus
M → N exists in the DomTree(G) if and only if (M idom M). Note:
A node in a dominator tree dominates all its descendants in the tree, and
immediately dominates all its children.
It should be mentioned that dominators reveals which basic block in a CFG
must be executed prior to a block N , they also reveal blocks that are not always
executed. The complexity of generating the dominator tree is O(|U |2). The
dominator tree for the example CFG shown in Figure 3.1c is illustrated in
Figure 7.1a; Figure 7.1b depicts the dominance relationship for the dominator
tree. The coloured nodes depicts dominator nodes, i.e., nodes that strictly
dominate one or more nodes.
Given a CFG GP = 〈V, v0, A,W,Φ〉 of program P with amplification factor
A, the heuristic works as in Heuristic 7.1: first, the dominator tree of GP ,
DomTreeG(P ), is generated, and the edges are labelled with the corresponding
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Entry
BB1
BB2
BB3 BB4 BB5
Exit
(a) Dominator Tree
Basic Block Immediate	
Dominator
Dominates Dominance	Frontier
Entry None {Entry,	BB1,	BB2, BB3,
BB4,	BB5, Exit}
{Ø}
BB1 Entry {BB1,	BB2, BB3, BB4,	
BB5, Exit}
{Ø}
BB2 BB1 {BB2, BB3,BB4,	BB5,
Exit}
{Ø}
BB3 BB2 {BB3, Exit} {BB2, BB4,	BB5}
BB4 BB2 {BB4} {BB2,	,	BB5}
BB5 BB2 {BB5, Exit} {Ø}
Exit BB5 {Exit} {Ø}
(b) Dominance Relationships
Figure 7.1: Example of a dominator tree for a CFG and its corresponding
dominance relationships.
weights from GP . Each node are tagged with their dominance frontier as dic-
tated by GP . The set of possible locations U
l is initially set to V . Then, all leaf
nodes of DomTreeP are removed from U
l, and any node n that is not deemed
vulnerable, i.e., any node n of DomTreeP with a non-empty dominance frontier
(DFn 6= {∅}), were also removed from U l.
The set U l represents the set of potential fault injection locations. It does not
represent the actual locations where faults will be injected, but rather where
faults could potentially be injected. Given that A is set to twice the longest
distance between two successive potential locations - which can be obtained
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input : GP = (UP , u0, A,W,Φ)
output: Set of locations/blocks
begin
1 Generate the DomTreeG(P ) of GP ,
label edges in DomTreeG(P ) from GP ,
tag nodes in DomTreeG(P ) with dominance frontier from GP ;
2 Initially, set U l to be UP ;
3 Remove all leaf nodes of DomTreeG(P ) from U
l and all nodes
that immediately dominate the exit node.;
4 Remove any node n in DomTreeG(P ) where DFn 6= {∅} from U l;
5 Remove every node u such that Φ(u) = 0 from U l;
end
Heuristic 7.1: Heuristic for Injection Location Selection (ILS)
from a software engineer, this distance is equal to twice the longest distance
between two dominator nodes. Thus, the set of potential locations obtained
from Heuristic 7.1 satisfies the amplification factor A. Also, the reason the leaves
of the dominator tree are removed is that injection of faults at these locations
do not guarantee error propagation. The complexity of the ILS heuristic is
O(|U |2).
7.3 Target Variable Selection (TVS)
Following the identification of the set of potential locations, it is necessary to
identify the set of variables to target for fault injection. This means, there may
be potential locations at which no fault will be injected and others where more
than one fault may be injected.
To determine this target variable set, the dominator tree generated by the
heuristic presented in Chapter 7.2.1 (see Heuristic 7.1) is used and transformed
into a weighted graph, where a dependency graph is superimposed upon the
dominator tree. In this thesis, such a dependency graph for a program P upon
its dominator tree is modelled as follows: the dependency graph for P is denoted
as GDP = 〈U,A,U0,W,L〉, where U is the set of nodes (representing variables
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of P ), A representing the set of arcs, where (u, v) ∈ A means that variable u
depends on variable v, U0 is the set of nodes with no outgoing arcs (variables
which do not depend on any other variables), W is the function that returns the
weight on the arcs, and L is a function (called level) that maps a variable to a
given block in the dominator tree DP . The dependency graph of P is extended
in such a way that A is augmented to include arcs between nodes at the same
level with a weight 0. The significance of this is that if there are two variables
v1, v2 in the same block in the dominator tree, then it means that it is irrelevant
if a fault is injected in v1 first and v2 second or vice-versa.
The challenge in selecting target variables stems from the fact that when a
variable u is overlooked, then it means either that a variable v on which it
depends has been selected (and selecting u will override the effect of propagating
error from v to u) or a variable w that depends on v has been selected. Thus,
the decision of selecting a variable is not a local one. In Chapter 6, it has
been demonstrated that early injections have a potential of uncovering more
vulnerabilities. As such, the TVS heuristic is made biased towards selecting
variables in earlier blocks.
7.3.1 Heuristic for TVS
This Chapter presents a heuristic (See Heuristic 7.2) that returns a list of vari-
ables, together with their corresponding locations, that solves the TVS problem.
A function called level that maps a given variable onto the block it appears in
the dominator tree is assumed. The heuristic then works as follows: A variable
block is defined, which is set to 1 initially, to capture the block being visited in
the dominator tree. The heuristic takes as input the dependency graph of the
dominator tree and outputs a set of variables at given locations. It starts at
level 1 of the dominator tree and considers all the nodes at that level.
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Input: Input weighted dependency graph G = (U,A,U0,W,L)
Output: Set of variables for fault injection with their location
begin
1 block : = 1; // keeps track of the blocks from the
dominator tree
2 NotAllowed: set of (variable, block) init ∅;
// keeps track of the location of the variable in the
dominator tree
3 SelectedV ars: set of (variable, block) init ∅;
// selects the variable and its location in the program
4 while( block ≤ N )
do {
5 forall n ∈ {m | level(m) = block}
do {
6 if( ∃l : ((n, l) ∈ A ∧ [(l, level(l)) ∈ SelectedV ars ∨
((l, level(l)) 6∈ NotAllowed)]) )
then:
7 NotAllowed := NotAllowed ∪ {(n, level(n))};
8 elseif( ∃k : ((k, n) ∈ A ∧ (level(k) > level(n))) )
then:
9 SelectedV ars := SelectedV ars ∪ {(n, level(n))};
} od
10 block + +;
} od
end
Heuristic 7.2: Heuristic for Target Variables Selection
A variable n at a given location x is not selected (i.e., (n, x) ∈ NotAllowed) if
there is a variable l on which it depends has already been selected as a target
variable for fault injection or l is not allowed (i.e., injecting in v can override
the impact of the injection in l or error propagating from l) . Variable n is
otherwise selected (i.e., (n, x) ∈ SelectedV ars) if there is at least one variable
k that depends on it. The complexity of the TVS heuristic is O(|U |2).
7.4 Case Studies
Ten programs are used as case studies: Cubic, Isqrt, CRC, FFT, Dijkstra, In-
sert, Remove, Search, Encfile, Decfile. Description of these program and their
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input data is presented in Chapter 3.3. Fault injection experiments are per-
formed to evaluate the viability of the proposed injection locations framework.
LLFI (See Chapter 3.4.2) is used for all experiments. The proposed approach fo-
cuses on efficient selection of injection location. However, even with the heuristic
proposed, there is still an exponential number of bits to flip. To keep the experi-
ments tractable the work presented here only consider flipping maximum of four
bits. Thus only single, double, triple and quadruple fault models as described
in Chapter 3.2 are adopted for the evaluation of the case studies. Henceforth in
this chapter, Multiple Fault Injections (MFI) is assumed to mean double bits
or triple bits or quadruple bits fault injection, unless specified otherwise.
Source/byte
code
Generate	CFG Generate	Dependency	Graph
Execute	ILS	Heuristic
Generate	Dominator	Tree
Prune	Dominator	Tree
Potential	Injection	
Locations (Blocks)
Execute	TVS	Heuristic
Superimpose	 Dependency	
Graph	on	Pruned	Dominator	
Tree	(Generate	Vargraph)	
Target	
Variable	Set
Figure 7.2: An overview for the execution of the proposed framework to select
efficient target variables.
Figure 7.2 summarises the workflow of the ILS and TVS heuristics (for identi-
fying injection locations) for the LnCm fault model .
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7.5 Experiment Setup
The experimental procedure adopted was to address the following research ques-
tions:
• Does MFI in variables identified by the TVS heuristics uncover more vul-
nerabilities than MFI in interface variables?
• Does MFI in variables identified by the TVS heuristics uncover more vul-
nerabilities than MFI in randomly selected variables?
• Does MFI in variables identified by the TVS heuristics uncover more vul-
nerabilities than injecting single bit-flip (L1C1) faults in the same vari-
ables?
• How does MFI as multiple bit-flips faults in a single variable or MFI as
single bit fault in multiple variables affect the the fault injection outcome?
The fault injections experiments performed focused on processor faults that
impact on the program state by altering the content of ISA registers. Hence-
forth, variables denote states defined by the registers. Fault injection location
is defined according to the assumed fault model under investigation as follows:
• L1C1: Single bit-flip error in a single location is considered, i.e., one bit
is flipped in a single location.
• L1C2: Double bit-flips error in a single location is considered, i.e., two
bits are flipped in a single location.
• L1C3: Triple bit-flips error in a single location is considered, i.e., three
bits are flipped in a single location.
• L1C4: Quadruple bit-flips error in a single location is considered, i.e., four
bits are flipped in a single location.
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• L2C1: Double single bit-flip error in a pair of locations is considered, i.e.,
two locations are chosen and a single bit is flipped in each location.
• L3C1: Triple single bit-flip error in a triad of location is considered, i.e.,
three locations are chosen and a single bit is flipped in each location.
• L4C1: Quadruple single bit-flips error in a quad of location is considered,
i.e., four locations are chosen and a single bit is flipped in each location.
• L2C2: Double bit-flips error in a pair of locations is considered, i.e., Two
locations are chosen and two bit is flipped in each location.
Variable selection is done randomly from internal program variables or at pro-
gram interface or by using TVS heuristics. It should be mentioned that variables
selected at the program interface are done exclusively at the entry point, i.e.,
input interface.
7.5.1 Application of the Proposed Framewwork
The heuristics presented in preceeding sections are executed for the case studies
as follows:
Step 1: Executing ILS
To apply the ILS heuristic (See Heuristic 7.1), first, the CFG (as described in
Chapter 3.1 is generated. Since faults are injected into registers, the CFG for
the IR byte-code of the program is generated rather than for its source code.
Figure 7.3 shows the CFG for Isqrt. Due to space limitations, only graphs for
Isqrt are presented and adopted to provide an overview of the execution flow of
the heuristics.
Next, the generated CFG is converted into its dominator graph by applying the
dominance concept defined earlier on in this chapter. The dominator tree for
Isqrt is shown in Figure 7.4. Then, the set of potential injection locations, Ul,
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Figure 7.3: (Extended) CFG for Isqrt
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is set to contain all nodes of the dominator graph. Thus:
Ul = {block1, . . . , block34}
Next, block24 and block28, being leaf nodes, are taken out from Ul, nodes dom-
inating the exit block is also removed, in this case block34. Finally, all nodes
with non-empty dominance frontier set are taken out Ul, thus block5 through
block23 and block25 through block27 are removed and the following set of blocks
is returned.
Ul = {block1, . . . , block4, block29, . . . , block34}
Step 2: Execute TVS
To apply the TVS heuristic (see Heuristic 7.2), the dependency graph for the
program is superimposed on its dominator tree generated in Step 1. The super-
imposed graph is condensed to only include nodes (blocks) returned by the ILS
heuristics.
In Figure 7.5 the superimposed dependency graph over the dominator tree (of
blocks set returned by ILS heuristics) for Isqrt is depicted.
Figure 7.6 simplifies the superimposed dependency graph as a variable graph
(vargraph) and Heuristic 7.3 shows the Heuristic for generating a vargraph. The
complexity of this heuristic is O(|U |2).
Then, the TVS heuristic is applied on the vargraph of Isqrt to obtain the MTVS.
MTVS is initialised to be null and the process is started in block1. All variables
in block1 are added to the MTVS, since the MTVS is empty, i.e., there are no
variable in MTVS that any of block1 variables are dependent on. Thus variables
%1, %2, %a, %r, %e and %i are added to MTVS. Moving to block2, because
variables %1, %2, %a, %r, %e and %i are dependent on %1, %2, %a, %r, %e
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Figure 7.4: Dominator tree for Isqrt
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Figure 7.5: Dependency graph superimposed on dominator tree for Isqrt over
its potential injection location set.
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Figure 7.6: Variable Graph for Isqrt
and %i in block1 respectively, they are not added to MTVS. However, variables
%1 and %2 are dependent on the interface variables x and q respectively. Thus,
as x and q are not dependent on any variable in MTVS they are added to the set.
Moving through the remainder blocks, no eligible variable is found for MTVS
as all variables encountered are dependent on at least one variable contained in
MTVS.
Thus executing the TVS heuristic on Isqrt returned the following variables at
the following locations:
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Input: Dominator dependency graph G = (U,A,U0,W,L)
Output: Variable graph G′ = (V ′, A′, U0,W ′)
begin
1 block, A′, V ′ := 1, ∅, ∅ ; // keep track of the blocks from
the dominator tree
2 while( block ≤ N )
do {
3 forall n ∈ {m | level(m) = block}
do {
4 if( ∃l : ((l, n) ∈ A) )
then:
5 V ′ := V ′ ∪ {n};
fi
} od
6 if( block = 1 )
then:
7 U0 := V
′;
fi
8 block + +;
} od
9 forall m ∈ V ′
do {
10 if( ∃n ∈ V ′ : (m,n) ∈ A )
then:
11 A′ := A′ ∪ {(n,m)};
fi
} od
12 W ′ := W ;
end
Heuristic 7.3: Algorithm to obtain a variable graph
{(%1, block1), (%2, block1), (%a, block1), (%r, block1),
(%e, block1), (%i, block1), (%x, block2), (%q, block2), }
It should be mentioned that in all the case studies, all interface variables are
returned as subsets of the variables set returned by the TVS heuristic.
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7.5.2 Experiment Procedure
It should be mentioned that the programs are instrumented using the instru-
mentation process explained in Chapter 6.2.1, however, the variables are chosen
using the three different variable selection methods and the errors injected are
based on the different fault models adopted in this chapter. It should also be ob-
served execution flow, campaign and experiment are as defined in Chapter 6.2.1.
To answer the four research questions posed earlier in this chapter, a number
of fault injection experiments into a number of different variables (or combi-
nations of variables) identified by different selection methods was conducted.
Before running these experiments, internal program variables were selected ran-
domly for the different target programs. Table 7.1 presents the total number of
variables chosen for the three different variable selection methods.
Table 7.1: Number of target variables selected for the different target programs
Programs
Variable Selection Method Program Variables
(Total #)Interface Heuristic Random
CRC 4 11 6 38
FFT 7 33 17 212
Dijkstra 4 7 4 70
Insert 2 10 5 76
Remove 2 13 7 277
Search 3 9 5 60
Encfile 5 15 8 105
Decfile 6 21 11 126
Cubic 2 8 4 171
Isqrt 6 19 10 39
For each execution flow, fault injection at locations corresponding to interface
variables was executed at source registers of Store instructions. All other injec-
tions were done into destinations registers of their respective locations. Variables
are grouped according to their selection method. For each group of variables,
errors injections consisting of double, triple and quadruple locations, were done
in every pairwise, triadwise and quadwise combination of variables, respectively.
For each campaign, 1000, 2000, 3000 and 4000 random experiments were con-
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ducted for each single errors, each double errors, each triple errors and each
quadruple errors, respectively. A total of 53, 163, 000 fault injections was con-
ducted (See Table 7.2).
Table 7.2: Total number of fault injection experiments conducted over all target
programs
Per Fault Model
L1C1 2340000
L1C2 4023000
L1C3 6363000
L1C4 8703000
L2C1 5994000
L3C1 7020000
L4C1 9360000
L2C2 9360000
Per Variable
Selection Method
Interface 8487000
Heuristic 30222000
Random 14454000
To better understand the profile of the software the failure scheme defined in
Chapter 3.4.3 is adopted to categorise the outcomes of the fault injection ex-
periments.
7.6 Evaluation of the Case Studies
This section sought to answer the research question introduced earlier in this
chapter (see Chapter 7.5). First, in the following section, the impact of variable
selection on experiments outcome is discussed and the various selection meth-
ods used in the experiments are compared, as reported in Chapter 7.5. The
experiments outcome shows:
1. Interface variables are subset of TVS of variables, and injections in inter-
face variables cause more SDCs.
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2. Injections in the full set of TVS cause more severe failure,
3. Injections in random internal variables show no consistent failure pattern,
4. Injecting LnCm faults causes more failures than injecting single faults,
5. Injecting L1Cm faults causes more SDCs and the higher the number of
corruptions the higher the proportion of SDCs,
6. injecting LnC1 faults causes more severe failures and the higher the num-
ber of corruptions the higher the proportion of SDCs.
This and following sections further analyse and discuss the impact of fault
model on experiments outcome. Analyses will be based on the data shown
in Tables 7.3–7.10 and in Figures 7.7a–7.7c.
Tables 7.3–7.10 depicts the percentage of error sensitivity for the different pro-
grams for each fault model under consideration. Each row shows the error sen-
sitivity to a particular failure class for a particular variable selection method.
Figures 7.7a–7.7c shows the average error sensitivity for the three variable selec-
tion methods across the different fault models. In each figure, the vertical axis
denotes the average error sensitivity to the failure classes (over all the programs)
and the horizontal axis depicts the different fault models.
Table 7.3, Table 7.4, Table 7.5, Table 7.6, Table 7.7, Table 7.8, Table 7.9 and
Table 7.10 shows the results under L1C1, L1C2, L1C3, L1C4, L2C1, L3C1, L4C1,
and L2C2, respectively. Figure 7.7a, Figure 7.7b, and Figure 7.7c shows the
results for variables selected randomly, variables selected at the interface and
variables selected by the TVS heuristic. In this analysis the variables selected
by the three methods will be referred to as random variables, interface variables
and TVS variables.
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Table 7.3: Average error sensitivity distributions for different programs for L1C1
Program
No Impact
(%)
Exception
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 8.95 7.17 3.99 55.64 30.22 26.17
dijkstra 33.85 20.66 10.94 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 10.74 9.02 4.50 50.94 31.43 22.23
search 64.48 36.50 10.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 40.78 26.94 6.89 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 9.98 7.99 2.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 14.09 9.49 3.42 43.80 26.69 22.46
decfile 14.13 9.57 3.38 43.92 26.90 22.20
isqrt 12.50 2.70 6.71 23.90 31.63 22.22
cubic 17.50 15.62 15.32 24.90 31.53 23.82
Program
SDC
(%)
Time Out
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 12.06 9.66 5.37 4.28 3.43 1.91
dijkstra 6.77 42.15 30.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 13.59 11.62 5.67 3.92 3.56 1.62
search 12.90 37.23 18.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 16.31 43.97 19.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 19.97 48.88 22.89 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 23.74 17.06 8.07 3.37 3.03 1.64
decfile 23.80 17.19 7.97 3.38 3.05 1.62
isqrt 19.10 27.33 15.22 0.20 0.00 0.00
cubic 15.60 15.52 8.51 0.00 0.10 0.20
Program
Crash
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic
crc 19.07 49.53 62.56
dijkstra 59.38 37.19 58.85
fft 20.81 44.36 65.98
search 22.62 26.28 70.85
insert 42.91 29.09 74.10
remove 70.05 43.13 74.34
encfile 15.01 43.74 64.42
decfile 14.78 43.29 64.83
isqrt 44.20 38.34 55.96
cubic 41.90 37.24 52.25
7.6.1 Variable Selection Method Effects
Figure 7.6 shows the distribution of the fault injection outcomes over all pro-
grams, grouped by fault model. These results were obtained through injections
into interface variables, random variables or TVS variables. The failure modes
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Table 7.4: Average error sensitivity distributions for different programs for L1C2
Program
No Impact
(%)
Exception
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 4.55 3.54 1.68 57.95 25.00 15.23
dijkstra 24.40 1.32 2.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 6.67 4.56 2.37 51.93 23.81 14.78
search 56.22 2.03 2.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 31.87 0.94 1.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 6.86 0.21 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 7.75 4.90 1.64 49.39 23.06 14.88
decfile 7.75 4.90 1.64 49.39 23.06 14.88
isqrt 5.89 0.40 2.10 17.88 27.20 15.72
cubic 7.89 18.10 15.32 22.68 16.70 9.01
Program
SDC
(%)
Time Out
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 8.52 6.64 3.15 1.70 1.33 0.63
dijkstra 4.85 39.80 24.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 10.23 7.51 3.80 1.53 1.26 0.61
search 11.18 61.55 24.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 12.67 56.94 28.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 13.63 62.69 45.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 18.16 12.24 5.39 1.45 1.22 0.62
decfile 18.16 12.24 5.39 1.45 1.22 0.62
isqrt 20.68 26.70 13.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
cubic 23.28 19.50 9.81 0.00 0.00 0.80
Program
Crash
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic
crc 27.27 63.50 79.31
dijkstra 70.75 58.88 73.12
fft 29.63 62.85 78.44
search 32.60 36.42 73.12
insert 55.45 42.12 69.58
remove 79.52 37.10 54.38
encfile 23.24 58.57 77.48
decfile 23.24 58.57 77.48
isqrt 55.54 45.70 68.77
cubic 46.15 45.70 65.07
of each fault model are calculated as the mean across all programs.
Injection in TVS Variables vs. Injection in Interface Variables
The observations from Figure 7.7b, and Figure 7.7c are as follows:
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Table 7.5: Average error sensitivity distributions for different programs for L1C3
Program
No Impact
(%)
Exception
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 1.94 2.41 0.99 38.83 24.82 11.13
dijkstra 19.60 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 3.60 3.48 1.51 36.04 23.65 10.89
search 51.04 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 27.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 5.42 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 3.76 3.53 0.98 37.56 24.24 11.09
decfile 3.76 3.53 0.98 37.56 24.24 11.09
isqrt 2.57 0.06 0.61 12.35 22.49 10.28
cubic 3.24 19.00 13.40 18.81 8.01 2.98
Program
SDC
(%)
Time Out
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 0.97 1.20 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
dijkstra 3.40 35.67 21.48 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 2.70 2.33 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
search 8.85 58.09 21.48 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 9.37 52.58 25.57 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 9.40 58.09 40.84 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 2.35 2.35 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
decfile 2.35 2.35 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
isqrt 20.66 25.08 10.94 0.00 0.00 0.00
cubic 31.64 22.20 9.90 0.00 0.00 2.80
Program
Crash
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic
crc 58.25 71.57 87.39
dijkstra 77.00 64.33 77.56
fft 57.66 70.55 86.57
search 40.10 41.91 77.56
insert 63.64 47.42 73.86
remove 85.18 41.91 58.98
encfile 56.34 69.88 87.07
decfile 56.34 69.88 87.07
isqrt 64.42 52.37 78.17
cubic 46.31 50.79 70.91
Overall, injection in TVS variables tend to induce more severe failure than
injection at only interface variables. On the other hand, injection at interface
variables are more susceptible to SDCs and Exception failures than injection in
TVS variables. With the exception of L1C4 and L2C1, injections into interface
variables are more probable to result in No impact than injections into the TVS
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Table 7.6: Average error sensitivity distributions for different programs for L1C4
Program
No Impact
(%)
Exception
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 3.17 2.41 1.63 63.49 24.82 0.49
dijkstra 24.53 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.32
fft 5.63 3.48 1.65 56.34 23.65 0.49
search 57.21 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.32
insert 32.49 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.38
remove 6.99 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.62
encfile 6.02 3.53 1.62 60.15 24.24 0.48
decfile 6.02 3.53 1.62 60.15 24.24 0.48
isqrt 1.06 0.01 0.17 8.12 18.19 6.42
cubic 1.25 18.90 10.68 14.67 3.64 0.90
Program
SDC
(%)
Time Out
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 1.59 1.20 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00
dijkstra 4.07 32.20 19.32 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 4.23 2.33 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00
search 9.48 54.24 19.32 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 10.77 48.68 23.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 11.59 54.21 37.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 3.76 2.35 1.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
decfile 3.76 2.35 1.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
isqrt 19.66 23.06 8.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
cubic 40.41 23.94 9.10 0.00 0.00 8.94
Program
Crash
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic
crc 31.75 71.57 97.07
dijkstra 71.40 67.73 80.20
fft 33.80 70.55 97.03
search 33.30 45.64 80.18
insert 56.74 51.21 76.47
remove 81.41 45.62 61.99
encfile 30.08 69.88 96.48
decfile 30.08 69.88 96.48
isqrt 71.15 58.74 84.89
cubic 43.67 53.51 70.38
heuristic variables. There is negligible difference in time out failures induced.
Injecting L1C1, L1C2, L1C3, L1C4, L2C1, L3C1, L4C1 and L2C2 errors in TVS
variables and interface variables mirrors the overall trend observed for each fault
outcome.
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Table 7.7: Average error sensitivity distributions for different programs for L2C1
Program
No Impact
(%)
Exception
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 9.97 14.02 3.93 59.12 8.03 4.89
dijkstra 10.76 0.00 2.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 11.56 14.19 4.14 52.87 7.91 4.84
search 31.03 0.00 2.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 14.36 0.00 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 2.60 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 18.06 19.55 3.93 53.54 7.47 4.89
decfile 18.06 19.55 3.93 53.54 7.47 4.89
isqrt 8.10 0.00 1.50 3.30 12.60 8.19
cubic 4.50 20.68 13.30 15.60 0.00 0.00
Program
SDC
(%)
Time Out
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 0.30 0.51 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
dijkstra 7.59 36.35 13.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 2.91 0.90 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
search 21.88 58.81 13.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 20.26 53.32 15.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 18.36 58.81 27.63 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 0.68 0.95 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
decfile 0.68 0.95 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
isqrt 56.40 13.20 6.79 0.00 0.00 0.00
cubic 19.30 17.08 9.20 0.00 0.10 0.30
Program
Crash
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic
crc 30.61 77.44 91.03
dijkstra 81.65 63.65 84.78
fft 32.66 77.00 90.63
search 47.09 41.19 84.78
insert 65.38 46.68 82.76
remove 79.03 41.19 71.90
encfile 27.72 72.02 90.93
decfile 27.72 72.02 90.93
isqrt 32.20 74.20 83.52
cubic 60.60 62.14 77.20
From the results in Tables 7.3–7.10, it is deduced that: on program level, sim-
ilar to the already observed failure trend, injecting faults into TVS variables
causes higher crash rate than injection in interface variables, with observable
percentage difference ranging from 13.03% to 45.00%, 14.24% to 36.70%, 13.23%
to 35.65%, 12.47% to 34.54%, 9.32% to 43.59%, 5.73% to 36.02%, 0.90% to
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Table 7.8: Average error sensitivity distributions for different programs for L3C1
Program
No Impact
(%)
Exception
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 0.10 1.05 0.05 52.99 4.22 0.50
dijkstra 0.68 0.00 0.12 8.49 7.55 0.99
fft 2.60 2.62 0.07 50.03 8.72 0.50
search 3.10 1.30 0.17 23.88 25.98 0.99
insert 2.25 1.22 0.13 24.99 24.47 1.23
remove 1.04 4.38 0.15 17.93 8.77 2.37
encfile 0.20 2.89 0.05 52.86 7.71 0.50
decfile 0.20 3.11 0.05 53.09 8.29 0.50
isqrt 5.53 0.00 0.26 2.25 5.25 1.43
cubic 2.40 9.51 2.47 8.32 0.00 0.00
Program
SDC
(%)
Time Out
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 0.10 1.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
dijkstra 8.15 3.02 1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 2.60 2.62 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
search 24.12 11.69 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 25.24 11.01 2.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 18.11 3.95 4.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 0.25 3.85 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
decfile 0.25 4.15 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
isqrt 38.50 5.50 1.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
cubic 10.29 7.86 1.71 0.00 0.05 0.06
Program
Crash
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic
crc 46.81 93.67 99.40
dijkstra 82.68 89.43 97.15
fft 44.78 86.05 99.35
search 48.90 61.03 97.06
insert 47.52 63.29 96.42
remove 62.92 82.90 93.20
encfile 46.69 85.55 99.36
decfile 46.46 84.45 99.36
isqrt 53.72 89.26 97.12
cubic 78.99 82.58 95.76
19.95%, 1.49% to 36.46% for L1C1, L1C2, L1C3, L1C4, L2C1, L3C1, L4C1 and
L2C2 errors, respectively .
While there is not much difference in proportion of time out rate, injection at
interface variables are more prone to No impact, exception failures and SDCs
than injection in TVS variables.
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Table 7.9: Average error sensitivity distributions for different programs for L4C1
Program
No Impact
(%)
Exception
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
dijkstra 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 0.63 0.80 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
search 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 1.64 0.37 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
decfile 1.74 0.38 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
isqrt 3.44 0.00 0.04 1.40 1.84 0.22
cubic 1.13 3.17 0.39 3.92 0.00 0.00
Program
SDC
(%)
Time Out
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 1.58 2.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
dijkstra 1.58 2.20 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 5.05 8.84 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
search 16.72 15.79 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 13.84 9.28 1.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 11.81 15.79 2.71 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 16.45 8.22 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
decfile 17.35 8.64 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
isqrt 13.33 7.51 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
cubic 4.04 17.43 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.01
Program
Crash
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic
crc 98.22 97.60 99.40
dijkstra 98.42 97.80 98.70
fft 94.32 90.36 99.40
search 83.28 84.21 98.70
insert 86.16 90.72 98.50
remove 88.19 84.21 97.24
encfile 81.91 91.40 99.25
decfile 80.91 90.99 99.25
isqrt 81.83 90.64 99.56
cubic 90.92 79.39 99.34
One possible reason for injections in interface variables leading to more SDCs,
and leading to severe failure less frequently may likely be faults in one or more
of these variables only gets activated in a looping structure. We surmise that,
should this hold true, error propagation is limited to a part of the state only
when faults are injected in these structures, thereby not disturbing the state
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Table 7.10: Average error sensitivity distributions for different programs for
L2C2
Program
No Impact
(%)
Exception
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 0.08 0.17 0.07 69.38 1.83 0.20
dijkstra 4.11 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 3.12 0.26 0.08 60.93 1.82 0.20
search 14.95 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 5.96 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 0.98 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 0.16 0.25 0.07 69.24 1.81 0.20
decfile 0.16 0.25 0.07 69.24 1.81 0.20
isqrt 1.58 0.00 0.01 0.64 0.53 0.03
cubic 0.49 0.74 0.05 1.69 0.00 0.00
Program
SDC
(%)
Time Out
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic Random Interface Heuristic
crc 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
dijkstra 5.29 28.25 9.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
fft 3.12 0.26 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
search 19.22 12.87 6.63 0.00 0.00 0.00
insert 15.32 10.56 8.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
remove 12.61 12.87 11.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
encfile 0.20 0.82 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
decfile 0.20 0.86 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
isqrt 6.11 24.05 6.82 0.00 0.00 0.00
cubic 1.75 45.45 9.68 0.00 0.00 0.00
Program
Crash
(%)
Random Interface Heuristic
crc 30.46 97.84 99.67
dijkstra 90.60 71.75 90.42
fft 32.84 97.67 99.65
search 65.83 87.13 92.99
insert 78.72 89.44 91.60
remove 86.41 87.13 88.62
encfile 30.39 97.11 99.62
decfile 30.39 97.08 99.62
isqrt 91.67 75.42 93.14
cubic 96.07 53.81 90.27
enough to cause a crash, but only enough to cause data failures (SDCs and
exception failures).
However, it should be noted that failures observed with interface variables are
a subset of the failures induced by the TVS heuristic, on the account of the
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L1C1 L1C2 L1C3 L1C4 L2C1 L3C1 L4C1 L2C2
Crash 39.84 48.93 62.58 53.09 50.08 55.79 89.94 69.36
Time-Out 1.40 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SDC 16.11 14.84 12.46 14.71 19.59 15.81 8.27 6.50
Exception 25.91 25.07 17.67 23.77 21.82 26.09 0.89 22.11
No	Impact 16.75 10.62 7.30 8.43 8.52 2.32 0.90 2.03
(a) Random
Figure 7.7: Average error sensitivity distribution over all target programs for
different variable selection methods.
interface variables are contained in the TVS heuristic variables. This means,
the failures uncovered by injections in interface variables are a subset of failures
uncovered by injections in the TVS variables. The trend is noticed across the
different fault models. Henceforth, interface variables and interface variables
subset will be used interchangeably.
Injection in TVS Variables vs. Injection in Random Variables
First the overall observations shown in Figure 7.7a, Figure 7.7b and Figure 7.7c
are presented: Very negligible difference between time out failures are observed.
While proportions of Exception failures are higher when injecting in random
program variables, the proportions of crash failures are ≈ 41% higher when
injecting in TVS variables. However, considering interface as a subset of TVS
variables and comparing injections into them with injections in random vari-
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L1C1 L1C2 L1C3 L1C4 L2C1 L3C1 L4C1 L2C2
Crash 40.28 49.49 55.77 58.53 63.11 82.96 88.82 83.55
Time-Out 1.18 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
SDC 26.16 30.00 26.91 25.57 23.97 5.33 10.17 15.56
Exception 20.80 15.45 13.16 11.75 4.76 8.57 0.31 0.70
No	Impact 11.57 4.62 4.16 4.14 8.15 3.13 0.69 0.19
(b) Interface
Figure 7.7: Average error sensitivity distribution over all target programs for
different variable selection methods.
ables, The most difference observed being ≈ 13% higher crash rate for injections
in interface variables, and ≈ 7% in favour of injections in program variables,
under L3C1 and L1C3 respectively. Similarly, random internal injections are
mostly more prone to exception failures than interface injections.
Observations on fault model level: the most noticeable difference is in the rate
of crash failures ranging from 13% to 41%, the lowest and highest difference are
observed under L1C3 and L3C1 errors respectively. There is almost no difference
in time out failure rate. Injections in random program variables are more prone
to exception failure and more probable to result in No impact than injections in
TVS variables. Similar trend is observed for injections into a interface variable
compared to injections in random variables. Injections into TVS variables is
often slightly more resilient to SDCs. However, injections into the interface
variables subset is more sensitive to SDCs.
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L1C1 L1C2 L1C3 L1C4 L2C1 L3C1 L4C1 L2C2
Crash 64.18 69.26 75.98 81.31 82.84 96.87 98.91 93.82
Time-Out 0.62 0.34 0.47 1.49 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
SDC 12.78 17.37 14.79 13.27 10.01 1.59 0.82 6.02
Exception 15.73 9.12 5.88 1.55 2.99 1.00 0.04 0.07
No	Impact 6.69 3.92 2.88 2.38 4.11 0.52 0.23 0.09
(c) TVS Heuristic
Figure 7.7: Average error sensitivity distribution over all target programs for
different variable selection methods.
Observations on program level: the following can be inferred from Tables 7.3–
7.10: while injection into TVS variable is more prone to crashes than injection
into random variables (with difference ranging from ≈ 0.18% to ≈ 69.22%), in-
jections in random variables are often more prone to SDCs (with most observed
difference of ≈ 11%) compared to injections in the full set of TVS variables and
consistently more resilient to the same SDCs when compared to the interface
variables subset. However, under certain errors for certain program injection
into the full set of TVS errors is more prone to SDCs than injections into ran-
dom variables. For example, under L1C2 for remove (patricia), injecting in full
set of TVS variables induced ≈ 32% higher SDCs and for Isqrt under L2C2
errors, injecting into random variables observed ≈ 50% higher SDC rate.
We conjecture, the tendency for injections in TVS variables to induce more
severe failure than injections in randomly selected program variables may be
7.6. EVALUATION OF THE CASE STUDIES 131
explained by the TVS heuristic bias towards selecting target locations that
will always be reached during normal program execution. This means faults
inserted in TVS variables will mostly be activated, i.e will be read by another
instruction in the program, except in instances where another activated fault
has either change the flow of execution or cause the program to prematurely
terminate.
7.6.2 Fault Model Effects
At a glance, L2C1, L3C1, L4C1 and L2C2 errors seem to consistently cause more
severe failures than L1C4, L1C3, L1C2 and L1C1 errors, they also tend to be less
susceptible to exception faults and less prone to SDCs. There is almost no differ-
ence between the eight models for time out failures. The multiple fault models
induces less benign faults than the single fault model. The proportion of no
impact faults is almost constant as corruption increases for the multiple corrup-
tions in single location fault models (L1C2, L1C3 and L1C4) and decreases with
corruption increase for the single corruption across multiple locations (L2C1,
L3C1 and L4C1) and for L2C2.
L1C1 faults vs. LnCm faults
Injecting LnCm faults cause higher crashes than injecting L1C1 faults, irrespec-
tive of variable selection method or fault type. Most crash rate difference are
observed under L4C1 faults, ≈ 50% for random variables, ≈ 49% for interface
variables subset and ≈ 35% for TVS variables full set. Whereas the least ob-
served rate difference are under L1C2 errors, ≈ 9% for random variables and
interface variables subset, and ≈ 5% for TVS variables full set.
Proportion of exception failures is lower under LnCm than under L1C1 faults,
irrespective of variable selection method. No impact rates observed under LnCm
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are almost halved, in some cases more, as compared to L1C1 errors. While SDCs
are less under errors injected across multiple locations (LnC1 and L2C2) than
under L1C1 errors, SDCs are slightly more under multiple errors injected into a
single variable than under L1C1 errors, for interface variables subset and TVS
variables (full) set. Most difference observed is for L2C1 errors, ≈ 4% and ≈ 5%
for interface variables subset and TVS heuristic (full) set, respectively. However,
for injections in random variables there is no distinct pattern in SDC rate. And
there is almost no observable difference between the LnCm models and the L1C1
model for time out failure mode.
Thus, the results show that LnCm faults tend to cause:
1. Higher proportion of failures,
2. Higher proportion of SDCs under L1Cm faults,
3. A higher proportion of severe failures under the LnC1 faults.
We conjecture that the reason for the higher proportion of crashes is due to the
fact that the impact of each individual fault is amplified, causing a big enough
perturbation in system state to cause a crash.
L1Cm faults vs. LnC1 faults vs. L2C2 faults
While injecting LnC1 faults cause more crashes and less no impact rates than
L1Cm faults, L1Cm causes more SDCs and exception failure rates than LnC1.
For injections in TVS variables, L1Cm causes negligibly higher proportion of
time out failures than LnC1.
Proportion of crash rate increases with number of corruptions, irrespective of
selection method. SDC decreases with number of corruptions for TVS vari-
ables, whereas for interface variables subset SDC rates increase with number of
corruptions under L1Cm faults and decrease with number of corruptions under
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LnC1 faults. However, for random variables, while SDC rate under L1Cm faults
slightly varied in no definitive way and under LnC1 it decreases as corruption
increases.
L1Cm injections in interface variables subset causes exception rate to slightly
decrease as number of corruption increases and no definitive change rate for in-
jecting LnC1. Injecting L1Cm faults in interface variables subset causes decrease
in exception failure rate as number of corruptions increases, whereas injecting
LnC1 causes slight decrease. There are no observable pattern for injecting ei-
ther L1Cm or LnC1 in random variables. Proportion of no impact rate decreases
with number of corruptions under either L1Cm or LnC1 irrespective of variable
selection method.
L2C2 faults cause less crashes than L4C1 faults but more crashes than the other
L1Cm and LnC1 faults, irrespective of variable selection method. Injecting L2C2
errors in interface variables subset or the full TVS variables set cause more SDC
rate than injecting multiple faults in more than two locations (L3C1 and L4C1
errors) and less SDC rates than injecting L1Cm and L2C1 faults. Whereas in-
jecting L2C2 faults in random variables cause less SDCs than either L1Cm or
LnC1 faults. Injecting L2C2 errors cause lower proportion of no impact rate than
injecting either L1Cm or LnC1, irrespective of fault variable selection method.
While injecting L2C2 faults cause negligibly higher proportion of exception fail-
ure rate for interface variables subset and full TVS variables set than injecting
L4C1 faults, for random variables L2C2 faults cause a much higher proportion
of exception failure rate than L4C1 faults. Whereas they cause less proportion
of exception failure rate in for the other types of errors. And there is almost no
observable difference between the different types of models for time out failure
mode.
Thus, the results show that:
1. Crash rate increase concomitantly with corruption increase,
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2. SDC rate increase with number of corruption under L1Cm faults and de-
crease as number of corruption increases under LnC1 faults,
3. LnC1 faults cause more crash rate and less no impact rate than L1Cm
faults,
4. L1Cm faults cause more SDC rate and exception failure rate than LnC1
faults.
We conjecture that LnC1 faults increase error propagation in a program, thus
resulting in lower no impact rat. Secondly, they amplify the effect of errors in the
program thereby causing more crashes. Also, it is postulated that because L1Cm
are constricted to a single location they do cause perturbation great enough to
corrupt the data but may not be great enough to induce a crash. Secondly, the
nature of the LnCm fault model, prohibits the selection of variables along the
same path, as such variable location combinations that may potential amplify
the effect of SDCs are overlooked. This is also postulated to account for the
reason why the L1Cm models are causing higher SDC rate that the LnC1 fault
model.
7.7 Implication and Limitation
From the results, the key findings that emerge are:
1. Differences exist among different types of variables selection methods in a
program in terms of their failure rates,
2. Injecting faults in TVS variables leads to higher crash rates compared to
injecting into randomly selected variables,
3. Interface variables are a subset of TVS variables, and injecting into them
leads to higher SDC rates,
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4. Difference exist among different types of soft-errors in a program in term
of their failure rates,
5. Flipping multiple bits in a single location leads to higher SDC rates as
compared to flipping single bits in multiple locations, and SDC rate in-
creases with increase in number of bits flipped,
6. Flipping single bits in a multiple location leads to higher crash rates as
compared to flipping multiple bits in a single location.
The results imply that systematic selection of variables for soft-error injections
potentially selects those locations that uncover more severe vulnerabilities in
program as compared to random variable selection. Another implication of the
results is it does not matter for the SDC rate of the program whether injections
are made in full TVS variables set or in just the interface variables subset. This
indicates that if the primary focus is on SDCs, then injections into interface
variables subset may be sufficient for analysing the resilience of the program,
compared to injections in the full TVS variables set. Similarly, the results show
adopting the L1Cm fault models may be sufficient for analysing the resilience
of the program to SDCs, compared to adopting LnC1 fault models.
The interface variables demonstrated a completely different failure profile to
that of its superset, the TVS variables. This suggests that different subset of
the target variable may potentially induce different failure profile. The approach
presented here is not readily applicable to neither black-box software as data
dependency cannot be obtained nor to software that cannot be modelled as
a control-flow graph. For such software, new techniques are required. The
target systems adopted, the input sets uses and fault models assumed may have
influenced the results shown, i.e., adopting different programs or input set or
fault model may produce a divergent result.
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7.8 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter presents heuristics to systematically select the location aspect of
the LnCm, fault model. This framework selects target variables for injecting
MBF in a single software execution. To determine these variables, the problem
is split into two: (i) injection location selection and (ii) target variables selection
at the possible locations. The thesis proved, in Chapter 5, both problems to
be NP-complete and provided, in this chapter, two heuristics, one for each
problem. Case studies have been developed to show the viability of the proposed
methodology. To demonstrate the framework the chapter have shown detailed
results from injecting seven versions of LnCm errors into ten embedded control
systems.
In comparison with injection in randomly selected variables, the results show
that LnCm uncovers more vulnerabilities. Also, the results show that the frame-
work always include interface variables in the set of target variables suitable for
injection. Injecting into interface variables uncovers more SDCs than random
injections. Injecting into full set of the selected variables uncovers more severe
vulnerabilities than random injections and into its interface variables subset. In-
jections into variables selected randomly uncovers more exception failures than
injections into variables at either the interface variables subsets or the full set
of variables selected by the approach.
Secondly, the results presented demonstrate that multiple errors in a single
locations (LnCm fault models) cause higher SDC rates as opposed to single
errors in multiple locations (LnC1 fault models), and SDC rate increases as
number corruptions introduced increases for L1Cm faults, whereas single errors
in multiple locations cause more crashes and lower no impact rates as compared
to multiple errors in a single locations. Thirdly, more severe vulnerabilities are
uncovered concomitantly with increase in number of corruptions.
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Finally, the results show that the fault space for multiple bit-flips fault injections
can be effectively and systematically reduced. The next chapter will explore
means of further reducing the fault space using data mining approach to discern
the bit-position combinations that would induce wider failure profile.
CHAPTER 8
Learning Bits Patterns
Thus far, the thesis has focused on determining efficient target locations for
the LnCm fault model. To this end, in the previous chapter a framework was
proposed to facilitate the selection of efficient program variables that should
be targeted during multiple soft-errors fault injections. This framework has
facilitated in the reduction of the exponential fault space (in terms of target
variables) for multiple fault injections. However, the fault injection point space
(in terms of injection points) remains enormous for the LnCm fault model.
For any given LnCm fault model, there are
(
x
n
)
variable combinations possible,
where x is the total number of all variables in the target variable set and n, the
maximum number of locations to corrupt in a given execution. And, number
of possible fault injections for a given location is
(
y
m
)
, where y is the size of the
given location (in terms of the length of bits) and m is the maximum number
of corruption to introduce in the said location. Thus, the fault space for the
LnCm fault model is
(
x
n
) · ( ym)n.For example, adopting a L3C4 fault model over
six target variables, with each variable being 8-bits long, makes the number
of possible injections
(
6
3
) · (84)3, i.e., there are 1, 410, 760, 000 possible injection
points.
This chapter attempts to fine tune the LnCm fault model by narrowing down the
fault injection points, in terms of combination of variables to inject into and the
bit-positions to perturb within a given variables combination. To this end, the
chapter develops a systematic approach for the identification of efficient injec-
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tion points for real world, embedded software. More specifically, the proposed
approach employs data mining techniques, including decision tree induction and
rule induction, for the analysis of fault injection data sets, in order to discover
efficient injection points. The results presented demonstrate that this approach
can be used to efficiently reduce the fault injection point space for the LnCm
fault model.
8.1 Data Mining in Software Dependability
Data mining techniques have been applied to address a number of other soft-
ware dependability issues. In the context of improving software reliability, the
application of data mining techniques have generally focused on the analysis
of failure data and service logs for dependable software systems. For example,
Some research [99, 101] have applied data mining techniques to improve soft-
ware bugs detection. For example, Livshits and Zimmermann [99] emplodyed
data mining techniques for learning common usage patterns from the revision
histories of large software systems. The research analyses source code check-ins
to find highly correlated method calls as well as common bug fixes in order to
automatically discover application-specific coding patterns. Lo et al. [101] first
mines a set of discriminative features capturing repetitive series of events from
program execution traces. It then performs feature selection to select the best
features for classification. These features are then used to train a classifier to
detect failures. There are studies that investigates data mining techniques for
the purposes of derivation of error detection predicates. For example, Pinte´r
et al. [122] used a combination of data mining techniques on data recorded
during benchmarking to identify key infrastructural factors in determining the
behaviour of systems in the presence of faults. These analyses can also serve to
help to identify weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a software system. Leeke et al.
[91] applied data mining techniques on fault injection data to discover efficient
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predicates for error detection mechanism in order to enhance dependability and
address vulnerabilities in software systems.
In contrast, the data mining-based approach proposed in this chapter seeks to
discover injection points for multiple soft-errors in order to enhance dependabil-
ity validation and address vulnerabilities in software systems.
8.2 Data Mining Concepts
Technological advancement have resulted in generating and recording flood of
data, and the amount of data information in the world is constantly rising as
technology advances. These data are of no use until they are converted into
useful information. Thus, it is necessary to analyse and understand this huge
amount of data and extract useful information from it. The ability to extract
useful knowledge hidden in these data and to act on that knowledge is becoming
vital in today’s increasingly information-driven world. In the case of the research
presented in this chapter, it is important to understand behavioural patterns of
software systems that can be used for building high-level soft-error fault models.
8.2.1 Fundamentals of Data Mining
Data mining is a technology that automatically sifts through huge amount of
raw data, seeking regularities and patterns that exist therein, with the aim
of using the information obtained to forecast behaviours of future data or to
derive knowledge about the data, if the data itself is obscure. Data mining is
well-motivated in areas where processes generate vast volume of raw data and
there exist high complexity in analysing the data.
Data mining sorts through large-scale data to discover patterns and establish
relationships. Technically, data mining is the process of finding correlations or
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patterns among dozens of fields in large relational databases. This process of
finding correlations or patterns is called learning. The (the patterns or corre-
lations) to be learned is called a concept or a target function or a model. The
data input used for learning the concept is a set of instances. Each instance
is an individual, independent example of the concept to be learned. It should
be mentioned that some learning tasks makes it improbable to express the raw
data as individual, independent instances and often require background knowl-
edge to be considered as part of the input. For example, learning task involving
time sequence. However, the research presented in this chapter employs simple
learning schemes and the data used can be presented in the form of individ-
ual instances. Each instance is characterised by the values of attributes that
measure different aspects of the instance. There are different types of attribute,
although the research here deals only with numeric and nominal (or categorical)
ones. The output produced by a learning scheme is called a concept description
or a target function or a model. Data mining learning styles include:
• Classification: This involves seeking novel and informative patterns. If
an existing structure is already known, data mining can be used to clas-
sify new cases into these pre-determined categories. That is, the learning
scheme called a classifier, is presented with classified instances from which
it is expected to learn a way of classifying previously unseen instances.
Classified instances are labelled with class values, and class values for new
instances are determined. In the case of the research presented in this
chapter, classification algorithms are applied to fault injection instances to
learn, fault injection points that may likely induce failure. In a sense, clas-
sification learning operates under supervision, as the actual outcome, i.e.,
the class, of each learning example is given. Thus, classification learning
is sometimes called supervised learning. The target function of supervised
learning is a discrete function and is also referred to as a classifier.
• Association: This seeks for insightful patterns where one event is corre-
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lated with another event. This seeks association between attributes, not
just ones that predict a particular class value. Association learning differ
from classification in two ways: (i) they can determine the value of any
attribute, not just the class, and (ii) they can determine the value of more
than one attribute at a time.
• Clustering: This involves discovering and recognising distinct categories
of facts not previously known within the data. This seeks groups of in-
stances that naturally belong together. Clustering finds these clusters and
assign the instances to them, and if need be assigns new instances to the
clusters.
• Forecasting (or prediction): Finds patterns in the data that can lead to
reasonable prediction about future probabilities and trends. This area of
data mining is known as predictive analytics. It is used to predict missing
or unavailable numerical data values rather than class labels. Regression
Analysis is generally used for prediction. Prediction can also be used for
identification of distribution trends based on available data.
• Sequence (or path analysis): Is concerned with finding relevant pat-
terns between data examples where the values are delivered in a sequence,
i.e., where one event leads to another later event. The input data is a set
of sequences called data sequences. Each data sequence is a list of trans-
actions, where each transaction is a sets of items. A sequential pattern
also consists of a list of sets of items. Sequence pattern analysis aims to
find all sequential patterns with a user specified minimum support, where
the support of a sequential pattern is the percentage of data sequences
that contain the pattern.
The work in this chapter focuses on classification learning, hereafter, discussions
are focused on concepts relating to supervised learning. In a simple domain, each
instance is characterised by a set of n-attributes, the set of instances is a subset
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of an n-dimensional space called an Instance Space, I. Every point in I is a
potential state of the process being modelled. In supervised learning, a data
mining algorithm is tasked with learning a good approximation, fˆ , of the target
function, given a set of instances called training data set, Ttrain, (Ttrain ⊂ I),
consisting of N pairs < xi, f(xi) >. The success of supervised learning is judged
by trying out fˆ on an independent set of instances called test data set, Ttest,
(Ttest ⊂ I), for which the true classifications are known but not made known
to the learner. The success rate on the Ttest gives an objective measure of how
efficiently the concept has been learned.
While there are many classification algorithms, most use the same workflow for
approximating a function. Data mining involves a sequence of important steps.
The steps for supervised learning include:
• Preparing data: This step include transforming the data into appro-
priate data mining format, i.e., creating data mining data sets, cleaning
data and dealing with missing values, scaling and normalising data, trans-
forming and reducing variables, partitioning data set into training, vali-
dation and test data sets, addressing class imbalance, and carrying out
exploratory data analysis using graphical and statistical techniques.
• Choosing an algorithm: Classification algorithms include regression,
decision-trees, rules induction, support vector machines (SVM), neural
networks, genetic algorithms, na¨ıve Bayes and nearest neighbours meth-
ods. The key difference between classification algorithms is in the kind
of decision boundary that is defined between classes, i.e., their functional
form and the set of parameters they fit, and the heuristic they employ in
searching for the optimal function, also known as the hypothesis, within
the space of possible hypotheses as defined by the functional form of the
hypotheses.
• Fitting a model: This step is the learning step or the learning phase.
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This involves adjusting learning parameters of the chosen classification
scheme and building the model from a training data set. The learning pa-
rameters and the type of model generated are dependent on the algorithm
used.
• Choosing a validation method: This involves selecting measures to
examine the accuracy of the resulting fitted model. The model validation is
done, in order to obtain a measure of its expected accuracy on unseen data.
Often the accuracy of a model is evaluated with respect to the percentage
of test data instances correctly classified, hence most algorithms seek to
learn hypotheses that minimise the number of errors.
• Examining fit and updating until satisfied (model refinement):
After validating the model, there might be need to change it for better
accuracy, better speed, or to use less memory.
• Using fitted model for predictions: This involves interpreting the
model and drawing conclusions.
The approach proposed in this chapter is to generate simple model to guide in
the selection of efficient fault injection points. The main goal of the approach is
is to detect the combination of multiple bit-flips that may likely result in system
failure. For example, the approach aims to be able to predict that flipping bit
6 in variable A, bit 18 in variable B and bits 11 and 29 is variable C will most
probably induce a system failure. Considering the objective of the approach
and the nature of the datasets, this chapter focuses on discriminant methods to
predict bit-flip combinations that may potentially cause the system to failure, as
such, decision trees, rule induction and na¨ıve Bayes algorithms are considered.
The fault injection point efficiency is determined by evaluating the quality of
the model produced by the learning schemes. This is done by measuring the
prediction capabilities of the model.
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8.3 Assessment Metrics for Model Quality
The validation methods often employed to measure the accuracy of the approx-
imation function, implicitly assumes that all types of misclassification incur
an equal cost, this however, is not always the case. For example, considering a
model for a safety-critical software system which predicts either a system failure-
inducing or non-failure-inducing state. Predicting a failure-inducing state as
being non-failure-inducing, will typically result in a much more significant cost
than classifying a non-failure-inducing state as being failure-inducing. In such
situations, the predictions of a model on a test data set can be cross-tabulated
with the actual classes assigned to the instances by the target function to pro-
duce a confusion matrix. Table 8.1 shows the general form of a confusion matrix
for a binary classification problem (though it can easily be extended to the case
of more than two classes). Classification tasks involving two classes is known
as binary classification and the corresponding function approximation is known
as a binary function. Typically, in binary classification, one class is the class of
interest and is referred to as the “concept”. The instances belonging to this con-
cept are referred to as positive instances or positives for short. On the contrary,
all other instances not belonging to the concept are called negative instances or
negatives for short. In the context of the aforementioned example, (and in most
software dependability analysis that uses for binary classification), the function
predicts either a system state is going to lead to a system failure or a successful
execution and the positives are the instances labelled as those leading to system
failure.
In Table 8.1, TP is the number of positive correctly labelled as positives by fˆ ,
known as true positives, whilst FN is the number of positives misclassified as
negatives, known as false negatives. Further, FP is the number of negatives
incorrectly classified as positives, known as false positives, whilst TN is the
number of negatives correctly classified as negatives, known as true negatives.
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Finally, npos and nneg are the respective total number of positives and negatives
in the test data and nˆpos and nˆneg are the total number of instances predicted
as positives and negatives, respectively. In software dependability analysis, it is
natural to seek out models that maximise true positives and minimise false pos-
itives, not least because these correspond closely with the concepts of accuracy
and completeness. However, as a balance must be struck between these related
concerns, it is appropriate to identify an aggregated measures of model quality.
Table 8.1: The general form of a confusion matrix for binary classification.
Predicted Class
Positives Negatives Marginal Sums
Actual Class
Positives TP TN npos
Negatives FP FN nneg
Marginal Sums nˆpos nˆneg n
A variety of metrics for model assessment are derived from a confusion matrix.
The most commonly used of these metrics are the True Positive Rate (TPR),
also known as sensitivity or recall, and true negative rate (TNR), also known as
specificity. Sensitivity measures how often a model predicts an instance to be
positive, when it is actually positive and it is computed as shown in Equation 8.1.
Specificity measures how often a model predicts an instance to be negative when
it is actually negative and it is computed as shown in Equation 8.2.
TPR = sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
(8.1)
TNR = specificity =
TN
TN + FP
(8.2)
Other commonly used model validation metric include Receiver Operating Char-
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acteristic (ROC) Curve (or ROC for short) and area under the curve (AUC),
F-score, precision, false positive rate (FPR), mcost, accuracy and misclassifica-
tion rate.
Accuracy measures how often the model is correct overall and it is computed as
shown in Equation 8.3. Misclassification Rate, measures how often the model
is wrong overall and it is given as shown in Equation 8.4. Misclassification rate
is also known as error rate and is equivalent to 1 minus accuracy.
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FN + FP
(8.3)
error rate = 1 − accuracy = FP + FN
TP + TN + FN + FP
(8.4)
FPR, measures how often a model predicts an instance to be positive, when
it is actually a negative. FPR is equivalent to 1 minus specificity, and its
computation is shown in Equation 8.5.
FPR = 1 − specificity = FP
FP + TN
(8.5)
ROC analysis combine the FPR and the TPR into one single metric and it is
based on a 2-dimensional graph that summarises the performance of a model
over possible thresholds. It is generated by plotting the TPR (y-axis) against
the FPR (x-axis) as the threshold for assigning instances to a given class is
varied. It shows the tradeoff between sensitivity and specificity (any increase
in sensitivity will be accompanied by a decrease in specificity). The closer
the curve follows the left-hand border and then the top border of the ROC
8.3. ASSESSMENT METRICS FOR MODEL QUALITY 148
space, the more accurate the test. The closer the curve comes to the 45-degree
diagonal of the ROC space, the less accurate the test. For different thresholds,
the same classifier will produce multiple points on such a plot. The AUC it
is obtained by joining these plotted points to (0,0) and (1,1). The AUC is a
measure of expected model accuracy for the classifier. For a single model, the
simple trapezium obtained by connecting the coordinates (0,0), (FPR,TPR),
(1,1) and (1,0) has an area given by Equation 8.6. An area of 1 represents a
perfect model.
AUC =
TPR − FPR + 1
2
(8.6)
The Euclidean distance from the perfect classifier, which has coordinates (0, 1),
i.e, FPR = 0 and TPR = 1, may be used in the ranking of single models. This
measure is given by the well known formula in Equation 8.7.
euclidean distance =
√
(FPR − 0)2 + (1 − TPR)2 (8.7)
Precision measure how often a model prediction is correct when it predicts
yes and is given by Equation 8.8. Precision and Recall together with their
harmonic mean F1 measure or balanced F-Score (F1-Score) are often used as
a model quality metric in the domain of information retrieval. The F-Score is
a weighted average of the recall and precision, and it is measured as shown in
Equation 8.9.
precision =
TP
TP + FP
(8.8)
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F1−Score = 2 · precision · recall
precision+ recall
(8.9)
When specific classification errors are more severe than others, e.g., When the
cost associated with a false positive is different from that of a false negative, a
more appropriate measure of quality is expected, misclassification cost, rather
than the expected error. This requires the definition of a cost matrix. Assuming
there are m class labels, Li, an m×m cost matrix, C, needs to be defined such
that the value C(i, j) is the cost of misclassifying an instance of class Li to
the class Lj . Clearly C(i, i) = 0 as there should be no cost associated with
correctly classifying an instance. The model tries to avoid classification errors
with a high error weight. Weights specified must be greater than or equal to zero.
The default weight is 1. The cost matrix diagonal must be zero. Minimising the
error is a special case of minimising misclassification cost when the cost matrix
is defined as C(i, j) = 1, where i 6= j and C(i, i) = 0. The expected
misclassification cost, mcost, can then be calculated as shown in Equation 8.10,
where CM(i, j) represents index access to the associated confusion matrix using
i and j.
mcost =
m∑
i
m∑
j
C(i, j) · CM(i, j) (8.10)
The proposed approach in this chapter focuses on the generation of efficient
fault injection points, which means that the model quality is evaluated with
respect to the efficiency, i.e., the levels of accuracy and completeness, that can
be achieved by these points. With this in mind, the AUC measure, which is
an aggregate representative of accuracy and completeness in the form of TPR
and FPR, is used in measuring model quality. However, as misclassification
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costs are likely to vary in the context of dependable software systems, steps
must be taken to ensure that high AUC values are not achieved through the
neglect of accuracy or completeness. Having this in mind, TPR and FPR are
also considered when evaluating the quality of generated models.
8.4 Addressing Class Imbalance
Typically standard learning algorithms, in addition to assuming equal mis-
classification costs, expect the balanced class distributions across the training
data [56, 63]. Therefore, when presented with complex imbalanced data sets,
these algorithms fail to properly represent the distributive characteristics of the
data and resultantly provide unfavourable accuracies across the classes of the
data. To improve the performance of learning algorithms in the presence of
under represented data and severe class distribution skews, there is need to bal-
ance the data efficiently. However, there are a number of domains, such as error
detection, intrusion detection, fraud detection and software reliability, where
the class distribution is skewed. Often in a binary classification, the positive
class is the minority class and the class of interest. For example, in the con-
text generating error detection mechanisms, detecting system failures is of most
interest and it is the minority class [91].
The approach proposed here assumes that the data generated during fault injec-
tion analysis generally captures aspects of relationships between system states
and systems failures, in particular it captures relationships between bit-positions
and failure profile. Based on the sampled states and observed system behaviour
during fault injection analysis, a data mining algorithm can then determine fault
injection points through learning about these captured relationships. Typically,
data sets generated from fault injection analysis are skewed, i.e., some failure
mode occur less frequently than others. Such imbalance data sets must first
be processed for the learning process to be effective with respect to generating
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efficient fault injection points.
There are two common used approaches to overcome the effects of imbalanced
data. The first of these, modifies the imbalance data set by some sort of sam-
pling approach in order to provide a balanced distribution [63, 80, 96]. A variety
of sampling methods have been proposed. Oversampling and undersampling are
the most commonly sampling methods in usage. They are opposite and roughly
equivalent approaches. They both involve using a bias to select more samples
from one class than from another. In the case of oversampling, original data
set is increased by a set of replicated instances from the minority class, and the
these resampling can be with or without replacement. Undersampling involves
decreasing the original set by removing some instances of the majority class, and
resampling is done without replacement. These approaches introduces their own
set of issues that can potentially hinder model performance. Removing instances
of majority class can potentially cause the learning scheme miss important con-
cepts regarding the majority class. On the other hand, adding replicated in-
stances may potentially cause the learning scheme to overfit. The former is a
problem related to undersampling and the latter to oversampling [110]. To cir-
cumvent around these issues and to improve model accuracy Chawla et al. [18]
demonstrated the use of cross validation for setting the level of oversampling
and undersampling of the majority and minority classes automatically. Some
research proposed informed undersampling and oversampling methods to ame-
liorate these issues. Zadrozny et al. [166] suggest the use of a cost-proportionate
rejection sampling technique, while Kubat and Matwin [80] proposed removing
redundant and borderline negative instances during undersampling. However,
Japkowicz [63] demonstrated that oversampling from the boundary regions and
undersampling far from the decision boundary adds little value over random
sampling approaches. Chawla et al. [17] proposed a method, Synthetic Minor-
ity Oversampling Technique (SMOTE), to generate synthetic data for minority
classes along the line segment joining an instance to k minority class nearest
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neighbours rather than simply sampling with replacement. They demonstrated
that SMOTE outperforms simple sampling with replacement.
The second approach uses cost-sensitive learning methods to consider the costs
associated with misclassifying instances. Typically, they set higher cost as-
sociated with misclassifying instances of the minority class by defining a cost
matrix based on the class imbalance and then use the same error minimisation-
based concept learning algorithms. However, this approach assumes that such
a cost matrix can be incorporated by the learning process. There are some
methods that replace error minimisation metrics with cost minimisation met-
rics when searching the hypothesis space. However, Pazzani et al. [120] et al.
demonstrated that adopting misclassification costs as a greedy selection crite-
ria in decision tree induction does not provide cost minimisation for the model
generated. Further, Ting [157] using instance weighting is more effective than
using a cost minimisation-based approach. However, assigning distinct weights
to training instances, in effect, modifies the data distribution within the train-
ing data [34, 41, 120, 157]. Typically, it is necessary to convert cost matrix
into cost vector, V , and this may potentially be difficult in the case of multi-
class classification problems. Breiman et al. [12] proposed using the sum of all
misclassification costs for instances of the class. Ting [157] uses an alternative
weight, V (i) = arg max
j
(C(i, j)), to assign weight to all instances of a particular
class, Lj , based on V (j) using the formula shown in Equation 8.11, where Nj is
the number of instances in the data labelled Lj and N =
∑
iNi.
w(j) = V (j) · N∑
i V (i) ·Ni
(8.11)
Another noteworthy approach adopted for imbalanced learning problems is ac-
tive learning methods [38, 39]. Traditionally, active learning methods are used
to solve problems related to unlabelled training data. The prime concept of
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active learning is that a machine learning algorithm can achieve high accu-
racy with small amount of training labels. This is achieved by allowing the
learning algorithm to interactively query an information source to provide for
data labels [143]. Active learning approaches for imbalanced learning are of-
ten integrated into kernel-based learning methods. For instance, Ertekin et al.
[39] uses SVM-based active learning to select instances that are closest to the
current hyperplane. In [38, 39], they proposed an efficient SVM-based active
learning method which queries a small pool of data at each iterative step of
active learning instead of querying the entire data set. In this procedure, an
SVM is trained on the given training data, after which the most informative
instances are extracted and formed into a new training set according to the
developed hyperplane. Finally, the procedure uses this new training set and all
unseen training data to actively retrain the SVM using the LASVM online SVM
learning algorithm [10] to facilitate the active learning procedure.
8.5 Generating Fault Injection Points
The approach presented in this chapter generates efficient fault injection points
in three stages. The initial stage of the process is done in two steps: Step 1,
involves performing fault injection analysis by perturbing identified target vari-
ables in a program with multiple soft-errors, in order to capture the relationship
between these perturbations and their impact on the program. The logged data
can be used for generating efficient fault injection points. Step 2 involves pre-
processing the fault injection analysis data. The aim of this step is to: (i)
transform the fault injection data into an appropriate format for usage in data
mining analysis, and (ii) to address any class imbalance in the generated data
sets. Stage two of the process consists of two steps: Step 1 requires choosing an
appropriate data mining algorithm and adjusting parameters that will improve
the effectiveness of the chosen algorithm. In step 2, the chosen learner is applied
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to transformed and balanced data set, in order to produce and assess the first
fault injection points. The third and final, stage, adjusts the fitting parameters
of the learning scheme, if need be, to improve the injection efficiency in terms in-
ducing failure. An overview of the process of generating efficient fault injection
points in shown in Figure 8.1, and the process in elaborated in Sections 8.5.1-
8.5.3.
Stage	1:	Data	Preparation
Fault	
injection	
analysis
Target	
Variables
Fault	
injection	
data
Transform	
to	data	set
Balance	
data	set
Stage	2:	Model	Fitting
Learning	
process
Training	
data	set
Select	learning	
scheme
Adjust	 learning	
parameters
Stage	3:	Model	
Optimisation
Refit	model
Efficient	fault	
injection	points
Figure 8.1: Workflow for generating efficient fault injection points.
8.5.1 Stage 1: Data Preparation
The objective of this is to generate data mining sets from fault injection analy-
sis. Thus, the initial step of the proposed approach is to perform fault injection
experimentations on a target software system in order to log aspects of the rela-
tionship between system state and failure failure, specifically bits being flipped
in variables and failure mode. The precise nature of the fault injection per-
formed is dependent on the assumed fault and system models, which in-turn is
dependent on the characteristic of the target program. This means, there will
be direct relationship between the nature of the fault and system models as-
sumed and the nature of (fault injection point) model that will be derived. The
importance of fault models and input sets assumed for fault injection analysis
to make dependability enhancement meaningful cannot be overemphasised. As
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such, the relationship of systems states to system failure not captured by the as-
sumed fault model may not potentially be discerned in data mining process. For
example, in this thesis multiple soft-errors, LnCm fault model (See Chapter 7.5)
is assumed, which means that the set of variables and bit-flips combination not
captured by the adopted fault models, may not necessarily be accounted for by
the derived fault injection point model. The results presented in this chapter are
based on sampling all variables in the set returned by TVS (See Chapter 7.5.1).
However, additional sampling was performed for the assumed single and double
faults, all bit-flips combinations was considered.
Following the analysis of the fault injection data, the generated data is converted
to appropriate data data mining datasets. The motivation for this step is to:
(i) transform the fault injection analysis data to a format that can be processed
by classification algorithms, and (ii) any address any class distribution skew-
ness present in the derived datasets. In the case of the results presented in this
chapter, the data format transformation was from LLFI [103] logging format
to the Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF) used by the Weka Data Mining
suite [54]. Often, classes have very unequal frequency, like those found within
datasets obtained through fault injection analysis. This occurs as a result of the
inherent resilience of software and difficulty of inducing system failures under
a given fault model. To generate a reliable model that will predict effective
fault injections points that might induce system failures, any such imbalance
will have to be addressed. This imbalance are usually addressed through sam-
pling approaches such as undersampling of the majority class and oversampling
with replacement of the minority class. However, with multiple fault injections
analysis the imbalance for a binary valued class is minimal and may likely yield
reliable models even if no sampling is done to balance the dataset. Oversam-
pling can be viewed as a case of SMOTE [17]. In SMOTE, synthetic instances
of the minority class are generated by operating in the “feature space” rather
than the “data space”. SMOTE creates new instances by taking samples of the
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feature space of the minority class, and its nearest neighbours, and generates
new examples that combine the features of the target case with features if its
neighbours. This approach increases the features available to each class and
makes the samples more general. The synthetic are generated as defined in
Equation 8.12.
−→s ij = −→xij + u · (−→nij − −→xij) (8.12)
with, −→xij representing the instances of the minority class, −→nij representing −→xij ’s
neighbours (randomly sampled with replacement from k of its nearest neigh-
bours), and u is a random number, such that 0 6 u 6 1. Oversampling with
replacement is a case of SMOTE where u = 0.
However, the task of addressing class imbalance can not completed until data
mining has been used to fit some initial model, hence it is an aim that is only
realised during the optimisation of the generated model, as described in Sec-
tion 8.5.3.
8.5.2 Stage 2: Model Fitting
The aim of the this stage of the approach is to generate first-attempt fault in-
jection point model from the transformed fault injection data. Following the
generation of the datasets, an appropriate data mining algorithm must be se-
lected for data analysis. To derive a discriminant model to predict combinations
of multiple bit-flips over program variables that may potentially induce system
failure. The use algorithms that generate intuitive models and are easily inter-
preted is advocated.
The next point after choosing the learning algorithm is to adjust the parame-
ters of the algorithm to improve the model’s performance and start the learning
process. At this point the aim is not necessarily to generate highly-efficient fault
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injection point model, but to establish a baseline model that can be optimised
and refined in the next stage of the approach. The validation of the generated
model may take place as flipping the relevant bits at the relevant program loca-
tion in the target program and observe the outcome of the program execution
or by testing the efficacy of the model’s prediction of unseen instances, i.e, in-
stances not used in generating the fault injection point model. The purpose,
in either case, is to assess the quality of the model’s prediction on previously
unseen data in order to measure efficiency properties.
8.5.3 Stage 3: Model Optimisation
Once a baseline model has been generated and evaluated, it may be refined
in order to improve its level of coverage. This can be achieved by varying the
parameters associated with the configuration of the adopted learning algorithm.
If class imbalance is present in the data set, it is useful to vary the levels of
undersampling or oversampling, including the number of nearest neighbours
used by any sampling techniques applied, in order to establish an algorithm
configuration which yields the most efficient fault injection points. An ideal and
optimal model will have TPR = 1, FPR = 0 and AUC = 1. In reality, it may
be infeasible to achieve an ideal model since the sample is severely constricted.
However, the aim of the approach is to achieve measures as close to the ideal
model as possible.
8.6 Case Studies
To demonstrate that the proposed approach for the generation of fault injec-
tion point yields efficient fault injection points prediction model, the results of
applying each stage of the approach are presented in Sections 8.6.1-8.6.3.
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8.6.1 Stage 1: Data Preparation
In order to generate datasets, fault injection analysis was conducted on all
target systems under the experimental conditions described in Chapters 3 and 7.
During fault injection it is possible to inject specific bit or bits combinations
in the specific program location or combination of locations and then log the
execution outcome. Broadly, the program location at which an injection is
performed and what is injected will dictate the set of erroneous states explored.
The variable locations were chosen using the framework in Figure 7.2. The
results of fault injection analysis were stored in the LLFI analysis and logging
format [103]. A purpose-built was used to convert from the LLFI analysis and
logging format to the ARFF format used by the Weka Data Mining Suite [54].
The datasets generated in this chapter are multiple class datasets. The failure
scheme adopted for labelling the instances is as defined in Chapter 3.4.3, however
No Impact outcomes are classed as non-failures in the generated datasets. As
mention earlier in this chapter, class imbalance may not be present in a multiple
fault injection data, and this proved to be true in the case of the analysis used in
this chapter. In some instances the minority class, are the negatives instances,
i.e the non-failure class. In the case of the results presented in this chapter,
the failure classes, i.e., crash, hang, sdc and exception, are considered to be
the positives. 30 datasets were generated, for ten target programs. For each
target program, three datasets were generated: (i) capturing the aspect of the
relationship of the system behaviour to injections of not more than two bit-flips
(double-bits datasets), (ii) capturing the aspect of the relationship of the system
behaviour to injections of not more than three bit-flips (triple-bits datasets),
and (iii) capturing the aspect of the relationship of the system behaviour to
injections of not more than four bit-flips (quadruple-bits datasets). This means,
that the double-bits datasets capture system behaviour related to single-bit-flips
and double-bit-flips; the triple-bits datasets are double-bits datasets extended
to also capture system behaviour relevant to triple-bit-flips; and the quadruple-
8.6. CASE STUDIES 159
bits datasets are extended triple-bits datasets capturing additional aspect of
system behaviour relevant to quadruple-bit-flips. An example of ARFF format,
consisting up to two double bits faults (one or two bit-flips injected injected in
one or two program locations) and five experiments, is depicted in Figure 8.2.
@RELATION	isqrtDouble
@ATTRIBUTE	loc1	{var1,var2,var3,var4,var5,var6,var7,none}
@ATTRIBUTE	loc2	{var1,var2,var3,var4,var5,var6,var7,none}
@ATTRIBUTE	pos1	NUMERIC
@ATTRIBUTE	pos2	NUMERIC
@ATTRIBUTE	failure	{no-impact,sdc,exception,time-out,crash}
@DATA
var1,	1,	var1,	7,	no-impact
var1,	2,	var2,	5,	sdc
var4,	23,	none,	 0,	crash
var3,	8,	var3,	9,	sdc
var6,	2,	var7,	51,	sdc
Figure 8.2: An overview of generated data set.
8.6.2 Stage 2: Model Fitting
Following the generation of the fault injection datasets and their pre-processing,
the following classification algorithms are selected to build the fault injection
points predictive models:
Na¨ıve Bayes: The na¨ıve Bayes classification algorithm is a probabilistic classi-
fier based on applying Bayes’ theorem. It assumes that the value of a particular
feature is unrelated to the presence or absence of any other feature, given the
class variable [71]. Despite its apparent over-simplified assumption, the na¨ıve
Bayes classifier have worked quite-well in many complex real-world applica-
tions. The na¨ıve Bayes classifier estimates the prior probability distribution
of the classes, i.e., crash, sdc, exception, hang and non-failure in the case of
learning error fault injection points, and the class conditional probabilities of
input vectors. It assumes conditional independence of input variables given the
class. Given an input vector, x, it assigns the class label that has the maximal
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posterior probability, as defined in Equation 8.13.
ci = arg max
ci
p(ci|x) = arg max
ci
n∏
j=1
p(ci|x)p(ci)∑
k
n∏
j=1
p(ck|x)p(ck)
(8.13)
In the case of continuous input attributes, kernel density estimation is used to
estimate the class conditional probability density functions as opposed to the
common assumption of a single Gaussian distribution. The implementation of
the na¨ıve Bayes classification algorithm used to generate the results presented
in this chapter employs the gaussian kernel, g, as shown in 8.14
p(Xi = x|cj) = 1
n
∑
k
g(x;xk;σj) (8.14)
Rule Induction: Rule induction is a desirable approach to learning because
the knowledge generated is a set of conjunctive rules that are easy to under-
stand. Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER) is
a propositional rule inducer and it is used as the rule induction implementation
for the results presented in this chapter [22]. Rule inducers are algorithms
that iteratively generates a rule that covers a subset of the training data, and
removing all the examples covered by the rule from the training data until there
are no more examples to cover. RIPPER builds a ruleset by repeatedly adding
rules to an empty ruleset until all positive examples are covered. Starting with
an empty antecedent, rules are formed by greedily adding conditions to the
antecedent of a rule until no negative examples are covered.
Decision Trees Induction: Decision tree inducers are algorithms that auto-
matically construct a decision tree from a given dataset. Typically the goal is to
find the optimal decision tree by minimising the generalisation error. However,
other target functions can be also defined, for example, minimising the number
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of nodes or minimising the average depth. The decision tree induction algorithm
implementation used to generate the results in this chapter is the C4.5 [128].
The C4.5 builds decision trees from a set of training data, using the concept of
information entropy. At each node of the tree, C4.5 chooses the attribute of the
data that most effectively splits its set of examples into subsets enriched in one
class or the other. The splitting criterion is the normalised information gain
(difference in entropy). The attribute with the highest normalised information
gain is chosen to make the decision. The C4.5 algorithm then recurs on the
smaller sublists.
Following the selection of the three classification algorithms, 10-fold cross val-
idation was used in order to generate the confusion matrix for each algorithm
on each data set. In 10-fold cross validation the entries in each data set are
partitioned into 10 stratified samples, then for each cross validation run, one of
these partitions is used as a test sample, whilst the other nine are used as the
training set for a particular classification algorithm.
Tables 8.2-8.4, Tables 8.5-8.7 and Tables 8.8-8.10 summarise the results of ap-
plying the na¨ıve Bayes, rule induction and decision tree induction data mining
algorithms respectively, to each fault injection data set. The statistics shown in
these tables relate to fault injection points predictive models generated using a
baseline configuration of each data mining algorithm, i.e., no attempt was made
to search for algorithm parameters that would yield the most effective predictive
models. In these table, the TPR and FPR columns give the mean true positive
and true false rates taken across all 10 cross validations. A false positive here
corresponds to the situation where a model incorrectly detects a state as being
failure-inducing (i.e., either as crash, hang, sdc or exception), whilst a true pos-
itive corresponds to a model correctly identifying a failure-inducing state. The
AUC column shows the area under the ROC curve, as described in Section 8.3,
whilst the SD column gives the standard deviation in AUC across all 10 cross
validations. Before proceeding with analyses of the results, the key points are
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summarised as follows:
1. Baseline na¨ıve Bayes may not always produce efficient fault injection
points predictive models,
2. Baseline decision tree induction algorithm produces efficient fault injection
points predictive models, and it out performs both the rule induction and
na¨ıve Bayes classifiers,
3. The baseline classifiers tend to generate more efficient fault injection points
predictive models from datasets derived from fault injection analysis with
higher number of corruptions.
Table 8.2: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.86023 0.03119 0.91452 0.02739
dijkstra 0.93890 0.09997 0.91946 0.01848
fft 0.90499 0.01005 0.94747 0.03495
search 0.95107 0.11872 0.91618 0.01436
insert 0.86747 0.04987 0.90880 0.01194
remove 0.86932 0.07048 0.89943 0.03901
encfile 0.86353 0.05394 0.90480 0.03649
decfile 0.90345 0.11794 0.89276 0.03851
isqrt 0.89714 0.04432 0.92641 0.03177
cubic 0.89510 0.06630 0.91440 0.02810
The results shown in Table 8.2 relate to fault injection points predictive models
generated by the na¨ıve Bayes algorithm for the double-bits datasets. It can
be observed that the predictive models generated for each dataset have varied
TPR values, with entries in Table 8.2 being in the range 0.86023 to 0.95107.
The value of mean FPR for na¨ıve Bayes are equally diverse across different
datasets, with these values being in the range 0.01005 to 0.11872. In general,
the TPR and FPR values shown in Table 8.2 mean that the worst performing
predictive model generated by na¨ıve Bayes may not have the levels of efficiency
that are required in the context of dependable software. In contrast, the best
performing of these predictive models may be useful in the design of dependable
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software. For example, the predictive model associated with fft have a TRP and
FRP of 0.90499 and 0.01005 respectively, yielding a promising AUC of 0.94747.
Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the results presented in Table 8.2
is the consistently low standard deviation in mean AUC, which indicates that
high levels of injection efficiency, i.e., TPR and FPR rates, were consistently
achieved during each of the 10 cross validations.
Table 8.3: (Triple) Injection points efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.86884 0.03088 0.92367 0.02767
dijkstra 0.94829 0.09897 0.92866 0.01866
fft 0.91404 0.00995 0.95694 0.03530
search 0.96058 0.11753 0.92534 0.01450
insert 0.87614 0.04937 0.91789 0.01206
remove 0.87802 0.06977 0.90842 0.03940
encfile 0.87216 0.05340 0.91384 0.03685
decfile 0.91249 0.11676 0.90168 0.03889
isqrt 0.90611 0.04388 0.93567 0.03209
cubic 0.90405 0.06564 0.92354 0.02838
The results presented in Table 8.3 demonstrate that the fault injection point pre-
dictive models generated by the na¨ıve Bayes classifier for the triple-bits datasets
are comparable with, but marginally more efficient than, those generated gen-
erated for double bits, with all mean AUC values being in the range 0.86884
to 0.96058. Indeed, the predictive models generated from triple bits classifier
surpassed the classifier trained with double bits, with respect to mean AUC.
Interestingly, the standard deviation in mean AUC remains consistently low,
again indicating the consistency with which similarly efficient fault injection
point predictive models are generated during cross validation.
The results presented in Table 8.4 indicate that the fault injection point predic-
tive models generated using the na¨ıve Bayes algorithm for the quadruple-bits
datasets marginally surpass those generated for both double-bits and triple-bits
with respect to the level of efficiency achieved, with all mean AUC values in
Table 8.3 being in the range 0.91070 to 0.96651. The standard deviation in
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Table 8.4: (Quadruple) Injection points efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with no
sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.87752 0.03057 0.93290 0.02794
dijkstra 0.95777 0.09798 0.93794 0.01885
fft 0.92318 0.00985 0.96651 0.03565
search 0.97019 0.11636 0.93459 0.01465
insert 0.88490 0.04888 0.92707 0.01218
remove 0.88680 0.06907 0.91751 0.03979
encfile 0.88088 0.05286 0.92298 0.03722
decfile 0.92161 0.11559 0.91070 0.03928
isqrt 0.91517 0.04344 0.94503 0.03241
cubic 0.91309 0.06498 0.93278 0.02866
AUC is also lower than for the predictive models built with either double-bits
or triple-bits datasets, with the highest observed standard deviation being less
than the lowest value associated with with both double-bits and triple-bits . In
general, the results associated with na¨ıve Bayes may not have the levels of effi-
ciency with respect to the generation of efficient fault injection points predictive
models, that being said, optimising the model may boost the levels of efficiency
to acceptable levels.
Table 8.5: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for rule induction with no sam-
pling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.94828 0.01933 0.96448 0.00011
dijkstra 0.93003 0.03147 0.94928 0.00217
fft 0.92317 0.07812 0.92252 0.00026
search 0.95087 0.05051 0.95018 0.00039
insert 0.97817 0.03475 0.97171 0.00116
remove 0.96485 0.03929 0.96611 0.00045
encfile 0.93927 0.01716 0.96106 0.00564
decfile 0.97961 0.05570 0.96195 0.00017
isqrt 0.92964 0.04583 0.94190 0.00017
cubic 0.94930 0.04140 0.95440 0.00120
The results presented in Table 8.5, Table 8.5 and Table 8.5 indicate that the fault
injection point predictive models generated by the decision rule inductor for the
double-bits, triple-bits and quadruple-bits datasets surpasses those generated
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under na¨ıve Bayes, with all mean AUC values being in the range 0.92252 to
0.97171, 0.93175 to 0.98143 and 0.94107 to 0.99124 respectively. The standard
deviation in AUC is also markedly lower than for all the na¨ıve Bayes classifiers.
Table 8.6: (Triple) Injection points efficiencies for rule induction with no sam-
pling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.95776 0.01913 0.97412 0.00011
dijkstra 0.93933 0.03116 0.95877 0.00219
fft 0.93241 0.07734 0.93175 0.00026
search 0.96038 0.05001 0.95968 0.00040
insert 0.98795 0.03441 0.98143 0.00117
remove 0.97450 0.03889 0.97577 0.00045
encfile 0.94866 0.01699 0.97067 0.00570
decfile 0.98940 0.05515 0.97157 0.00017
isqrt 0.93894 0.04537 0.95132 0.00017
cubic 0.95879 0.04099 0.96394 0.00121
Similar to the trend observed under na¨ıve Bayes, the rule inducers models from
the triple-bits datasets outperformed those model from double-bits datasets,
and those trained on quadruple-bits surpassed those generated from triple-bits
datasets. The worst results observed under the rule inducers was in the double-
bits dataset for fft, having a TPR and FPR of 0.92317 and 0.07812.
Table 8.7: (Quadruple) Injection points efficiencies for rule induction with no
sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.96734 0.01894 0.98386 0.00011
dijkstra 0.94873 0.03085 0.96836 0.00221
fft 0.94173 0.07657 0.94107 0.00026
search 0.96998 0.04951 0.96928 0.00040
insert 0.99783 0.03406 0.99124 0.00118
remove 0.98424 0.03850 0.98553 0.00046
encfile 0.95815 0.01682 0.98038 0.00576
decfile 0.99930 0.05459 0.98129 0.00017
isqrt 0.94833 0.04491 0.96084 0.00017
cubic 0.96838 0.04058 0.97358 0.00122
In general, the results associated with rule induction are promising with respect
to the generation of fault injection point predictive models, not least because
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these results relate to a baseline configuration of the rule induction algorithm.
Table 8.8: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for decision tree induction with
no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.95933 0.00004 0.97965 0.00579
dijkstra 0.99011 0.00143 0.99434 0.00017
fft 0.99817 0.00001 0.99808 0.00012
search 0.85785 0.00009 0.92888 0.00062
insert 0.98649 0.00010 0.99320 0.00009
remove 0.98638 0.00133 0.99253 0.00124
encfile 0.97999 0.00104 0.98947 0.00011
decfile 0.97363 0.00000 0.98681 0.00000
isqrt 0.99551 0.00011 0.99770 0.00015
cubic 0.96970 0.00050 0.98460 0.00090
Table 8.5, Table 8.7 and Table 8.7 suggest that decision tree induction is the
most effective of the classification algorithms applied to this point. Observe from
Tables 8.5-8.7 that the mean AUC of all baseline predictive models generated
through decision tree induction is greater than 0.97965. As this measure reflects
both FPR and TPR, this is an indication that the injection points generated are
effective classifiers for failure inducing injection points. Observe also that, aside
from datasets search, the mean TPR for all decision trees is greater than 0.95933
(using the double-bits datasets), with the maximum observed being 0.99937
(using the quadruple-bits datasets). Further, the mean FPR is extremely low
in all cases, with the maximum observed value being 0.00143 (in all the dijkstra
datasets).
As with na¨ıve Bayes and rule induction classifiers, the predictive models ef-
ficiency derived from the quadruple-bits surpasses those generated from the
triple-bits, and in-turn, the classifiers models from the triple-bits datasets out-
performed those derived from the double-bits datasets.
This indicates the discriminatory nature of the injection points generated by the
decision tree induction algorithm. It is also interesting to note that the stan-
dard deviation of the injection points generated, regardless of the data mining
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Table 8.9: (Triple) Injection points efficiencies for decision tree induction with
no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.96029 0.00004 0.98063 0.00580
dijkstra 0.99110 0.00143 0.99534 0.00017
fft 0.99917 0.00001 0.99908 0.00012
search 0.85871 0.00009 0.92981 0.00062
insert 0.98748 0.00010 0.99419 0.00009
remove 0.98737 0.00133 0.99352 0.00124
encfile 0.98097 0.00104 0.99046 0.00011
decfile 0.97460 0.00000 0.98780 0.00000
isqrt 0.99650 0.00011 0.99870 0.00015
cubic 0.97067 0.00050 0.98558 0.00090
Table 8.10: (Quadruple) Injection points efficiencies for decision tree induction
with no sampling
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.96048 0.00004 0.98083 0.00580
dijkstra 0.99130 0.00143 0.99554 0.00017
fft 0.99937 0.00001 0.99928 0.00012
search 0.85888 0.00009 0.93000 0.00062
insert 0.98768 0.00010 0.99439 0.00009
remove 0.98756 0.00133 0.99372 0.00124
encfile 0.98116 0.00104 0.99066 0.00011
decfile 0.97480 0.00000 0.98800 0.00000
isqrt 0.99670 0.00011 0.99890 0.00015
cubic 0.97086 0.00050 0.98578 0.00090
algorithm applied, is consistently low, which demonstrates the consistency with
which efficient injection point predictive models can be generated when using a
decision tree induction-based approach.
8.6.3 Stage 3: Optimising Model
Following the fitting of a set of baseline fault injection points predictive models
and validating their performance, these predictive models can now be refined
by varying the parameters associated with the applied classification algorithms.
In particular, it is interesting to vary parameters that are independent of any
algorithm, such as dataset sampling levels prior to learning. This permit the
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same optimsation process to be applied regardless of the selected classification
algorithm. Tables 8.11-8.19 summarises the results of the model optimisation
process for the presented case studies. Tables 8.11-8.19 are similiar to those
given in Tables 8.2-8.10, except that Tables 8.11-8.19 have addition columns,
Sampling and N, which show the level of sampling and the nearest neighbours
used in sampling to generate the associated predictive models respectively. Each
entry in the Sampling column also shows the type of sampling performed, where
an O denotes oversampling and a U, undersampling. A total of 20 undersampling
and 15 oversampling percentage levels were used in model refinement. These
levels were uniformly distributed over [5, 100] and [100, 1500] for undersampling
and oversampling respectively, giving increments of 5 and 100 respectively. The
number of nearest neighbours considered in the sampling process were uniformly
distributed over [1, 15] with increments of 1. The values in the Sampling and N
columns of Tables 8.11-8.19 represent optimal observed values, with regard to
achieved AUC, across all candidate values considered.
Before proceeding with analyses of the results, the key points are summarised
as follows:
1. Optimising the classifier can improve the efficiency of the fault injection
points predictive models,
2. Similar with the baseline classifiers, optimised decision tree induction out-
performs both na¨ıve Bayes and rule induction classifiers,
3. Similar with the baseline classiffiers, the optimised classifiers tend to pro-
duce more efficient fault injection points predictive models on datasets
derived from fault injection analysis with higher number of corruptions.
The results presented in Tables 8.11-8.13 improve on the results presented for
the na¨ıve Bayes classifiers in Tables 8.2-8.4, clearly demonstrating that varying
the sampling parameters associated with the application of na¨ıve Bayes can
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improve the efficiency of the fault injection points predictive models. More
specifically, all mean TPR and FPR values have been improved, which lead to a
increase in mean AUC. The standard deviation in AUC is consistently low and
remains comparable with the results generated under a baseline configuration
of the na¨ıve Bayes classifiers.
Table 8.11: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 500 (O) 8 0.90831 0.00363 0.95234 0.05592
dijkstra 1000 (U) 4 0.95237 0.08128 0.93555 0.03027
fft 300 (O) 3 0.93064 0.00211 0.96426 0.17206
search 200 (O) 2 0.97193 0.05788 0.95703 0.05469
insert 500 (O) 8 0.91706 0.01364 0.95171 0.04190
encfile 600 (O) 8 0.89438 0.02542 0.93448 0.05305
decfile 600 (O) 6 0.94737 0.05728 0.94505 0.06371
isqrt 600 (O) 0 0.92111 0.00476 0.95817 0.08239
cubic 500 (O) 0 0.92380 0.03140 0.94620 0.06770
Table 8.12: (Triple) Injection points efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 500 (O) 8 0.90922 0.00362 0.95330 0.05598
dijkstra 100 (O) 4 0.95332 0.08120 0.93648 0.03030
fft 300 (O) 3 0.93157 0.00211 0.96523 0.17223
search 200 (O) 2 0.97290 0.05782 0.95798 0.05474
insert 500 (O) 5 0.90637 0.05811 0.92457 0.05174
remove 400 (O) 8 0.91798 0.01363 0.95266 0.04195
encfile 600 (O) 8 0.89527 0.02539 0.93542 0.05311
decfile 600 (O) 6 0.94832 0.05722 0.94600 0.06378
isqrt 700 (O) 0 0.92203 0.00476 0.95913 0.08247
cubic 600 (O) 0 0.92472 0.03137 0.94715 0.06777
All entries in Tables 8.14-8.16 indicate that the optimisation process has im-
proved the efficiency properties of the fault injection points predictive models
derived with rule induction. Indeed, the results show an improved mean AUC
across all entries. The standard deviation in mean AUC is easily compara-
ble with standard deviation observed under a baseline configuration of rule
induction, with some generated predictive models even yielding a reduction in
standard deviation with respect to mean AUC.
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Table 8.13: (Quadruple) Injection points efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with sam-
pling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 500 (O) 8 0.91013 0.00362 0.95425 0.05603
dijkstra 100 (O) 4 0.95427 0.08112 0.93742 0.03033
fft 300 (O) 3 0.93250 0.00211 0.96619 0.17240
search 200 (O) 2 0.97387 0.05776 0.95894 0.05480
insert 500 (O) 5 0.90728 0.05805 0.92550 0.05179
remove 400 (O) 8 0.91890 0.01362 0.95361 0.04199
encfile 600 (O) 8 0.89617 0.02537 0.93635 0.05316
decfile 600 (O) 6 0.94927 0.05716 0.94694 0.06384
isqrt 700 (O) 0 0.92295 0.00475 0.96009 0.08255
cubic 600 (O) 0 0.92565 0.03134 0.94809 0.06784
Table 8.14: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for rule induction with sam-
pling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 700 (O) 2 0.96822 0.01933 0.97445 0.01780
dijkstra 500 (U) 6 0.98868 0.00889 0.98990 0.00910
fft 300 (O) 6 0.92984 0.05797 0.93594 0.00160
search 400 (O) 8 0.95420 0.03709 0.95855 0.04416
insert 700 (O) 3 0.96508 0.00473 0.98017 0.01165
remove 600 (O) 3 0.98460 0.01028 0.98716 0.02927
encfile 500 (O) 3 0.96973 0.00030 0.98472 0.00416
decfile 400 (O) 2 0.98961 0.05460 0.96751 0.00160
isqrt 400 (U) 9 0.92964 0.04583 0.94190 0.01028
cubic 500 (O) 0 0.96580 0.03000 0.96790 0.01340
Table 8.15: (Triple) Injection points efficiencies for rule induction with sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 500 (O) 2 0.96918 0.01931 0.97542 0.01782
dijkstra 100 (O) 6 0.98967 0.00888 0.99089 0.00911
fft 300 (O) 6 0.93077 0.05791 0.93687 0.00160
search 200 (O) 8 0.95516 0.03706 0.95951 0.04421
insert 500 (O) 3 0.96605 0.00473 0.98115 0.01166
remove 400 (O) 3 0.98558 0.01027 0.98814 0.02930
encfile 600 (O) 3 0.97070 0.00030 0.98570 0.00416
decfile 600 (O) 2 0.99060 0.05454 0.96847 0.00160
isqrt 700 (U) 9 0.93057 0.04578 0.94285 0.01029
cubic 600 (O) 0 0.96677 0.02997 0.96887 0.01341
Despite being the best performing algorithm under a baseline configuration, the
entries in Tables 8.17-8.19 show consistent improvements, with respect to the
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Table 8.16: (Quadruple) Injection points efficiencies for rule induction with
sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 500 (O) 2 0.97015 0.01929 0.97640 0.01784
dijkstra 100 (O) 6 0.99066 0.00887 0.99188 0.00912
fft 300 (O) 6 0.93170 0.05785 0.93781 0.00161
search 200 (O) 8 0.95611 0.03702 0.96047 0.04425
insert 500 (O) 3 0.96701 0.00472 0.98213 0.01167
remove 400 (O) 3 0.98657 0.01026 0.98913 0.02933
encfile 600 (O) 3 0.97167 0.00030 0.98669 0.00417
decfile 600 (O) 2 0.99159 0.05449 0.96944 0.00160
isqrt 700 (O) 9 0.93150 0.04574 0.94379 0.01030
cubic 600 (O) 0 0.96773 0.02994 0.96984 0.01343
mean AUC measure, during the fault injection point predictive models optimi-
sation process. Though, in some cases this improvement is small. In almost all
cases the standard deviation of all models is marginally decreased.
Table 8.17: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for decision tree induction with
sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 600 (O) 8 0.99538 0.00047 0.99746 0.00290
dijkstra 800 (U) 4 0.99635 0.00007 0.99815 0.00016
fft 300 (O) 9 0.99860 0.00002 0.99929 0.00013
search 300 (U) 0 0.86068 0.00452 0.92988 0.00150
insert 200 (U) 6 0.99684 0.00004 0.99840 0.00067
remove 700 (U) 7 0.99578 0.00176 0.99702 0.00046
encfile 100 (O) 2 0.99968 0.00665 0.99652 0.00004
decfile 15 (O) 0 0.97362 0.00000 0.98682 0.00000
isqrt 50 (U) 2 0.99551 0.00000 0.99775 0.00000
cubic 400 (O) 0 0.97940 0.00160 0.98890 0.00060
8.6.4 Bit-position and injection efficiency
As mentioned, the fault injection datasets are generated from fault injection
analysis that sampled random bit-positions, i.e., faults are injected randomly.
As such the injection efficiency of the generated fault injection points, to this
point, has been based on this sample. This will serve as a baseline to assess the
validity of the approach of discerning efficient variable-bit combinations for fault
8.6. CASE STUDIES 172
Table 8.18: (Triple) Injection points efficiencies for decision tree induction with
sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 500 (O) 9 0.99558 0.00047 0.99766 0.00287
dijkstra 100 (O) 4 0.99655 0.00007 0.99835 0.00016
fft 300 (O) 9 0.99880 0.00002 0.99949 0.00013
search 200 (U) 0 0.86086 0.00452 0.93007 0.00145
insert 500 (U) 6 0.99704 0.00004 0.99860 0.00065
remove 400 (U) 7 0.99598 0.00176 0.99722 0.00043
encfile 600 (O) 2 0.99988 0.00665 0.99672 0.00003
decfile 600 (O) 0 0.97382 0.00000 0.98701 0.00000
isqrt 700 (O) 2 0.99571 0.00000 0.99795 0.00000
cubic 600 (O) 0 0.97960 0.00160 0.98910 0.00059
Table 8.19: (Quadruple) Injection points efficiencies for decision tree induction
with sampling
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 500 (O) 9 0.99568 0.00047 0.99776 0.00283
dijkstra 100 (O) 4 0.99665 0.00007 0.99845 0.00011
fft 300 (O) 9 0.99890 0.00002 0.99959 0.00010
search 200 (O) 0 0.86094 0.00452 0.93016 0.00141
insert 500 (O) 6 0.99714 0.00004 0.99870 0.00030
remove 400 (O) 7 0.99608 0.00176 0.99732 0.00041
encfile 600 (O) 2 0.99998 0.00664 0.99682 0.00002
decfile 600 (O) 0 0.97392 0.00000 0.98711 0.00000
isqrt 700 (O) 2 0.99581 0.00000 0.99805 0.00000
cubic 600 (O) 0 0.97969 0.00160 0.98920 0.00055
injection. As the computation cost of performing an exhaustive bit-flipping for
more than two faults is prohibitive, the comparisons is done using single and
double faults. Thus using the the process explained in Section 8.6.1, a sec-
ond version of double-bits dataset is generated from exhaustive bit-flipping for
each case study. Following the generation of the datasets, they are processed
as explained in Sections 8.6.2-8.6.3. The results of the performance of the pre-
dictive models (baseline models) generated by the process in Section 8.6.2 are
presented in Tables 8.20-8.22, and those (optimised models) by the process in
Section 8.6.3 are shown in Tables 8.23-8.25. In this section, these new datasets,
will be referred to as exhaustive (double-bits) datasets and the double-bits used
in previous section will be called random (double-bits) datasets. Before pro-
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ceeding with the analysis of the results, the key finding of these results can be
summarised as follows:
• fault injection points predictive models generated from a subset of the bit-
positions can be as efficient as those generated from the entire bit-positions
set.
It has been observed from Tables 8.2-8.17 and Tables 8.20-8.25 that the dif-
ference in the injection efficiency of the fault injection points predictive mod-
els generated using exhaustive bit-flipping and those generated using random
bit-flipping is small. The largest difference in AUC when comparing these re-
sults is associated with datasets fft (baseline and optimised na¨ıve Bayes mod-
els), insert (baseline rule induction), dijstra (optimised rule induction), dec-
file (baseline decision tree induction) and isqrt (optimised decision tree induc-
tion). For these dataset the predictive models generated using exhaustive bit-
flipping have a mean AUC of 0.95884, 0.96619, 0.98337, 0.99188, 0.99866 and
0.99975, whilst those generated using random bit-flipping have a mean AUC
of 0.9474, 0.96429, 0.97171, 0.98990, 0.98681 and 0.99775 giving a difference
of just 0.01103, 0.00193, 0.01166, 0.00198, 0.01184 and 0.00200 in these worst
cases, for baseline na¨ıve Bayes, optimise na¨ıve Bayes, baseline rule induction,
optimise rule induction, baseline decision tree induction and optimised decision
tree induction respectively.
It should be observed also that the absolute AUC values for fault injection point
predictive models generated using only a subset of bit are consistently high, with
the maximum and minimum for baseline na¨ıve Bayes being 0.94747 and 0.89276
respectively, for optimised na¨ıve Bayes being 0.96426 and 0.92365 respectively,
for baseline rule induction being 0.97171 and 0.92252 respectively, for optimised
rule induction being 0.98990 and 0.93594 respectively, for baseline decision tree
induction being 0.99908 and 0.92888 respectively and for optimised decision
tree induction being 0.99929 and 0.92988 respectively. These consistently high
8.6. CASE STUDIES 174
Table 8.20: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with no sam-
pling using full bit set
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.87056 0.03082 0.92549 0.02706
dijkstra 0.95016 0.09877 0.93050 0.01826
fft 0.91585 0.00993 0.95884 0.03453
search 0.96249 0.11730 0.92717 0.01418
insert 0.87788 0.04927 0.91971 0.01179
remove 0.87976 0.06963 0.91022 0.03854
encfile 0.87389 0.05329 0.91565 0.03605
decfile 0.91429 0.11652 0.90347 0.03804
isqrt 0.90791 0.04379 0.93753 0.03139
cubic 0.90584 0.06550 0.92537 0.02776
Table 8.21: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for rule induction with no
sampling using full bit set
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.95966 0.01909 0.97605 0.00011
dijkstra 0.94119 0.03110 0.96067 0.00214
fft 0.93425 0.07719 0.93359 0.00025
search 0.96228 0.04991 0.96158 0.00039
insert 0.98991 0.03434 0.98337 0.00114
remove 0.97642 0.03882 0.97770 0.00044
encfile 0.95054 0.01695 0.97259 0.00558
decfile 0.99136 0.05503 0.97350 0.00016
isqrt 0.94080 0.04528 0.95321 0.00016
cubic 0.96069 0.04090 0.96585 0.00119
Table 8.22: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for decision tree induction with
no sampling using full bit set
Data Set TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 0.97085 0.00004 0.99141 0.00572
dijkstra 0.99902 0.00142 0.99583 0.00017
fft 0.99967 0.00001 0.99998 0.00012
search 0.86815 0.00009 0.94003 0.00061
insert 0.99833 0.00010 0.99508 0.00009
remove 0.99822 0.00131 0.99441 0.00123
encfile 0.99175 0.00103 0.99046 0.00011
decfile 0.98531 0.00000 0.99866 0.00000
isqrt 0.99700 0.00011 0.99870 0.00014
cubic 0.98134 0.00049 0.99642 0.00089
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AUC values, which are indicative of high true positive and low false positive
rates, serve to suggest that fault injection points generated using sample bits
can safeguard the functioning of a software system. Further, the fact that
standard deviation in AUC remains low, even unchanged in many cases, when
only random bits are used in the generation of fault injection points means that
efficient injection points can be consistently generated across separate cross
validations.
Table 8.23: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for na¨ıve Bayes with sampling
using full bit set
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 500 (O) 8 0.91013 0.00362 0.95425 0.05581
dijkstra 1000 (O) 4 0.95427 0.08112 0.93742 0.03021
fft 300 (O) 3 0.93250 0.00211 0.96619 0.17172
search 200 (O) 2 0.97387 0.05776 0.95894 0.05458
insert 500 (O) 5 0.90728 0.05805 0.92550 0.05158
remove 400 (O) 8 0.91889 0.01362 0.95361 0.04182
encfile 600 (O) 8 0.89617 0.02537 0.93635 0.05295
decfile 600 (O) 6 0.94927 0.05716 0.94694 0.06359
isqrt 600 (O) 7 0.92295 0.00475 0.96009 0.08223
cubic 500 (O) 9 0.92565 0.03134 0.94809 0.06756
Table 8.24: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for rule induction with sam-
pling using full bit set
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 700 (O) 2 0.97015 0.01929 0.97640 0.01776
dijkstra 500 (O) 6 0.99066 0.00887 0.99188 0.00908
fft 300 (O) 6 0.93170 0.05785 0.93781 0.00160
search 400 (O) 8 0.95611 0.03702 0.96047 0.04408
insert 700 (O) 3 0.96701 0.00472 0.98213 0.01162
remove 600 (O) 3 0.98657 0.01026 0.98913 0.02921
encfile 500 (O) 3 0.97167 0.00030 0.98669 0.00415
decfile 400 (O) 2 0.99159 0.05449 0.96944 0.00160
isqrt 400 (O) 9 0.93150 0.04574 0.94379 0.01026
cubic 500 (O) 10 0.96773 0.02994 0.96984 0.01337
This implies that the proposed approach remains robust when using random
bits, which is particularly important given that using datasets containing fewer
bits, in effect, reduces the amount of information available during the construc-
tion of fault injection points for multiple soft-errors. This substantiate the thesis
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Table 8.25: (Double) Injection points efficiencies for decision tree induction with
sampling using full bit set
Data Set Sampling N TPR FPR AUC SD
crc 600 (O) 8 0.99737 0.00047 0.99945 0.00283
dijkstra 800 (O) 4 0.99835 0.00007 0.99914 0.00010
fft 300 (O) 9 0.99990 0.00002 0.99999 0.00009
search 300 (O) 5 0.86240 0.00451 0.93174 0.00139
insert 200 (O) 6 0.99702 0.00004 0.99858 0.00029
remove 700 (O) 7 0.99777 0.00175 0.99901 0.00039
encfile 100 (O) 2 0.99998 0.00663 0.99851 0.00002
decfile 15 (U) - 0.97557 0.00000 0.98879 0.00000
isqrt 50 (U) - 0.99750 0.00000 0.99975 0.00000
cubic 400 (O) 2 0.98136 0.00160 0.99088 0.00053
claim that perturbing certain bits in combination of variables is as efficient as
performing an exhaustive perturbation in all variable-bit-wise combinations.
8.7 Implication and Limitation
The case studies presented have demonstrated the applicability of the proposed
approach is terms of generating predictive models for selecting efficient fault
injection points for multiple soft-errors. In particular, decision tree induction
and rule induction have, even under a baseline configuration, been shown to be
effective and consistent methods for generating predictive models for detecting
failure-inducing points which exhibit high coverage. In the case of decision tree
induction and rule induction, generated predictive models are represented as
a tree structure to be interpreted as a conjunction of disjunctions and as a
first-order predicate respectively.
Despite the presented case studies suggesting that the decision tree induction
and rule induction algorithms yield significantly more efficient fault injection
points predictive models than na¨ıve Bayes, it is not possible to conclude that
these algorithms will consistently outperform other algorithms, including na¨ıve
Bayes. As any two classification algorithms can differ only in the class boundary
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that they define, i.e., the boundary defined to classify system failure classes and
non-failures in the generation of fault injection points predictive models, it is
not possible to determine which classification algorithm will define an boundary
that is appropriate for a particular dataset. Indeed, it is current practise in data
mining approaches to classification problems to seek out an acceptable model
through the investigation of many classification algorithms.
Even though this a approach is proposed to improve and complement and the
framework propose in Chapte 7, it is not tied to the framework, this means this
approach can be applied to any fault injection datasets regardless of the method
used in selecting the target program locations. This implies that the main cost
of applying the proposed approach is associated with the execution of data
mining algorithms, which in-turn implies that the cost of generating efficient
fault injection points using the approach is related to dataset magnitude, the
data mining algorithm applied and the comprehensiveness of the optimisation
undertaken, i.e., the number of algorithm configurations that are considered in
model optimisation. It was shown in the cases studies presented in Section 8.6.2
that using only a baseline configuration of several data mining algorithms can
yield highly-efficient failure-inducing injection points and that systematically
varying the level of sampling applied to datasets, can allow the efficiency of
those injection points to be consistently improved, often to levels that would
make them applicable in the validation of dependable software systems. Further,
as with any approach that uses fault injection data, the efficacy of the proposed
model is constrained by the assumed fault model and input set used in the fault
inject analysis the data is derived from.
8.8 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter an approach to systematically reduce fault space for multiple soft-
errors injections has been proposed. The intuition of the proposed approach is
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that, given a set of target program locations at which multiple bit-flip faults will
be injected, data mining methods can be applied to fault injection datasets to
identify efficient set of bit-positions that will induce as much system failures as if
the entire bit-position fault space has been used. Following its descriptions, the
proposed approach was applied to ten embedded software modules, for each of
these modules, fault injection points for multiple target locations was generated
and their efficiency evaluated. The results demonstrated that the proposed
approach can be effectively used to identify a number of bits to flip from a set
of target program variables, that will cause almost the same amount of system
failure if the entire bits space is considered, i.e., the injection points exhibit high
coverage.
CHAPTER 9
Conclusions
To this point, this thesis presents research, analysis and discussions to substan-
tiate the thesis statement:
“There exists a computational feasible bits to explore un-
der multiple bit-flip faults that will induce a wider failure
profile.”
In this chapter a summary of these research contributions and a discussion of
future work relating to the exponential multiple fault space problem is provided
as a conclusion to this thesis. In particular, the research contributions made
throughout Chapters 5-8 are summarised with respect to the stated thesis.
9.1 Research Contribution Summary
In support of the stated thesis, the following specific contributions were made
to the selection of efficient fault injection points for multiple soft-errors, more
detailed account can be found in the respective chapters as indicated.
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9.1.1 Complexity Analysis and Formalisation of ILS and
TVS Problem
To circumvent around the exponential size of the fault space for multiple soft-
errors, Chapter 5 analysis the the complexity of the following sub-problems:
(i) choosing the locations in which faults can be injected and (ii) choosing the
variables in which faults will be injected. Each problem is formally defined
as an NP-problem and two known NP-complete problems, MVC and MDC,
respectively, were reduced to the former and latter sub-problems to prove their
NP-completeness respectively.
9.1.2 Double Single Bit-Flips Fault Model
In Chapter 6, a novel fault model representative of emerging hardware faults due
to technology advances is proposed. The chapter investigated the impact of such
fault once translated into soft errors. The model extend the traditional model
of simple faults to double faults in combination of two locations. The usability
of the proposed model for software dependability validation is evaluated using
fault injection analysis. The results show that the proposed model induces a
different failure profile compared with that caused by single fault model and an
existing variant double fault model.
9.1.3 Heuristics for the Injection Locations and Target
Variables Selection
Chapter 7 presents a framework for selection of efficient fault injection loca-
tions (in terms of potential injection location and target variable) in a program.
The approach takes account of relationships between block locations, program
variables and program states. The selection is done by applying static analysis
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and graph theory concepts on the software byte code, to first, discern potential
injection location and then to determine the most suitable combination of vari-
ables to target within these locations. The framework provided a systematic
approach for the selection component of the LnCm fault model. Furthermore,
the research evaluated the approach and validity of the LnCm fault model on
several case studies.
9.1.4 Efficient Bit Locations
In Chapter 8, a systematic approach for the selection of efficient fault injection
points for multiple soft-errors is proposed, based on the application of data
mining approaches to datasets generated from fault injection analysis. This is
done in order to refine the exponential size of the fault injection points space
(in terms of variables and bits combinations). The results demonstrate that
a subset of bits within a set of given locations can achieve similar injection
efficiency to that of the entire bits set. This results serve to substantiate the
thesis which this research is based on.
9.2 Applications
The work presented in this thesis can be used by system developers and en-
gineers for the development and validation of software-implemented hardware
fault tolerance techniques (SIHFT). For instance it can be used to aid the design
and evaluation of detectors for multiple soft-errors. The research can be used by
individuals and organisations for experimental benchmarking of the error sensi-
tivity of software components. Such benchmarking experiments is done in order
to measure the likelihood that the executable code of a software component
exhibit silent data corruptions (SDCs) for hardware errors that propagate to
ISA registers and main memory locations. The purpose of such measurements
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is to identify weaknesses in the executable code, and thereby finding ways of
hardening the code against hardware errors by means of SIHFT.
9.3 Future Work
The selection of efficient fault injection locations for multiple soft-errors remains
a key challenge in the development of fault tolerant software systems, partic-
ularly in the content of real-world, embedded software systems. In fact, there
is scarcity of research investigating systematic approaches in selecting injection
points for multiple fault injections. Despite the progress made by the work
presented in this thesis, there are many areas for future work relating to the
problem of multiple soft-errors injections. Fews areas for future research relating
to the work presented in this thesis are summarised as follows:
• Typical to embedded systems, programs goes though different iterations
as they execute. This produces a dominator graph instead of a dominator
tree. Capturing this structure is important, if the notion of amplification
is to effectively encapsulated for such systems. As mentioned in previous
chapters, this thesis, have not specifically address the problem of handling
looping structures in program. Since the approach for selecting potential
locations is based on a dominator tree, then there is no cycle in such a
structure, meaning that the heuristic will terminate with a set of poten-
tial injection locations. Given that the heuristic for selecting variables is
also obtained from the dominator tree and that there are no loops in the
resulting dependency graph, then the heuristic will terminate properly as
well. Thus future work will look into the design amplification metric to
decide when to inject and when not to inject faults through the different
iterations of a programs execution especially for embedded control systems
in order to enhance the applicability of the framework presented in this
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thesis. To Further enhance the effectiveness of the approach presented in
Chapters 5-8, comparative studies with different compiler optimisations,
hardware platforms, and different programming languages may be con-
sidered. Another important part of this work is to extend the study with
experiments on target programs that are equipped with SIHFT techniques
will be conducted.
• There are software that cannot be modelled as a control flow graph, such
as operating systems and device drivers [163]. Since applications running
on such systems make system calls to execute, we believe that such calls
can be abstracted in an inter-procedural CFG. However, the notion of
dominance and dominating graph to select best parameters (in a system
call) as target variables may not be suited to such environments. This is
an area considered for future research.
• The work indicates there are intuitions that can guide the selection of
bit-positions. As future work, such intuitions for bits-selection, will be
investigates, analysed, documented and developed.
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